Entry and Merger in Commercial Fishing with Multiple Markets

Received May 23, 2001; revised version received October 22, 2001     

Inferior factor in Cournot oligopoly

The condition for factor inferiority has been well known for a competitive firm facing perfect competition in both product and factor markets. Whether the factor inferiority is observable or not has been unknown for oligopoly facing perfect competition in factor market. We derive a general condition for the factor inferiority in Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation. We derive it on the basis of a novel technique for proving the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium industry output.     

Cournot and Stackelberg Duopolies Revisited

First, conditions are derived for a leader (or a follower) to be more advantageous than a follower (or a leader) in Stackelberg duopoly with symmetric firms and without product differentiation. Second, the equilibria in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies are compared under a set of reasonable assumptions. If the reaction function slopes upward, the Cournot duopolists' profits turn out to be lower than those of both the Stackelberg leader and follower, and the equilibrium industry output is smaller in Stackelberg duopoly than in Cournot duopoly.
JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D43, L13.     

International Competition in one Country: Comparative Static Analysis

A comparative static analysis is conducted for international competition among several domestic and foreign firms in one country in relation to a change in the domestic firms' cost parameter, which could be technological, export subsidy or tax, or pollution tax rate. The general result is made more transparent for some simple cases. The effects of entry of a new domestic firm are analyzed.     

A dynamic cournot-nash equilibrium in fishery: The effects of entry

A dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the fish war between two countries has been derived and its steady-state behavior studied by Levhari and Mirman on the basis of a discrete dynamic programming method. In this paper we shall consider an n-country extension of Levhari-Mirman fish war model. We shall derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its steady-state value to analyze the effects of entry (or exit) in fish war. A comparison is made between in dividual management of fishery by each country and joint management by all countries.

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Riassunto In questo lavoro si considera l'estensione, al caso din paesi concorrenti, del modello concorrenziale dell'attività peschereccia proposto da Levhari e Mirman. Viene derivata la configurazione di equilibrio di Cournot-Nash e si calcola il suo valore stazionario per analizzare l'effetto d'entrata (o d'uscita) di un agente nella attività concorrenziale.Viene infine fatto un confronto tra la conduzione individuale della pesca in ogni singolo paese e la conduzione congiunta di tutti i paesi considerati.

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Versione definitiva pervenuta il 17-1-81