Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?

Conditions under which endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation entail wealth-stratification are examined in a model where unequally wealthy households with identical preferences form jurisdictions in order to produce a public good financed by proportional taxation. We define a stable jurisdiction structure to be a partition of the households into jurisdictions that is immune to individual deviations. We define a jurisdiction structure to be wealth-stratified when each jurisdiction is composed of households who form an interval with respect to the ordering of their wealth. We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the stratification of any stable jurisdiction structure is for the individual preferences for the public and the private good to exhibit a relation of gross substitutability/complementarity between the public good and the private good that is independent from prices and wealth.     

Market access and the other determinants of North–South manufacturing location choice: An application to the Euro-Mediterranean area

This paper examines the impact of market and supply accessibility on the geographic distribution of manufacturing sectors in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The evolution of market and supplier access in the area is first investigated. Then, market and supplier access, production cost and regional integration are focused on as the main determinants of industrial location. A deeper regional integration agreements can act as an important dispersion force, driving the location of manufacturing in new member states and Mediterranean countries.     

SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES IN GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO THE OVERBIDDING PUZZLE*

This article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games. We conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first‐price auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction, and indeed overbid. When provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions, subjects learn to make better predictions, and to curb significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding, and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed.     

Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making

This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The first procedure composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements. The second procedure first selects the set of maximal elements of the first binary relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the Mth binary relation. We show several distinct sets of conditions for the choice functions representing these two procedures to satisfy non-emptiness and choice-consistency conditions such as contraction consistency and path independence. We also examine the relationships between the outcomes of the two procedures. Finally we investigate under what conditions the outcomes of each procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic application of the criteria.     

Militant and moderate trade union orientations: what are the effects on workplace trade unionism,union-management relations and employee gains?

This paper presents survey findings exploring the claim that trade union militancy will deliver more advantages for unions than moderation (Kelly, 1996). Responses from representatives in two unions reveal militancy is associated with stronger union workplace activity and greater engagement with management in solving operational problems and long-term business strategies. However, there was no evidence that militancy significantly affects many terms and conditions. Moderate trade unionists in this sample were no more likely to hold a unitarist frame of reference. A further factor analysis of the militancy-moderation scale revealed two separate dimensions of militancy - a 'bargaining' and a 'mobilizing' approach. Although finding some expected benefits linked with militancy, different benefits appear to be associated with a bargaining approach and a mobilizing approach. It is suggested the approach taken in collective bargaining may be at least as important as mobilizing union members in securing gains from a militant union strategy.     

Tacit Collusion in a One‐Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints

This paper analyzes price competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two‐stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short‐term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game, that is, the unique payoff‐dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on price competition and that of the convex cost function.     

Pairs trading: does volatility timing matter?

Pairs trading is a dollar-neutral trading strategy. Using the components of two major stock indices, the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225, this article deals with the performance of a pairs trading system based on various pairs selection methods (distance, stationarity, cointegration) over a 10-year period. On both markets, using a classical framework, cointegration appears superior and effective. On the U.S. market and also in Japan to a lower extent, pairs trading strategies exhibited an impressive performance during the 2008 financial crisis. Bearish periods are associated with a high level of the VIX index: the ‘investor fear gauge’. Using a modified trading system, this article examines the link between pairs trading performance and volatility/VIX timing. It is shown that for the best selection technique (cointegration), timing volatility has no economic value in a pairs trading context.     

The versatile role of sustainable market entrepreneurs in market transformation: An intervention framework for institutional change

This article investigates in which way sustainable entrepreneurship can generate institutional change that transforms markets towards sustainability. A transformation of models of economic organization and market structures through sustainable entrepreneurship fosters the path towards sustainability. Institutional change involves sustainable market entrepreneurs as institutional entrepreneurs that operate in an effectual manner in different market transformation phases. Sustainable market entrepreneurs while seeking entrepreneurial opportunities simultaneously shape existing market structures and market conditions in different sustainable market transformation phases thereby creating new opportunities. Accordingly, a framework that explains institutional change prompted by sustainable market entrepreneurs in market transformation phases is developed. In this framework, various interventions which encourage sustainable market entrepreneurs to co-create with the stakeholders of their choice are strategized. The provided framework enhances the understanding of the versatile role of sustainable market entrepreneurs and potentially the leverage of their actions towards institutional impact over time.     

Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms

We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.     

INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES VS. INEQUALITY OF OUTCOMES: ARE WESTERN SOCIETIES ALL ALIKE?

This paper analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities for income acquisition in nine developed countries during the 1990s. Equality of opportunity is defined as the situation where income distributions conditional on social origin cannot be ranked according to stochastic dominance criteria. We measure social origin by parental education and occupation and use the database built by Roemer et al. (2003 ). Stochastic dominance is assessed using nonparametric statistical tests. Our results indicate strong disparities in the degree of equality of opportunity across countries and a strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. The U.S. and Italy show up as the most unequal countries in terms of both outcome and opportunity. At the opposite extreme, income distributions conditional on social origin are almost the same in Scandinavian countries even before any redistributive policy. We complement the ordinal comparison by resorting to an original scalar “Gini” index of opportunities, which can be decomposed into a risk and a return component. In our sample, inequality of opportunity is mostly driven by differences in mean income conditional on social origin, and differences in risk compensate the return element in most countries.