Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players.     

Do we need deeper trade agreements for GVCs or just a BIT?

The paper investigates two policies geared towards stimulating and shaping global value chains (GVCs), namely deep regional trade agreements (DRTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). In an augmented gravity model, we test the impact of both policies on a variety of trade in value added indicators. We find that both policies are likely to increase GVC trade, although their transmission channels differ. While backward linkages are stimulated through both BITs and DRTAs, forward linkages respond only to DRTAs. The estimates suggest that negotiating a DRTA with investment provisions has a higher impact on trade in value added than signing a shallow RTA and a separate BIT.     

Can religion insure against aggregate shocks to happiness? The case of transition countries

This paper examines the effects of reforms and religion on happiness in transition economies. Earlier literature suggests that religiosity insures happiness against various individual stressful life events. This phenomenon is well-explored in developed countries but rarely studied in post-communist countries, where religion was officially suppressed for a long period. These countries have undergone considerable economic transformations over the past two decades. Using cross-sectional Life in Transition Survey data and historical data on religions, I examine if religion insures against economic reforms. The endogeneity of religion is taken into account. The findings suggest that economic reforms may have both positive and negative effects on happiness. Religiosity indeed insures happiness and perceptions of economic and political situations against economic reforms.     

Externalities in knowledge production: evidence from a randomized field experiment

Experimental Economics - Are there positive or negative externalities in knowledge production? We analyze whether current contributions to knowledge production increase or decrease the future...