Do boards know when they hire a CEO that is a good match? Evidence from initial compensation

Are CEO initial compensation packages based on variations in the expected match quality of the hiring firms? Using CEO tenure as a proxy for expected match quality, and a sample of CEO turnovers between 1992 and 2006, we find that CEOs that experience good matches, defined as tenures exceeding four years, have higher initial compensation packages. We also find evidence from exogenous switching regression models that inside CEOs receive a higher good match premium than outside CEOs. To account for economic and regulatory changes across our sample period, we divide our sample into three subsamples: 1992–1997, 1998–2002, and 2003–2006, and repeat our analyses. Even though the positive relation between expected match quality and initial compensation persists across all periods, we find that the good match premium for inside and outside CEOs does not differ in the post-2002 period. We attribute this result to increased board independence and changes in regulation (Sarbanes–Oxley) in the post-2002 sample period.     

Obesity,Mortality, and the Obesity Paradox

The percentage of the population who are obese has grown dramatically on a worldwide basis over the last several decades, although the growth in the prevalence of obesity has slowed recently at a high level in the United States. Although there have been numerous studies of the effect of this trend on mortality, the findings have been inconsistent and controversial, in part because of methodological differences and the complexity of the relationships between obesity and mortality. The objective of this article is to discuss the issues surrounding these relationships and to shed light on the likely effects of the obesity epidemic on mortality. Of particular interest is the so-called obesity-mortality paradox, where mortality experience is lower for overweight and in some cases obese individuals than for those of normal weight. Although more recent studies of the relationship between mortality and obesity seem to indicate those who are obese have experienced a reduced percentage of additional mortality, this may in part be due to the shorter average time those currently obese have been exposed to their condition, the heterogeneity of the normal and obese populations, measurement issues including treatment of smokers and those who are ill, and study design limitations. An increased number of premature deaths may arise as more individuals who are obese are exposed for a longer period to excess adiposity. Although public policy issues surrounding obesity are being addressed with a great deal of activity and publicity, they have and will continue to prove quite challenging for both individuals and society to manage and overcome. The prevalence of obesity has had and will continue to have a significant effect on the mortality experience in most areas of actuarial practice. As a result, it is important for actuaries to enhance their understanding of these effects.     

The economic burden of tuberous sclerosis complex in UK patients with renal manifestations: a retrospective cohort study in the clinical practice research datalink (CPRD)

Background: Tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC) is a multi-system genetic disorder in which renal manifestations occur in ～50% of children and 80% of adults. Since these often present alongside other manifestations, renal TSC is likely to incur significant costs. This study aims to quantify healthcare resource use (HCRU) and costs for renal TSC patients in the UK.

Methods: TSC patients in the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD) linked to Hospital Episodes Statistics were identified from January 1987–June 2013. Clinical data were extracted over the entire history and costs were reported over the most recent 3-year period. HCRU was compared with a matched comparator cohort. Incremental costs were reported and the key cost drivers by primary manifestation category were identified by regression modeling.

Results: A total of 79 renal TSC patients were identified with manifestations including chronic kidney disease stage 3–5 (with prevalence increasing with age) and renal angiomyolipoma. Renal TSC patients consistently reported greater HCRU than the comparator. Inpatient hospitalizations were more frequent for renal TSC patients (3.2 vs 1.6), but length of stay was comparable; however, 70.9% of renal TSC patients recorded no kidney-related procedures ever and averaged <1 test per year in the 3-year period. Average costs for renal TSC patients were nearly 3-fold greater than the comparator (£15,162 vs £5672). Costs increased with additional manifestation categories (£3600: only renal; £27,531: renal with ≥4 additional manifestation categories [25% of patients]). Additional nervous system and dermatology/psychiatric manifestations significantly (p?Conclusions: Renal TSC patients have greater HCRU than the general CPRD population, likely to result from progression of renal disease and additional manifestations; however, surveillance for disease progression appears to be deficient. Inadequate monitoring may contribute to a lack of co-ordinated care and increased healthcare-associated costs. Efforts should be made to follow the TSC guidelines to effectively monitor and treat patients.     

Lobbying for Education in a Two‐Sector Model

Firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and the education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly and there is sufficient asymmetry between the sectors, only one sector will exert pressure on the policy‐maker in the attempt to direct resources toward the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity, and price. We also provide some preliminary evidence that lobbying activity by firms may influence the production of skills needed by those firms.     

Category management and consumer choice

This paper shows the results of an exploratory analysis of the structure of a complex product category: Wine. In complex categories, a usual strategy of consumers is the partitioning of alternatives into homogeneous subsets and the sequential eliminations of subsets until a product/brand is chosen from among few homogeneous alternatives in the last subset. To identify if there is such a kind of strategy and the product attributes involved is of great interest for the retailer. After a discussion of the different modelling alternatives of the choice process, the authors provide an application of the additive trees (ADDTREE) model to explore the hierarchical structure. The ADDTREE results provide a first overview of the competitive market structure of the wine category: competition becomes more intense as the wine category is partitioned by, first, the type of wine criteria and, second, the designation of origin (DO) criteria.     

A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems

We examine the role of school grades as a signal of worker productivity under different examination systems in relation to errors that may affect student performance. Firms use school grades as a signal of workers’ effective skills, taking into account that these evaluations are effected by stochastic shocks. We show that more precise evaluation systems, being associated with a higher reactivity of wages to school grades, induce students to provide more effort. Low ability students tend to react less than high ability students. Moreover, individuals with low abilities may prefer less accurate evaluation systems. Nevertheless, when productivity increases, these systems become less convenient and the number of individuals preferring them diminishes. Our analysis highlights an important trade-off between centralised and decentralised evaluation systems. On the one hand, frequent evaluations, typical of decentralised systems, weaken the impact on grades of those errors which influence student performance and, so, reduce signal noise, while, on the other hand, different teachers generally adopt different performance assessment standards, leading to noisier evaluations.