Do foreign exchange fund managers behave like heterogeneous agents?

This paper estimates an Heterogeneous Agent Model (HAM) on currency trader indices to explain the large shifts in profitability in currency styles surrounding the global financial crisis. In the model, fund managers allocate capital conditional on recent performance to a value strategy, a momentum strategy, and a carry strategy. Subsequent estimation results reveal that (1) a large part of the behavior of currency managers can indeed be described by these three simple strategies, and (2) currency managers shift capital from recent winning styles to recent losing styles, and hence apply a negative feedback strategy. We finally show that a negative feedback strategy is indeed optimal, but currency managers could improve performance by applying it less aggressively if they were able to.     

Portfolio Selection and Optimization with Higher Moments: Evidence from the Indian Stock Market

The Markowitz portfolio optimization model, popularly known as the Mean-Variance model, assumes that stockreturns follow normal distribution. But when stock returns do not follow normal distribution, this model wouldbe inadequate as it would prescribe sub-optimal portfolios. Stock market literature often deliberates that stock returns are non-normal. In such context the Markowitz model would not be sufficient to estimate the portfolio risks. The purpose of this paper is to expand the original Markowitz portfolio theory (mean-variance) via adding the higher order moments like skewness (third moment about the mean) and kurtosis (fourth moment about the mean) in the return characteristics. The research paper investigates the impact of including higher moments using multi-objective programming model for portfolio stock selection and optimization. The empirical results indicate that the inclusion of higher moments had a considerable impact in estimating the returns behavior of portfolios. The portfolios optimized using all the four moments, generated higher returns for the given level of risk in comparison to the returns of the Markowitz model during the study period 2000–2011. The results of this study would be immensely useful to fund managers, portfolio managers and investors as it would help them in understanding the Indian stock market behavior better and also in selecting alternative portfolio selection models.     

Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry

Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.     

Editorial

Original Papers

Editorial     

When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for a securities transactions tax

Unlike most major industrialized nations, the United States does not impose an excise tax on securities transactions. This article examines the desirability and feasibility of implementating a U.S. Securities Transfer Excise Tax (STET) directed at curbing excesses associated with short-term speculation and at raising revenue. We conclude that strong economic efficiency arguments can be made in support of a STET that throws sand into the gears, in James Tobin's (1982) phrase, of our excessively well-functioning financial markets. Such a tax would have the beneficial effects of curbing instability introduced by speculation, reducing the diversion of resources into the financial sector of the economy, and lengthening the horizons of corporate managers. The efficiency benefits derived from curbing speculation are likely to exceed any costs of reduced liquidity or increased costs of capital that come from taxing financial transactions more heavily. The examples of Japan and the United Kingdom suggest that a STET is administratively feasible and can be implemented without crippling the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. A STET at a .5% rate could raise revenues of at least $10 billion annually.