A macroeconomic two-country model with price-discriminating monopolists

I am indebted to J. Frijns, R. de Groof, S. Kuipers, F. van der Ploeg, V. Okker, A. van Schaik and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer of course applies.     

Opmerkingen en berekeningen betreffende "Poisson-proces met interrupties" van J. C. A. Zaat

Summary
In an earlier paper by J.C. A. ZAAT an interrupted Poisson process was studied. Here we clarify some of the results there obtained. The process is obtained from a stationary Poisson process on the real axis by covering the axis with a sequence of adjoining intervals which have alternatively length a and b, the first left-hand endpoint of an a-interval to the right of 0 being chosen in a stochastic point with If has a rectangular distribution on [0, a + b] the interrupted Poisson process is stationary, but the distribution of the length of an interval between two successive points in the interrupted process is now different for different intervals. For each distribution ofy over [0, a + b] the distribution of the length of the interval between the nth and the (n + I)st point to the right ofO in the interrupted Poisson process tends to the distribution function G(y) as n tends to infinity. Somehow ZAAT based his calculations exclusively on this stationary distribution.     

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Should countries block foreign takeovers of R&D champions and promote greenfield entry?

Abstract In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.     

Downstream labeling and upstream price competition

This paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two vertically related markets. Labeling on the downstream market affects upstream price competition through two effects: a differentiation effect and a ranking effect. The magnitude of these two effects determines who in the supply chain will receive the benefits and who will bear the burden of labeling. For instance, whenever the ranking effect dominates the differentiation effect, the low-quality upstream firm loses from labeling while all downstream actors are individually better off. By decreasing the low-quality input price, the label acts as a subsidy and leads to an increase of the downstream market welfare. This analysis furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of labeling in cases like those of GMOs or restaurants.