Mix-Up: Models of Governance and Framing Opportunities in U.S. and EU Consumer Policy

Students of comparative politics have highlighted different styles of regulation in the U.S. and Europe. These differences also apply to consumer policy and its different models of governance. The paper holds that governance is a key variable but adds aspects of issue framing. Two examples of consumer policy are analysed: regulation of genetically modified organisms and tobacco control. The case studies show that features of governance such as adversarial legalism or the precautionary principle are not necessarily linked to distinctive styles of regulation. Instead they vary across policy fields. Only a mix of governance elements and framing opportunities for interest groups can explain output and new directions of consumer policy. Dilemmas of collective action appear to be shrinking for consumers because framing trumps mobilization of members.     

Regional rigidities in the process of economic structural development

This paper outlines a framework for a vintage type analysis of structural change in production systems. By focusing on the existing industrial establishments in a region, rigidities are described with regard to (i) production techniques and input requirements, (ii) the semi-fixed location of the labour force and its specific set of production skills, (iii) the existing patterns of intersectoral deliveries. A scenario technique, utilizing programming models, is suggested as a method to study the effects on structural change of such rigidities.     

Empirical bias in intraday volatility measures

Intraday volatility measures have recently become the norm in risk measurement and forecasting. This article empirically investigates the unbiasedness of three of these measures over four different datasets. We find that the three measures are significantly biased and that the bias can have either sign.     

Correction to: Conservative solutions for progress: on solution types when combining QCA with in‑depth Process‑Tracing

Quality & Quantity -     

In which financial markets do mutual fund theorems hold true?

The mutual fund theorem (MFT) is considered in a general semimartingale financial market S with a finite time horizon T, where agents maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. The main results are:

On a generalization of a class of production functions

In Appl. Econ. Lett. 18 (2011), 1777–1784, as a natural generalization of some famous production models with two inputs, C.A. Ioan and G. Ioan introduced a new class of production functions with constant return to scale, called sum production function, and proved three theorems of characterization for such production models. In this article, we give new and more simple proofs of these theorems, extending also the results to the case of increased/decreased return to scale. The generalization to the case of an arbitrary number of inputs is also discussed.     

Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania

After the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favourable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop as perhaps expected. This article explores the factors that determine the formation of the intention of Romanian vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so called producer groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, which we model with a structural equation model. We identified as main intention drivers the expectation for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor. The level of distrust is high. Although our trust variable is not significant as a predictor of the intention to cooperate in the model, we find qualitative indications that trust plays a role when the intention is translated into actual behaviour.     

Dominated choices in a simple game with large stakes

This paper examines data from the Norwegian television game show Joker, where contestants make well-specified choices under risk. The game involves very large stakes, randomly drawn contestants, and ample opportunities for learning. Central models of risk choice, including expected utility theory, give a simple prediction of choice under weak conditions, as one decision is always first-order stochastically dominating. We document frequent, systematic and costly violations of dominance. Many contestants appear to have a systematic expectation bias that can be related to Tversky and Kahneman’s (Cogn. Psychol. 5(2):207–232, 1973) “availability heuristic”. In addition, contestants seem to make systematic calculation errors that are well captured by the so-called Fechner model.