The effect of multi-scenario policies on empty container repositioning

This paper addresses a container maritime-repositioning problem where several parameters are uncertain and historical data are useless for decision-making processes. To address this problem, we propose a time-extended multi-scenario optimization model in which scenarios can be generated taking into account shipping company opinions. We then show that multi-scenario policies put shipping companies in the position of satisfying empty-container demands for different values that may be taken by uncertain parameters.     

Task assignment,incentives and technological factors

In this paper, we examine the allocation of tasks between a principal and an agent considering their incentives to provide effort, their different abilities in handling tasks, and transmission costs. We focus our attention on two tasks: the first may be handled by the principal or by the agent, whereas the second is necessarily carried out by the agent. Under a fully decentralised organisation, the agent performs both tasks, whereas, under partial delegation, the principal handles the first task and transfers the outcome to the agent who handles the second task. Assuming technological complementarities, from our analysis it emerges that, if there is imperfect observability of effort, full delegation is better at eliciting effort by the agent in the second task, whereas, in comparison with partial delegation, it lowers effort in the first task. Although with contractible effort, the choice between the two organisational forms depends only on transmission costs and on the relative ability of its members, when moral hazard problems are taken into account, the organisational choice is related to the relative importance played by the two tasks in production. If the agent's task is relatively important in production, full delegation, encouraging a higher level of effort in this task, may be optimal, even if technological factors favour partial delegation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical analysis of organized crime,corruption and economic growth

In a companion study, Blackburn et al. (Econ Theory Bull, 2017), we have developed a theoretical framework for studying interactions between organized crime and corruption, with the view of examining the combined effects of these phenomena on economic growth. The analysis therein illustrates that organized crime has a negative effect on growth, but that the magnitude of the effect may be either enhanced or mitigated in the presence of corruption. In this paper we tackle the ambiguity produced by the coexistence of the two illicit activities with an empirical investigation using a panel of Italian regions for the period 1983–2009. We find that organized crime distorts growth less when it coexists with corruption and show our results to be robust to different specifications, measures of organized crime, and estimation techniques.     

Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?

We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.     

Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry

Making use of an original dataset containing information on 20 Italian motorways concessionaires over the 1992–2004 period, we study the technology prevailing in the motorways industry in Italy. We focus on the estimation of the technical progress for the years covered by our sample, and on the measurement of the economies of scale and density. We find that the industry has experienced significant technical progress and that there are sizeable economies of density and scale (at least up to a medium-large network size). These results provide valuable insights for regulatory purposes, notably for the definition of the optimal dimension of the network of a concessionaire and the correct setting of the X factor in the price cap formula, which is used to regulate the toll levels. We also control for the effects on the performance of the concessionaires due to the changes in the ownership structure and the regulatory regime, both introduced by the recent reform of the industry. We find that the productivity of the concessionaires has not increased with the adoption of a price cap regime, while it has benefited from the privatization process.      

ON THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE CASE FOR A GOLDEN RULE

This paper uses the SVAR methodology to investigate the effects of public investment on GDP and, more specifically, the effects of the introduction of a golden rule of public finance. We extend the existing literature by estimating a model for the British economy that takes into account long-run factors such as public debt accumulation and policy interactions. We find that in such a long-run framework, public investment has a significant and permanently positive effect on GDP; this result runs counter to the most recent literature on the topic using SVAR, which was limited to a short-run specification. We further find, by comparing different subsamples, that the introduction of the golden rule in 1997 strengthened the positive effect of public investment.     

Shifts in autonomy, responsibility and control from centre to periphery in public administration: the case of the ministry of finance in Italy

In tackling administrative reform and in the hope of improving the effective allocation of resources, most European governments have shown a growing interest in adopting private sector management models in the public administration. The assumption underlying this paper is that the decisive variables in the different national contexts have to do with the relationships between the central and the peripheral administrative levels, and the way in which administrative actors at the two levels interpret their roles and participate in the reform process. The paper examines the case of the reform of the Italian Ministry of Finance. In seeking to improve its performance and the services it provides, the ministry reform is intended to introduce a management system in which the key concepts are the planning, programming and control of administrative action and results. According to reform rhetoric, shaping a new class of administrative managers at the local level is the crux of the question. However, research results hint that the “creation” of this new local executive staff is yet to be completed. The working hypothesis advanced is that this is due to local executives’ lack of confidence in the “system”, inasmuch as the reform process has so far been characterised by a tendency to give them responsibility without autonomy and autonomy without control. The greater their lack of trust, the lesser their willingness to risk the consequences of failure and the greater their tendency to stick to defensive positions and to return to previous “bureaucratic” conceptions and ways of operating.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

The deterrent effects of the penalty points system for driving offences: a regression discontinuity approach

Using data on road accidents, traffic fatalities and driving offences taking place in Italy over the period 2001–2005, we estimate the effects of the introduction on July 2003 of a penalty points system for driving offences. To identify the causal effect of the penalty points system (PPS) on road safety we use a regression discontinuity design. It emerges that, controlling for weather conditions, police patrols, speed cameras, gasoline price, unemployment rate, the introduction of the PPS has led to a reduction of about 9 % of road accidents and of about 30 % of traffic fatalities. These findings are robust to different specifications of the model and different time windows. Moreover, it emerges that the driving offences for which the introduction of the new regime has determined a sharp change in the sanction scheme have reacted more than offences for which the change was less relevant.     

Role of home and host country innovation systems in r&d internationalisation: a patent citation analysis

This paper has three novelties. First, we argue that any given R&D facility’s capacity to exploit and/or augment technological competences is a function not just of its own resources, but the efficiency with which it can utilise complementary resources associated with the relevant local innovation system. Just as asset-augmenting activities require proximity to the economic units (and thus the innovation system) from which they seek to learn, asset-exploiting activities draw from the parent’s technological resources as well as from the other assets of the home location’s innovation system. Furthermore, we argue that most firms tend to undertake both asset exploiting and augmenting activities simultaneously. Second, we use patent citation data from the European Patent Office to quantify the relative asset augmenting vs. exploiting character of foreign-located R&D. Third, we do so for European MNEs located in the US, as well as US MNEs located in Europe. Our results indicate that both EU (US) affiliates in the US (EU) rely extensively on home region knowledge sources, although they appear to exploit the host country knowledge base as well.