Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight

We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputation. Our main result is that partisanship can improve the efficacy of an oversight regime, as the distortions caused by a partisan overseer's desire to affect the executive's reputation can offset the distortions caused by her desire to enhance her own. Our results provide a new rationale for divided government, as partisan considerations are often necessary to prevent the overseer from rubber stamping all executive proposals.     

How much does household collateral constrain regional risk sharing?

We construct a new data set of consumption and income data for the largest US metropolitan areas, and we show that the extent of risk-sharing between regions varies substantially over time. In times when US housing collateral is scarce nationally, regional consumption is about twice as sensitive to income shocks. We also document higher sensitivity in regions with lower housing collateral. Household-level borrowing frictions can explain this new stylized fact. When the value of housing relative to human wealth falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines, and the sensitivity of consumption to income increases. Our model aggregates heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households into regions characterized by a common housing market. The resulting regional consumption patterns quantitatively match those in the data.     

Financial development,institutional quality and maximizing-growth trade-off in government finance

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that the relation between long-run economic growth and both monetary and fiscal policies is subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, growth-maximizing governments must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if “institutional quality” and “financial development” indicators are low (respectively high). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax rates, as a result of growth-maximizing strategies in different structural environments (notably concerning institutional and financial development contexts). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts. A short empirical section confirms our theoretical results.     

Toward a North American Security Perimeter? Assessing the trade,FDI, and welfare impacts of liberalizing 9/11 security measures

This paper examines the trade, FDI, and welfare impacts of (liberalizing) 9/11 security measures at the Canada–US border. First, the study provides econometric estimates of the impact of post 9/11 security measures on bilateral (US–Canada) trade flows. Second, we compute sectoral tariff rates “equivalent” to the 9/11 security measures using these econometric estimates together with a three-region nine-sector general equilibrium model. Finally, we assess for both the Canadian and the US economies: 1) the (general equilibrium) impacts on trade, FDI, and welfare, of (liberalising) the 9/11 US security measures and 2) the economic impacts of a change of security paradigm toward a North American Security Perimeter within a Customs Union that would liberalize the Canadian and US 9/11 security measures at the Canada–US border and shift them at the external security perimeter.     

Creating compassion: How volunteering websites encourage prosocial behaviour

Organisations increasingly use websites to promote prosocial behaviour such as volunteering, philanthropy, and activism. However, these websites often fail to encourage prosocial behaviours effectively. To address the lack of relevant research, we develop, then refine, a design model that identifies the user experience factors that create intention to engage in prosocial behaviour on websites. We test an initial model developed from the literature, by interviewing forty participants, each of whom visited and compared six volunteering websites. Our analysis of the participants' user experience reveals eighteen elements that interplay to create intention to engage in prosocial behaviour. Our refined design model comprises ten website features (interaction, factual, anecdata, external recognition, organisational expression, value suggestion, explanatory content, visual media, written media and, website design), seven perceptions (ease of use, aesthetics, information quality, trust, negative affect, positive affect, and argument strength), and one motivation (egoism). These findings provide novel insights into how to design Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to encourage prosocial behaviour.     

On the incidence of commissions in auction markets

We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. Commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers, and standard economics suggests that both sellers and buyers are made worse off by the tax. However, we show that when the buyers' participation constraint binds and when sellers set optimal reservation prices, the level of commissions correlates to participation and reservation prices in such a way that participating buyers strictly gain from higher commissions.     

人工神经网络自学习方法在大港滩海油田的应用

本文以人工神经网络自学习方法在大港滩海油田的试验为例,探讨能否利用人工神经网络自学习方法预测泵的工作状况并通过生产参数优化提高电潜泵油井产量.试验结果表明,该方法可以解决电潜泵油井生产过程中的两大问题:预测泵的工作状况,实时计算并优化泵的最大合理产量.操作人员根据预测结果可及时合理地采取防范措施,尽量避免故障的发生或将故障损失降到最低,及时调整油井的合理产量,使油井处于最佳生产状态,提高电潜泵油井生产运行的稳定性,并提高了试验油井产量的5%.     

Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion

This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists.