Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?

We study market breakdown in a finance context under extreme adverse selection with and without competitive pricing. Adverse selection is extreme if for any price there are informed agent types with whom uninformed agents prefer not to trade. Market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We present a necessary and sufficient condition for market breakdown. If the condition holds, then trade is not viable. If the condition fails, then trade can occur under competitive pricing. There are environments in which the condition holds and others in which it fails.     

Attitude toward imprecise information

This paper presents an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty which incorporates objective but imprecise information. Information is assumed to take the form of a probability–possibility set, that is, a set P of probability measures on the state space. The decision maker is told that the true probability law lies in P and is assumed to rank pairs of the form (P,f) where f is an act mapping states into outcomes. The key representation result delivers maxmin expected utility (MEU) where the min operator ranges over a set of probability priors—just as in the MEU representation result of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141–153]. However, unlike the MEU representation, the representation here also delivers a mapping, , which links the probability–possibility set, describing the available information, to the set of revealed priors. The mapping is shown to represent the decision maker's attitude to imprecise information: under our axioms, the set of representation priors is constituted as a selection from the probability–possibility set. This allows both expected utility when the selected set is a singleton and extreme pessimism when the selected set is the same as the probability–possibility set, i.e., is the identity mapping. We define a notion of comparative imprecision aversion and show it is characterized by inclusion of the sets of revealed probability distributions, irrespective of the utility functions that capture risk attitude. We also identify an explicit attitude toward imprecision that underlies usual hedging axioms. Finally, we characterize, under extra axioms, a more specific functional form, in which the set of selected probability distributions is obtained by (i) solving for the “mean value” of the probability–possibility set, and (ii) shrinking the probability–possibility set toward the mean value to a degree determined by preferences.     

Is Under-Employment due to Labour Hoarding? Evidence from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey

In this paper, Australian data are used to study the characteristics of workers who are constrained in their hours of work. Matched employer–employee data allow us to control for their employers' characteristics as well. In particular, the information on the firms' state of demand provides useful evidence on the underlying cause of under-employment. The labour hoarding model cannot explain the observed patterns involving under-employment. Alternative explanations are offered.     

Purchasing Power Parities for Industry Comparisons Using Weighted Elteto–Koves–Szulc (EKS) Methods

This study has three main objectives. First, it develops a generalization of the commonly used EKS method to multilateral price comparisons. It is shown that the EKS system can be generalized so that weights can be attached to each of the link comparisons used in the EKS computations. These weights can account for differing levels of reliability of the underlying binary comparisons. Second, various reliability measures and corresponding weighting schemes are presented and their merits discussed. Finally, these new methods are applied to an international data set of manufacturing prices from the ICOP project. Although theoretically superior, it appears that the empirical impact of the weighted EKS method is generally small compared to the unweighted EKS. It is also found that this impact is larger when it is applied at lower levels of aggregation. Finally, the importance of using sector specific PPPs in assessing relative levels of manufacturing productivity is indicated.     

TOURISM AND REGIONAL IMMISERIZATION

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the consequences of tourism in rural and urban areas on regional incomes, welfare and urban unemployment using a generalized Harris Todaro model. In this model two urban and two rural goods are produced. A distinguishing characteristic of this model is that the urban non-traded good is not consumed in the rural region and, similarly, the rural non-traded good is not consumed in the urban region. The most important result we obtain is that a tourist boom in the urban region may immiserize the rural area. Hence the welfare interests of rural and urban consumers may be in conflict as a result of tourist expansion in the urban region.     

Single or double bounded contingent valuation? A Bayesian test

This paper evaluates the performance of asymptotic approximations of the Bayes factor to appraise the relative likelihoods of the bivariate and the restricted double bounded models for contingent valuation. The performance of the Bayes factor test is studied by Monte Carlo simulation showing that it correctly chooses the bivariate model when appropriate, but tends to over predict the double bounded model when the correlation coefficient is not estimated accurately. However, the quadratic error in estimating willingness to pay is reduced if the model preferred by the test is chosen. In addition, we consider the effect of averaging the estimates of WTP from both models, weighting each model with its posterior probability. The results show that ‘model averaging’ across the competing hypothesis further reduces the squared error. The applications with two data sets on National Parks show that the test rejects the restricted double bounded hypotheses against the bivariate model.     

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

Elicitation of Expert Opinion in Benefit Transfer of Environmental Goods

Benefit transfer is a method for estimating the value of environmental goods that involves the use of past information on identical or similar goods. This paper considers the extent to which benefit transfer can be based on prior distributions elicited from expert opinion. We propose two alternative methods to elicit the parameters of a prior distribution from experts on environmental valuation. An experiment is carried out on the value of National Parks in Spain. The results from the elicited distributions are compared with the information provided by onsite samples of visitors. The results indicate that individual experts made different predictions about the potential value of the policy areas that were diverse and unable to accurately predict the value for each policy site. However, the average across the elicited distributions approaches the estimated distribution with empirical data and accurately predicts the relative values for the two policy sites considered.