Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

Payout policy,financial flexibility,and agency costs of free cash flow

This paper explains how firms choose between dividends and open-market repurchase programs, the prevailing method that firms use to disburse cash today. While earlier theories about payout policy are motivated by signaling, the motivation for payout in this paper is to prevent the waste of free cash by self-interested insiders. In the model, dividends prevent free cash waste by forcing cash out, but result in underinvestment if the cash paid out is later needed for operations. Open-market programs stimulate payout by providing personal gains to informed insiders that are associated with the firm's repurchase trade. Yet, they also avoid the underinvestment problem by leaving insiders the option to cancel the payout. Because their execution is optional, however, open-market programs only partially prevent the waste of free cash. The model provides testable predictions that are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: Comment

We take issue with the reasoning of Coniglio et al. ( 2009 ) that whereas better‐skilled illegal migrants will prefer to return‐migrate, lower‐skilled illegal migrants will not. We argue that under asymmetric information, all the illegal migrants are initially paid a wage based on the average productivity of the group of illegal migrants. The better‐skilled illegal migrants thus face two “taxes:” being paid less than if they were legal, and being averaged down. Therefore, better‐skilled illegal migrants can be expected to expend more effort to become legal than lower‐skilled illegal migrants. And once legalized, there is no reason for the better‐skilled illegal migrants to want to return to their country of origin more than the lower‐skilled illegal migrants. Thus, it is the lower‐skilled illegal migrants that are likely to dominate the return migration flow. We argue that in other respects too, the model of Coniglio et al. is not based on reasonable assumptions, and that even under the postulated assumptions, the model suffers from several inconsistencies. In particular, when the rate of return to savings is an increasing function of skill level, we would expect there to be few better‐skilled individuals among illegal migrants in the first place. Also, an obvious distinction between savers and borrowers is ignored.     

The Prospect of Migration,Sticky Wages,and “Educated Unemployment”

An increase in the probability of work abroad, where the returns to schooling are higher than at home, induces more individuals in a developing country to acquire education, which leads to an increase in the supply of educated workers in the domestic labor market. Where there is a sticky wage rate, the demand for labor at home will be constant. With a rising supply and constant demand, the rate of unemployment of educated workers in the domestic labor market will increase. Thus, the prospect of employment abroad causes involuntary “educated unemployment” at home. A government that is concerned about “educated unemployment” and might therefore be expected to encourage unemployed educated people to migrate will nevertheless, under certain conditions, elect to restrict the extent of the migration of educated individuals.     

Optimal execution of open-market stock repurchase programs

This paper formalizes the following intuition about open-market share repurchases. Firms do open-market share repurchases to return free cash, which would otherwise be wasted. However, when the firm goes to buy its own shares with this cash, it has inside information and hence the actual execution is characterized by adverse selection. The market knows that the firm has inside information, and consequently the ask price is high to compensate for this adverse selection problem. This implies that, all else equal, the greater the adverse selection problem compared to the cash waste problem, the higher the ask price, and, therefore, the wider the bid–ask spread and the lower the share repurchase completion rate. We test this implication on a sample of U.S. firms and report evidence consistent with the model.     

Mediale Geschlechterstereotype

News represent gender in a manner that continues the process of the symbolic, social, and cultural construction of gender. In Western countries, masculinity and femininity have traditionally been conceptualized as being polar opposites. Although this dichotomous conception still influences all areas of life, nowadays masculinity and femininity are represented in mass media in a more multifaceted way—despite some stable patterns of construction. Moreover, national cultures differ with respect to single attributes of masculinity and femininity as well as to the degree of stereotyping. To identify national differences as well as transculturally shared patterns of gender stereotypes, we analysed gender representations in three countries: Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. In order to gain representative results, a quantitative content analysis was conducted. The study tries to approach gender representations in an innovative way—not only by considering different national cultures and different types of newspapers, but also by avoiding, due to theoretical considerations of deconstruction, to measure gender attributes in dichotomized form. All in all, the results are ambiguous. On the one hand, gender representation is still in line with traditional gender stereotypes—even in times when role models actually change. On the other hand, some aspects depicted new patterns in press coverage and more multifaceted gender representations. To explain these differences, studies should investigate journalistic patterns of selection regarding gender representations, in particular in a comparative longitudinal perspective.     

Efficient agglomeration of spatial clubs

We investigate here the agglomeration of spatial clubs in an efficient allocation of a club economy. The literature on agglomeration has focused largely on a primary agglomeration caused by direct attraction forces. We concentrate mainly on secondary and tertiary agglomerations caused by a primary agglomeration. Initially, scale economies in the provision of club goods (CGs) lead each CG to agglomerate in facilities of its club. This primary agglomeration causes a secondary concentration of population around these facilities, which in turn brings about a tertiary agglomeration of facilities of different clubs into centers in the midst of population concentration. The agglomeration of facilities occurs only if a secondary concentration of population takes place. We analyze in detail two specific patterns of agglomeration. One is the central location pattern in which the facilities of all clubs agglomerate perfectly in the middle of the complex. The second is a triple-centered complex in which the center in the middle of the complex consists of perfectly agglomerated facilities of different clubs, each with a single facility per complex. The remaining two centers also consist of facilities of different clubs, but clubs in these centers each have two facilities per complex, one in each center. Each of these two centers is located between a boundary and the middle of the complex closer to the middle of the complex than to the boundary. The facilities in these two centers form condensed clusters of facilities that may contain residential land in between the facilities. We then show that these agglomeration patterns also characterize agglomerations in general. The literature maintains that an efficiently behaving municipality increases its tax-base. This implies that it is in the municipality’s interest to achieve efficiency. The best way for a local government to achieve this desired efficiency is by partially intervening in market operations in order to internalize local externalities. Such an intervention should be limited to providing the city’s infrastructure, to taxing only residential land rents and clubs’ profits, to subsidizing the basic industry of the city, and to partially regulating land uses. Consequently, if the local governments of all complexes behave according to the above, the decentralization of the efficient allocation of the club economy would be attained.     

The probability of return migration,migrants' work effort,and migrants' performance

"This paper demonstrates that differences in earnings between migrants and the native population may reflect differences in incentives rather than differences in characteristics. The analysis indicates that in the presence of a positive probability of return migration, migrants' work effort is higher than that of comparable native-born workers. This differential may explain why, even if all workers are perfectly homogeneous in skills, migrants often outperform the native-born workers in the receiving economy."     

A brain gain with a brain drain

"We study human capital depletion and formation in an economy open to out-migration, as opposed to an economy which is closed. Under the assumption of asymmetric information, the enlarged opportunities and the associated different structure of incentives can give rise to a brain gain in conjunction with a brain drain. Migration by high-skill members of its workforce notwithstanding, the home country can end up with a higher average level of human capital per worker."     

Death of the “organization man”: Temporal relations in strategic alliances

Environment is shifting the power balance between the organization and its members, providing the individual with the power to bargain with the organization. The present article explores the sources and consequences of this change for the individuals who are members of strategic alliances as well as for the organizations they are affiliated with. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.