Intrafirm resource allocation: The economics of transfer pricing and cost allocations in accounting*

Abstract. A theory of intrafirm allocation under information asymmetry based on Myerson's general theory of mechanisms is developed. From the general model, it is shown that every Myerson equilibrium resource allocation mechanism is a “cost plus” type of transfer pricing. Specializing the general model to allow risk-neutral agents, we derive the exact form of the compensation schemes in dominant strategy equilibrium transfer pricing mechanism. The general Myerson agency problem is transformed into a central planner's problem enabling us to bypass the first-order approach to the problem. The closed form solution shows that each of the agents' compensation schemes is composed of a profit-sharing component, a cost refund, taxes, and subsidies, making it a Groves-like scheme. Additional results show that if the principal is asymmetrically informed about one of the agents only, the agent may derive rent from private information under monotonic compensation schemes, and we provide additional conditions under which Hirshleifer's classical marginal cost pricing is in equilibrium. Résumé. Les auteurs élaborent une théorie d'affectation des ressources internes au sein de l'entreprise, en situation d'asymétrie de l'information, à partir de la théorie générale des mécanismes de Myerson. En se fondant sur le modèle général, les auteurs démontrent que chaque mécanisme d'affectation des ressources correspondant à l'équilibre de Myerson tient du prix de cession interne de type « prix coûtant majoré ». En spécialisant le modèle général de façon à permettre l'introduction de mandataires neutres à l'égard du risque, ils dérivent la forme exacte de régimes de rémunération correspondant au mécanisme de détermination du prix de cession en situation d'équilibre de la stratégie dominante. Le problème mandant-mandataire général de Myerson se transforme en problème de planificateur central, ce qui permet de court-circuiter le premier ordre d'analyse du problème. La solution de nature fermée révèle que tout régime de rémunération des mandataires est composé d'un élément de participation aux bénéfices, de remboursement de frais, de taxes et de subventions, ce qui l'apparente à celui de Groves. D'autres résultats indiquent que si le mandant obtient de l'information asymétrique de l'un des mandataires seulement, ce dernier peut tirer, dans le cadre de regimes de remuneration monotoniques, un loyer de l'information privilégiée qu'il communique. Les auteurs ajoutent des conditions supplémentaires selon lesquelles l'établissement du prix selon la méthode classique de Hirshleifer en fonction des coûts marginaux est en équilibre.     

Uban Tolled Roads and the Value of Travel Time Savings*

The recent interest in the privatization of major urban roads has opened up the debate on the tolling of such facilities. Central to the identification of optimal tolls is a knowledge of the amount of money individuals are willing to outlay to save travel time. This paper combines a utility maximization framework with stated response data to determine values of time savings in the presence of varying levels of toll for the full set of urban journey purposes. The empirical results provide a basis for establishing one benchmark for toll setting, in the context of substantial lengths of urban roads. There are no tolled urban roads in any major urban area throughout the world     

Forward Rates,Interest Rates,and Expectations Under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes*

A model comprising spot and forward foreign exchange markets and a domestic credit market is used to examine the trade-off between volatility in the nominal exchange rate and domestic interest rate. It also shows how a slowly crawling spot rate can raise interest rate volatility and the amplitude of reserve flows. Finally, the paper extends a finding by Driskill and McCafferty that the exchange rate effects of external shocks are differently affected by the responsiveness of speculation to expected profits; high responsiveness makes the spot exchange rate more sensitive to foreign financial shocks but less sensitive to trade balance shocks.     

The Valuation of Sequential Exchange Opportunities

Sequential exchange opportunities are valued using the techniques of modern option-pricing theory. The vehicle for analysis is the concept of a compound exchange option. This security is shown to exist implicitly in several contractual settings. A valuation formula for this option is derived. The formula is shown to generalize much previous work in option pricing. Several applications of the formula are presented.     

Real Options Models of the Firm,Capacity Overhang,and the Cross Section of Stock Returns

We use a stochastic frontier model to obtain a stock‐level estimate of the difference between a firm's installed production capacity and its optimal capacity. We show that this “capacity overhang” estimate relates significantly negatively to the cross section of stock returns, even when controlling for popular pricing factors. The negative relation persists among small and large stocks, stocks with more or less reversible investments, and in good and bad economic states. Capacity overhang helps explain momentum and profitability anomalies, but not value and investment anomalies. Our evidence supports real options models of the firm featuring valuable divestment options.