Strategische Kommunikationsspiele

The main question of this paper is how actors in strategic communication constellations deal with seemingly hopeless situations. The thesis presented here is that actors in such situations make a strategic communication play. Basically, this facilitates the continuation of communication. The concept of strategic communication plays is developed theoretically in this paper. It is shown that strategic communication plays come across in direct interpersonal communication as well as in mass medial mediated communication. In the communication-sociological approach, it is used as the theoretical basis of a difference theory and paradoxical term of play based on Bateson (1956, 1985), embedded in the frame analysis of Goffmann (1980). On this basis, two functions of strategic communication plays are worked out. On the one hand, it is an extension of freedom of action and on the other hand increases the probability of sympathy and credibility attributions through self-thematization.     

Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?

When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest, using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough profit levels.

The deregulation of international trucking in the European Union: form and effect

We describe the regulatory regime under which international trucking operated in Western Europe until the mid-1980s, the deregulatory process that followed, and the effect of this deregulation. We find that deregulation had a large positive effect on the growth of international trucking. We also find that shippers shifted toward more outsourcing of their trucking needs, but this occurred to an even greater extent in local and national road transport. We conclude that other factors beside the deregulation of international trucking affected the organization of the industry at the time. Finally, despite concerns voiced by member countries, we find no evidence that deregulation disproportionately favored carriers of countries that were initially more (or less) involved in international trucking, nor that it has favored low-wage countries.      

Business Cycle Synchronization in the EMU: Core vs. Periphery

This paper examines business cycle synchronization in the European Monetary Union with a special focus on the core-periphery pattern in the aftermath of the crisis. Using a quarterly index for business cycle synchronization by Cerqueira (Int Econ Econ Policy 10(3):349–363, 2013), our panel data estimates suggest that it is countries belonging to the core that are faced with increased synchronization among themselves after 2007Q4, whereas peripheral countries decreased synchronization with regards to the core, non-EMU countries and among themselves. Correlation coefficients and nonparametric local polynomial regressions corroborate these findings. The usual focus on co-movements and correlations might be misleading, however, since we also find large differences in the amplitude of national cycles. A strong common cycle can thus lead to large differences in cyclical positions even if national cycles are strongly correlated.