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101.
Market Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that banks incentives for risk taking are invariant to a change in the banking market structure from duopoly to monopoly. Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the gains from bank competition when banks use asset quality as a strategic instrument.revised version received October 15, 2003 相似文献
102.
The paper demonstrates how various parametric models for duration data such as the exponential, Weibull, and log-normal may be embedded in a single framework, and how such competing models may be assessed relative to a more comprehensive one. To illustrate the issues addressed, the survival patterns of marriages among 1203 Swedish men born 1936–1964 are studied by parametric and non-parametric survival methods. In particular, we study the sensitivity of model-choice with respect to level of aggregation of the time variable; and of covariate-effects with respect to the model chosen. In accordance with previous works our empirical results indicate that the choice of a parametric model for the duration variable is affected by the level of time aggregation. In contrast to previous results, however, our analysis shows that estimates of covariate effects are not always robust to distributional assumptions for the duration variable. 相似文献
103.
104.
Three main objectives are pursued in this paper. First, we intend to analyze the aggregation problem of directional distance functions from a constructive viewpoint. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the structural properties of the production technology and of the nature of groups of firms. Indeed, exact additive aggregation holds for a linear technology and for a direction solely defined in the output space. Second, since these conditions are somewhat restrictive, we are interested in providing a measure for the aggregation bias through the relationship between industrial and structural technical efficiency. Finally, we show that this aggregation bias is a lower bound for industrial allocative efficiency. 相似文献
105.
106.
From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51 相似文献
107.
Jeffrey?P.?CarpenterEmail author Peter?Hans?Matthews Okomboli?Ong’ong’a 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2004,14(4):407-429
Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification:
C91, C92, D64, H41
Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953). 相似文献
108.
Synopsis Classification is an important activity that facilitates theory development in many academic disciplines. Scholars in fields
such as organizational science, management science and economics and have long recognized that classification offers an approach
for ordering and understanding the diversity of organizational taxa (groups of one or more similar organizational entities).
However, even the most prominent organizational classifications have limited utility, as they tend to be shaped by a specific
research bias, inadequate units of analysis and a standard neoclassical economic view that does not naturally accommodate
the disequilibrium dynamics of modern competition. The result is a relatively large number of individual and unconnected organizational
classifications, which tend to ignore the processes of change responsible for organizational diversity. Collectively they
fail to provide any sort of universal system for ordering, compiling and presenting knowledge on organizational diversity.
This paper has two purposes. First, it reviews the general status of the major theoretical approaches to biological and organizational
classification and compares the methods and resulting classifications derived from each approach. Definitions of key terms
and a discussion on the three principal schools of biological classification (evolutionary systematics, phenetics and cladistics)
are included in this review. Second, this paper aims to encourage critical thinking and debate about the use of the cladistic
classification approach for inferring and representing the historical relationships underpinning organizational diversity.
This involves examining the feasibility of applying the logic of common ancestry to populations of organizations. Consequently,
this paper is exploratory and preparatory in style, with illustrations and assertions concerning the study and classification
of organizational diversity. 相似文献
109.
Daniel?W.?MccollumEmail author Kevin?J.?Boyle 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2005,30(1):23-33
Tests of convergent validity and procedural invariance were used to investigate whether individuals lacking direct experience with a commodity can provide valid responses to contingent-valuation questions eliciting ex post use values. Convergent validity between samples with and without experience was shown to hold for dichotomous-choice responses, but not for open-ended responses. 相似文献
110.
Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions. 相似文献