Recursive methods for incentive problems

Many dynamic incentive problems have a primal recursive formulation in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate dual recursive formulations with these problems. We make transparent the connections between recursive primal and dual approaches, relate value iteration under each and give conditions for such value iteration to be convergent to the true value function.     

Optimal simple rules and the lower bound on the nominal interest rate in the Christiano–Eichenbaum–Evans model of the US business cycle

Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (NBER wp 10724, 2004b) analyzes the optimal, simple and implementable monetary policy rules in a medium-scale macromodel, as the one proposed by Christiano et al. (J Polit Econ 113:1–45, 2005). In doing so, they use a sensible, but somewhat arbitrary constraint to account for the lower bound condition on the nominal interest rate. In this work, we check the robustness of their main results to such a criteria. We find that the optimal policies are actually absolutely robust to the easing of this criterion for all the different cases considered.

Modelling choice and switching behaviour between Scottish ski centres

The paper identifies the need to model the skier's choice of centre and the basic ideas underlying discrete choice models and their estimation. It then identifies data requirements and sources, the final choice of specification and the estimated parameters of the resultant nested multinomial logit model. The results indicate two quite distinct markets. For day-trippers snow cover, cost, and, to a lesser extent, the journey length, were the critical factors. For those staying overnight the key determinant in this market seems to be accommodation. Interestingly centres which for the day-tripper are competitors, become, for the overnight customer, complementary.     

Mark-ups, economies of scale and the role of knowledge spillovers in OECD industries

Using R&D-based models of economic growth as a foundation, this paper argues that market-driven knowledge creation is necessarily linked as an engine of productivity growth to economies of scale and market-power. A cost function and factor demand model is applied to a cross-country industry data set to study market-power, economies of scale and the role of knowledge in an integrated approach. Empirical results reveal the presence of market-power and economies of scale in all of the industries investigated. R&D and spillovers explain some of the productivity growth observed. Spillovers are identified as an external source of economies of scale.     

Family ownership and environmental performance: The mediation effect of human resource practices

Previous literature has found that listed family firms underperform their nonfamily counterparts in terms of environmental performance, but has not explained why this occurs. We address this research gap by hypothesizing that training and development practices (i.e., managerial practices devoted to providing training and development for the workforce) mediate the relationship between family blockholders and environmental performance. Using a sample of 33,901 firm‐year observations from 2002 to 2016 distributed across 56 countries and employing the structural equation model technique, we find that investment in training and development practices explains almost half of the negative relationship between family blockholders and environmental performance. Our study contributes to the agency theory debate on principal–principal problems by explaining why family blockholders could damage other blockholders and minority shareholders.     

Supply side inflation persistence

We explore the role of the cost channel in accounting for inflation persistence in the New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing. Hump-shaped responses of inflation to monetary shocks are obtained under purely nominal rigidities.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION IN AWARDING PUBLIC CONTRACTS

ABSTRACT * :  The main economic literature emphasizes that the efficiency of the awarding procedure depends on the contractual rules, especially those regarding firm's remuneration. In this work we show the existence of a reverse link: when the enforcement of contractual terms is imperfect, the rules of the awarding mechanism can help to improve the efficiency of the contractual relationship. In some circumstances, awarding rules based only on bids are not able to deal with the problem of opportunistic behaviour during the execution of the contract. Our model points out that the public administration can incentivize the contractor's fairness by considering not only competitors' bids, but also their different reputation.     

Academic entrepreneurship

This paper proposes a model of the choice to commercialize research, of the amount and type of pre‐commercial research to perform, and of the timing of commercialization by an academic scientist, and analyzes the returns and costs of these choices. The behavior and performance of the academic scientist is compared with that of an industrial researcher. Unlike the industrial researcher, the academic scientist receives direct benefit from performing research, e.g. in the form of publication and peer recognition. However, the type of research that is more effective in reducing commercialization costs may not be the one generating the highest scientific benefit. It is shown that, while in some cases the academic scientist is more reluctant to commercialize research, in other cases she may commercialize faster than a solely profit‐seeking agent would—and perform less research. Academic and non‐academic scientists also select different projects, and this may explain the good performance of academic entrepreneurs found in several empirical studies. The model offers a unified framework to interpret the mixed evidence on the success of, and the arguments in favor and against, the involvement of universities into commercial activities. Managerial and public policy implications are also examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.