Weak dependence, models and some applications

The paper is devoted to recall weak dependence conditions from Dedecker et al. (Weak dependence, examples and applications. Lecture Notes in Statistics, vol 190, 2007)’s monograph; the main basic results are recalled here and we go further in some new applications. We develop here several models of weakly dependent processes and random fields. Among them an ARCH(∞) model is considered with statistical applications to ordinary least squares. A last part aims at proving new asymptotic results for weakly dependent random fields. Such applications are indeed the main proof of the interest of this theoretical notion which measures the asymptotic decorrelation of a process.     

State prices,liquidity, and default

We show, in a monetary exchange economy, that asset prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank, through its effect on default and interest rates. Two agents trade goods and nominal assets to smooth consumption across periods and future states, in the presence of cash-in-advance financing costs that have effects on real allocations. We show that higher spot interest rates reduce trade and as a result increase state prices. Hence, states of nature with higher interest rates are also states of nature with higher risk-neutral probabilities. This result, which cannot be found in a Lucas-type representative agent model, implies that the yield curve is upward sloping in equilibrium, even when short-term interest rates are fairly stable and the variance of the (macroeconomic) stochastic discount factor is 0. The risk-premium in the term structure is, therefore, a monetary-cost risk premium.     

Economic and Non-economic Satisfaction as Outcomes of Micro-enterprises’ Perceived Value from Banking Relationships

ABSTRACT

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to position economic and non-economic satisfaction as outcomes of micro-enterprises’ perception of value, and to determine the antecedents of perceived value within the business banking industry.     

Speculative pressure

The paper investigates the information content of speculative pressure across futures classes. Long-short portfolios of futures contracts sorted by speculative pressure capture a significant premium in commodity, currency, and equity markets but not in fixed income markets. Exposure to commodity, currency, and equity index futures’ speculative pressure is priced in the broad cross-section after controlling for momentum, carry, global liquidity, and volatility risks. The findings are confirmed by robustness tests using alternative speculative pressure signals, portfolio construction techniques, and subperiods interalia. We argue that there is an efficient hedgers-speculators risk transfer in commodity, currency, and equity index futures markets.     

So you want to delight your customers: The perils of ignoring heterogeneity in customer evaluations of discretionary preferential treatments

Many firms assume that customers like to feel special and to receive discretionary preferential treatments (DPT). This research argues that the reality is more complicated: the same preferential treatment may delight one customer but enrage or embarrass another. To help companies align their DPT with their customers' preferences, this article identifies four dimensions along which consumers positively or negatively evaluate DPT: justification, imposition, visibility, and surprise. This article then introduces customer heterogeneity in the form of two individual traits that moderate DPT evaluations. Through two studies, the article shows that distinction seekers prefer visible rewards that impose on other customers, but negotiators prefer unjustified, non-surprising privileges. Finally, by tying consumer preferences to two readily available variables (age and gender), this article concludes with a set of practical guidelines for the companies that hope to align their DPT strategy with customer profiles.     

Crowdfunding models: Keep-It-All vs. All-Or-Nothing

Reward-based crowdfunding campaigns are commonly offered in one of two models via fundraising goals set by an entrepreneur: “Keep-It-All” (KIA), where the entrepreneur keeps the entire amount raised regardless of achieving the goal, and “All-Or-Nothing” (AON), where the entrepreneur keeps nothing unless the goal is achieved. We hypothesize that AON forces the entrepreneur to bear greater risk and encourages crowdfunders to pledge more capital enabling entrepreneurs to set larger goals. We further hypothesize that AON is a costly signal of commitment for entrepreneurs yielding a separate equilibrium with higher quality and more innovative projects with greater success rates. Empirical tests support both hypotheses.     

Insurance Guaranty Schemes in a Contingent Claims Setting

The introduction of an insurance guaranty scheme can have significant influence on the pricing and capital structures in a competitive market. This contribution summarizes the major findings of a working paper written by Schmeiser and Wagner (Working Papers on Risk Management and Insurance (IVW-HSG), No. 80, 2010). The effect on competitive equity-premium combinations is studied while considering a framework with policyholders and equity holders where guaranty fund charges are volume-based, as levied in existing schemes. Several settings with regard to the origin of the fund contributions are assessed and the immediate effects on the incentives of the policyholders and equity holders are analyzed through a one-period contingent claim approach. One result is that introducing a guaranty scheme in a market with competitive conditions entails a shift of equity capital towards minimum solvency requirements. Hence adverse incentives may arise with regard to the overall security level of the industry.     

Insurance guaranty fund—what good is it?

In this paper, we analyze under which conditions a self-supporting insurance guaranty fund can be beneficial for the policyholders in an incomplete market. Within the analyzed setting, we find out that in general, if existent, the potential advantages from its introduction cannot be fairly divided among the participating insurers. Thereby, we have to expect systematic wealth transfers between the policyholders of different insurance companies. We introduce a framework for utility-based fund charges as a solution to this problem.