What's the matter with business ethics?

The more business ethics secures its status in campuses across the country, the more bewildering it appears to actual managers. It's not that managers dislike the idea of doing the right thing. As University of Toronto Assistant Professor Andrew Stark argues, far too many business ethicists just haven't offered them the practical advice they need. Before business ethics became a formal discipline, advocates of corporate social responsibility claimed that the market would ultimately reward ethical behavior. But ethics and interests did not always intersect so fruitfully in the real world. And when they did not, managers were left in the dark to grope for the right ethical course. In the 1970s, the brand-new field of business ethics came onto the scene to address this issue. Critical of the "ethics pays" approach, academics held that ethics and interests can and do conflict. Still, scholars took an equally unrealistic line. To them, a manager's motivation could be either altruistic or self-interested, but never both. In short, ethicists still weren't addressing the difficult moral dilemmas that managers face on a day-to-day basis, and only recently have they begun to do so. After some initial stumbles, ethicists are getting their hands dirty and seriously considering the costs of doing the right thing. Finally, a new business ethics is emerging that acknowledges and accepts the messy world of mixed motives. As a result, novel concepts are springing up: moderation, pragmatism, minimalism, among others.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Relative performance evaluation in board cash compensation: UK empirical evidence

This paper presents an empirical examination of whether evidence of the implicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) can be found in the cash compensation of boards of directors for 169 UK non-financial listed companies that existed for all of the period from 1971 to 1998. We perform two types of analyses. Initially, we estimate individual firm time series regressions of the change in board cash compensation against measures of firm and peer group performance. The measures of firm performance we use are annual cash stock market returns and pre-tax accounting earnings. Peer group measures of performance are industry value-weighted average cash stock market returns and industry value-weighted average pre-tax accounting earnings. Subsequently, we analyse the data as a balanced panel.We provide evidence that board cash compensation is positively related to accounting earnings and negatively associated with peer group pre-tax accounting earnings. Some evidence suggests that board cash compensation is related to firm stock market returns but none suggests it is related to peer group market returns. This result implies the presence of RPE based on accounting earnings in the design of UK board compensation, with the cash compensation of boards of directors implicitly (partially) protected from industry uncertainties.     

A THEORY OF MIGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO OCCUPATIONAL STIGMA*

A theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid “social humiliation.” In a general‐equilibrium framework, it is shown that as long as migration can reduce humiliation sufficiently, migration will occur even between two identical economies. Migration increases the number of individuals who choose to perform degrading jobs and consequently, migration lowers the price of the good produced in the sector that is associated with low social status. Moreover, the greater an individual's aversion to performing degrading jobs, the more likely it is that he will experience a welfare gain when the economy opens up.     

The incidence and intensity of wage indexation: an empirical analysis

Variables suggested by theoretical studies of indexation are considered with a view to examining their utility in the context of the decision to index (incidence) and the desired degree of indexation when escalator clauses are put into effect (intensity). The Tobit model, which can address both of these issues, suggests that most of the effects of explanatory variables on the regressand occur by modifying the incidence of indexation, not its intensity. However, the Tobit model is itself rejected in favour of separate Probit and Truncated Regression investigations of incidence and intensity, respectively. The results obtained indicate that the standard list of explanatory variables, which one thinks of in the context of the theoretical literature as dealing primarily with intensity, perform well in explaining incidence but very poorly in accounting for the non-limit observations. The latter are influenced by bargaining power proxies such as the unemployment rate and union density; a very clear trade-off between indexed and non-contingent wage adjustment can also be discerned. These results call for more theoretical attention to the distinction between indexation incidence and its intensity.     

The Information Value of Bond Ratings

We test whether bond ratings contain pricing-relevant information by examining security price reactions to Moody's refinement of its rating system, which was not accompanied by any fundamental change in issuers' risks, was not preceded by any announcement, and was carried simultaneously for all bonds. We find that rating information does not affect firm value, but that debt value increases (decreases) and equity value falls (rises) when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings. We also find that when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings, the volatilities implied by prices of options on the fine-rated issuers' shares decline (rise).