Goal programming: Planning process of tourism organizations

The complex rapidly changing environment faced by tourism organization officials makes tourism planning extremely difficult. Goal programming can aid the tourism planner in appraising the goal attainment potential associated with proposed tourism marketing program alternatives. By changing priorities of goals, budgetary limitations, and organizational constraints, the policy maker can test the effect of changes before they are implemented. By utilizing goal programming, a tourism organization can more systematically evaluate the nature and relative importance of organizational goals, critical constraints affecting the organization and marketing program alternatives.     

The Simple Welfare Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy Case for Subscribership Subsidies

The goal of universal service has dominated the telecommunications policy landscape for at least the past half century. This policy objective has been promoted with cross subsidies from long-distance telecommunications services to subscribers to local telecommunications service. The economic rationale for these cross subsidies is network externalities. In this paper, we show that: (1) the presence of network externalities, even if substantial in overall magnitude, does not generally justify a subscribership subsidy, even a well-designed one; and (2) the empirical realities of telecommunications markets make it unlikely that subscribership subsidies of any kind will increase social welfare.     

Taxation for the 21st century: the automated payment transaction (APT) tax

This paper examines the desirability and feasibility of replacing the present system of personal and corporate income, sales, excise, capital gains, import and export duties, gift and estate taxes with a single comprehensive revenue neutral Automated Payment Transaction (APT) tax. In its simplest form, the APT tax consists of a flat tax levied on all transactions. The tax is automatically assessed and collected when transactions are settled through the electronic technology of the banking/payments system. The APT tax introduces progressivity through the tax base since the volume of final payments includes exchanges of titles to property and is therefore more highly skewed than the conventional income or consumption tax base. The wealthy carry out a disproportionate share of total transactions and therefore bear a disproportionate burden of the tax despite its flat rate structure. The automated recording of all APT tax payments by firms and individuals eliminates the need to file tax and information returns and creates a degree of transparency and perceived fairness that induces greater tax compliance. Also, the tax has lower administrative and compliance cost. Like all taxes, the APT tax creates new distortions whose costs must be weighted against the benefits obtained by replacing the current tax system.     

Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets

A regulated upstream monopolist provides an input to firms in a downstream market. If the monopolist enters the downstream market, a natural concern is that it will act so as to raise its downstream rivals' costs. An offsetting incentive is that a higher downstream price will reduce demand for the input, which reduces the monopolist's profit. Conditions under which one incentive dominates the other are derived. The monopolist may desire to lower its downstream rivals' costs rather than raise them. These findings suggest that regulatory policy towards such downstream entry should not focus exclusively on the ability to discriminate.     

An Iterative Process for International Negotiations on Acid Rain in Northern Europe Using a General Convex Formulation

This paper proposes a game theoretical approach of internationalnegotiations on transboundary pollution. This approach is distinguished bya discrete time formulation and by a suitable formulation of the localinformation assumption on cost and damage functions: at each stage of thenegotiation, the parties assign the best possible cooperative state, giventhe available information, as an objective for the next stage. It is shownthat the resulting sequences of states converges from a non-cooperativesituation to an international optimum in a finite number of stages.Furthermore, a financial transfer structure is also presented that makesthe desired sequence of states individually rational and stategically stable.The concepts are applied in a numerical simulation of the SO₂transboundary pollution problem related to acid rain in Northern Europe.     

Preservation: Planning for the survival of things

Preservation—the immortalisation of living and designed things—is a channel for transmitting messages from the past to the future. Image is all important for conveying the meaning. To be preserved, a thing must have a constituency of supporters and a long-lived institution to serve as trustee: when appreciators of the message are no longer recruited, extinction is at hand. Community ecology, if extended to images, suggests some appropriate preservation policies for societies approaching steady state, eg adding to the total stock of biomass, to diversity, and to useful knowledge, while promoting new organised relationships between man and environment.