Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives,returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micro-modeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.     

On a Variation in the Economic Performance of Migrants by their Home Country’s Wage

Although the economic performance of migrants in the receiving country undoubtedly depends on qualifications, it is also affected by inclinations. Given the probability of return migration, a behavioural link is established between the incentive of migrants to save in their country of destination and the prevailing wage rate in their home country. It is shown that migrants coming from a low‐wage country optimally save more than migrants from a high‐wage country. Policy and research implications suggested by this savings behaviour are alluded to.     

Applying a non parametric methodology to the study of corporate reputation

This study applies nonparametric methodologies to the study of corporate reputation. The study examines the reputation of the five leading Israeli banks in the aftermath of a major crisis in the industry, and compares it with the reputation of the five major insurance firms in the country across seven reputation attributes which are then correlated with “hard” measures, including corporate performance. While promotional investment was identified as the major reputation determinant in both industries, performance and size were found to be major codeterminants in the banks, while age and growth were the major co-determinants among the insurance firms. A negative relationship has been identified between performance and prestige.     

The effect of ASU 2014–08 on the use of discontinued operations to manage earnings

Review of Accounting Studies - Accounting regulations require firms to separately disclose the profits and losses from discontinued operations. These discontinued operations are typically excluded...