On the Consequences of Behavioral Adaptations in the Cost–Benefit Analysis of Road Safety Measures

It is sometimes argued that road safety measures or automobile safety standards fail to save lives because safer highways or safer cars induce more dangerous driving. A similar but less extreme view is that ignoring the behavioral adaptation of drivers would bias the cost–benefit analysis of a traffic safety measure. This article derives cost–benefit rules for automobile safety regulation when drivers may adapt their risk‐taking behavior in response to changes in the quality of the road network. The focus is on the financial externalities induced by accidents because of the insurance system as well as on the consequences of drivers' risk aversion. We establish that road safety measures are Pareto improving if their monetary cost is lower than the difference between their (adjusted for risk aversion) direct welfare gain with unchanged behavior and the induced variation in insured losses due to drivers' behavioral adaptation. The article also shows how this rule can be extended to take other accident external costs into account.     

The Transformation of Urban Political Leadership in Western Europe

This overview article sets out the broad themes behind the transformation of local political leadership, in particular the forces that have led to the introduction of stronger forms of local executive, such as directly elected mayors. After setting out the role of local political leadership in traditional local government and different traditions and patterns across Western Europe, the article sets out the likely factors driving the changes toward a stronger form of leadership in the more complex pattern of governing described as local governance: complex networks, the ‘new political culture’, Europeanization of public policy and institutional mimetism. The article observes that the articles in this symposium do not fully confirm these hypotheses, showing the complexity of the responses and the different contexts across Western Europe. The concluding sections draw together the implications of the stronger forms of local executive for the current practice and functioning of local politics and policy‐making: the legitimacy crisis that may have emerged from more autonomous political leaders, which combines with the decline in the conventional measures of local political participation; the lack of complementary institutional resources to assist the performance of the enhanced executive function; and the emergence of a new north‐south divide in governing styles. Cet article général expose les grands thèmes qui sous‐tendent la transformation de l'autorité politique locale, notamment les forces qui ont conduit à l'introduction de formes d'exécutif local plus puissantes, comme l'élection des maires au suffrage direct. Après avoir expliqué le rôle d'une autorité politique locale dans un contexte classique et selon plusieurs traditions ou modèles d'Europe occidentale, l'étude s'intéresse aux facteurs susceptibles de tendre vers une forme plus forte d'autorité dans le cadre pluscompliqué d'une gouvernance locale intégrant réseaux complexes, ‘nouvelle culture politique’, européanisation des politiques publiques et mimétisme institutionnel. Les articles proposés pour ce symposium ne confirment pas totalement ces hypothèses, révélant la sophistication des réponses et la multiplicité des contextes européens. La conclusion déduit ce qu'implique le renforcement de l'exécutif local dans la pratique et le fonctionnement actuels de la politique et du processus décisionnel locaux: crise de légitimité, éventuellement née de leaders politiques plus autonomes, combinée au déclin des dispositifs classiques de participation locale; manque de ressources institutionnelles complémentaires qui faciliteraient la mise en ?uvre de la nouvelle fonction exécutive; émergence d'une scission nord‐sud dans les styles de gouvernement.     

Rules of Origin in North–South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA

All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North–South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North–South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal–agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.     

DO WEALTH DIFFERENCES AFFECT FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS?*

The influence of relative wealth on fairness considerations is analyzed in an ultimatum game experiment in which participants receive large and widely unequal initial endowments. Subjects initially demonstrate a concern for fairness. With time however, behavior becomes at odds with both subgame perfection and fairness. Evidence of learning is detected for both proposers and receivers in the estimation of a structural reinforcement learning model. The estimation results suggest that, guided by foregone best responses and an acquired sense of deservingness, rich subjects become more selfish, whereas poor subjects, influenced only by their own experience, learn to tolerate this behavior.     

In-work policies in Europe: Killing two birds with one stone?

Generous social assistance has been held responsible for inactivity traps and social exclusion in several European countries, hence the recent trend of promoting employment through in-work transfers. Yet, the relative consensus on the need for ‘making work pay’ policies is muddied by a number of concerns relative to the design of the reforms and the treatment of the family dimension. Relying on EUROMOD, a EU-15 integrated tax-benefit microsimulation software, we simulate two types of in-work benefits. The first one is means-tested on family income, in the fashion of the British Working Family Tax Credit, while the second is a purely individualized policy. Both reforms are built on the same cost basis (after behavioral responses) and simulated in three European countries suspected to experience large poverty traps, namely Finland, France and Germany. The potential labor supply responses to the reforms and the subsequent redistributive impacts are assessed for each country using a structural discrete-choice model. We compare how both reforms achieve poverty reduction and social inclusion (measured as the number of transitions into activity). All three countries present different initial conditions, including existing tax-benefit systems and distribution of incomes and wages. These sources of heterogeneity are exploited together with different labor supply elasticities to explain the cross-country differences in the impact of the reforms.     

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