Which Dimensions of Social Responsibility Concern Financial Investors?

Social and environmental ratings provided by social rating agencies are multidimensional. The first goal of our paper is to identify a small number of independent and relevant socially responsible (SR) dimensions reflecting a firms’ coherent posture toward social issues. We put forward that these dimensions are not exactly the same as the ESG ones (Environment, Social, and Governance). Using the six sub-ratings provided by the Vigeo rating agency, we perform a principal component analysis and we highlight three main independent SR dimensions related to (1) business stakeholders (employees, customers, and suppliers), (2) societal stakeholders (environment and society), and (3) financial stakeholders (stockholders and debt holders). The second objective of our paper is to explore the link between stock returns and these three SR dimensions. Our most notable finding is that for each SR dimension, investors ask for an additional risk premium when they accept to hold non-socially responsible stocks. The cost of equity is thus lower for SR firms. The average premium over the period 2003–2010 is larger for the components “business stakeholders” and “financial stakeholders” than for the component “societal stakeholders.” The premium for this last component has only existed since the end of 2008. Since that time, environment and community involvement have become important risk factors strongly considered by investors. For the three dimensions, investors notably penalize large non-social firms and reward small social firms.     

Large shareholders and corporate governance

The paper looks at the voluntary provision of governance to outside shareholders by an entrepreneur who takes his firm public but remains a large shareholder after the IPO. We find that the entrepreneur always puts in place an independent board which acts in the interests of the outside shareholders, but may put in place a friendly remuneration committee that ensures that CEO pay is structured to suit the entrepreneur in the cases where the retained equity stake is sufficiently large. When comparing this provision of governance to the provision preferred by a welfare maximizing regulator, we find that both voluntary overprovision and underprovision of governance can happen. Overprovision of governance happens in the cases where the entrepreneur commits to independence at the level of the remuneration committee when the regulator prefer a friendly remuneration committee. Underprovision of governance takes the form of establishing a friendly remuneration committee (with an independent board), when the regulator would prefer an independent remuneration committee (with a friendly board). We discuss the empirical predictions of the model.     

R&D and Innovation in Food Processing Firms in Transition Countries

We examine the implications of the liberalised economic conditions associated with the economic transformations in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for R&D and innovation in the food processing sector. We use a dataset derived from the World Bank's Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) database to examine the relationships between R&D/innovation activities in food processing firms in transition countries and (i) privatisation, (ii) foreign direct investment, (iii) trade activities, (iv) market competition pressure, and (v) economies of scale. The empirical analysis is implemented through: (i) a double‐hurdle model for R&D participation and expenditures, and (ii) a bivariate probit model for product and process innovation. We find that these economic transformations generally promote R&D/innovation activities in the food processing sector. Our results suggest that broadened and deepened economic liberalisation policies would improve the innovation performance of the food processing sector in transition countries, and would enhance competitiveness in domestic and foreign markets. They also indicate that innovation policies may need to be tailored to market and industrial characteristics of different transition regions.     

Interval bidding in a distribution elicitation format

Interval bidding allows people to report a range of values for a non-market good. Herein, we allow people to choose their distribution over this range endogenously. We consider a multiplicative error model explaining the willingness to pay (WTP) which is estimated using a feasible generalized least squares estimator. We apply our framework to a representative sample of the French population who were asked about the valuation of a bear conservation programme. We find that most participants prefer stating their WTP as a range rather than a point, but the shape of the distribution greatly varies across people. Our results support the use of the interval bidding with endogenous distribution approach in valuation studies.     

What Future for the EU in the Global Trading System?

The recent phase of globalisation could be characterised as “wider”, whereas the next phase to come will be “deeper”. This new phase is likely to prove bumpier than the previous one, as the issues now at stake will have more to do with values or ethics, the interpenetration of which will be both economically necessary and politically difficult. In the medium term, the growth of the European economies will become more dependent on external trade, and thus these policy challenges will need to be addressed.     

Collapse Through Collectivisation

International banks, stimulated by a government weakening of property rights, have over-lent to uncredit-worthy borrowers and precipitated a crisis in the international financial system, according to Professor Pascal Salin of the Université de Paris-Dauphine. He argues that the return of responsibility can be accomplished only through o reliance on private - not government -capital administered by bankers who bear the risk of their own actions, and sound monetary policies to restore the value of savings through the reduction of inflation.     

Supporting weakly Pareto optimal allocations in infinite dimensional nonconvex economies

In this paper, we prove a new version of the Second Welfare Theorem for economies with a finite number of agents and an infinite number of commodities, when the preference correspondences are not convex-valued and/or when the total production set is not convex. For this kind of nonconvex economies, a recent result, obtained by one of the authors, introduces conditions which, when applied to the convex case, give for Banach commodity spaces the well-known result of decentralization by continuous prices of Pareto-optimal allocations under an interiority condition. In this paper, in order to prove a different version of the Second Welfare Theorem, we reinforce the conditions on the commodity space, assumed here to be a Banach lattice, and introduce a nonconvex version of the properness assumptions on preferences and the total production set. Applied to the convex case, our result becomes the usual Second Welfare Theorem when properness assumptions replace the interiority condition. The proof uses a Hahn-Banach Theorem generalization by Borwein and Jofré (in Joper Res Appl Math 48:169–180, 1997) which allows to separate nonconvex sets in general Banach spacesThis work was partially supported by Nucleo Complex Engineering System. The successive versions of the paper were partly prepared during visits of Alejandro Jofré to CERMSEM and of Monique Florenzano and Pascal Gourdel to the Centro de Modelamiento Matematico. The hospitality of both institutions and the support of the french Coopération régionale Cone Sud are gratefully aknowledged. The authors thank Ali Khan for stimulating exchange of ideas and literature, Roko Aliprantis, Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Alain Chateauneuf, Roger Guesnerie, Filipe Martins Da Rocha, Moncef Meddeb, B. Mordukovich, Lionel Thibault and Rabee Tourky for valuable discussions