Calls of Warrants: Timing and Market Reaction

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.     

No Evidence of Compensating Wages for Occupational Fatalities

This study combines new estimates of occupational mortality with industry death rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to test for compensating wages associated with job hazards. The new estimates apply to 347 three-digit occupations in the United States. An unexpected result emerges: Evidence for compensating wages is apparent only when the BLS industry death rates are used; evidence is absent with the new occupational death rates.     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN MINING – ASSESSING UPPER BOUNDS WITH SIMULATION

As part of the trend towards increasing levels of mechanisation and automation, mines are turning to the use of larger equipment in order to achieve economies of scale. Larger trucks, for example, result in fewer hauls and fewer drivers required to haul the same quantity of ore. resulting in lower production costs. This paper uses simulation to show that larger capacity trucks also have higher maintenance costs, primarily associated with lost production due to unscheduled downtime. Specific recommendations on how to estimate the scale and impact of these costs are included.     

INDUSTRY‐LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT AND THE 2008 SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

The 2008 System of National Accounts recognizes capital services as the conceptually correct way to measure the input of capital into production. This allows setting up an integrated system of industry‐level and aggregate productivity accounts that are consistent with the 2008 SNA. The paper discusses the new aspects in the 2008 SNA and sets out such an integrated system, based on Jorgenson's aggregate production possibility frontier and gross output‐based industry productivity measures. Recent results for industry productivity measures for the United States complete the picture.     

The Probability of Leaving Unemployment: The Influence of Duration,Destination and Demographics*

This paper examines the influences of a number of demographic characteristics and the duration of unemployment on the probability of leaving unemployment. This probability is found to decrease as the duration of unemployment increases, with married females having the highest probability of exit. Various measures of average completed duration suggest that the longest spells of unemployment are incurred by older males. These appear to be longest for males withdrawing from the labour market. The relationship between the duration of unemployment and the probability of exit is important for labour market policy. Some relevant considerations are also explored in the paper.     

JOINT VENTURE BUY‐OUTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper provides a theory of joint venture buy‐outs in the presence of demand uncertainty. In an infinite horizon framework with demand uncertainty, we consider a foreign firm's decision on whether to form a joint venture or to open a fully owned subsidiary. Without the possibility of future share adjustment, the foreign firm enters the market through a joint venture if the host‐country firm helps to reduce the uncertainty significantly. Consequently, the firm enters at an earlier point in time compared to the situation in which opening a fully owned subsidiary is the only option to the firm. The possibility of future share adjustment in the joint venture further increases the incentive to speed up foreign investment. Although the possibility of share adjustment results in a joint venture buy‐out and can reduce the future profits of the host‐country firm, it may increase host‐country welfare by attracting foreign investment at an earlier point in time. We show the implications of learning in the joint venture.     

Time-Consistent Public Policy

In this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure. We characterize and solve for Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments. The characterization consists of an inter-temporal first-order condition (a "generalized Euler equation") for the government, and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations. For a calibrated economy, we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income—an inelastic source of funds at any point in time—the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates. We also find that when the only tax base is labour income the Markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the Ramsey equilibrium.