The relationship between corporate social responsibility and shareholder value: an empirical test of the risk management hypothesis

Do shareholders gain when managers disperse corporate resources through activities classified as corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Strategy scholars have recently developed a theoretical model that links such activities to shareholder value when a firm suffers a negative event; we test key portions of this theory of the ‘insurance‐like’ property of CSR activity. We posit that such activity leads to positive attributions from stakeholders, who then temper their negative judgments and sanctions toward firms because of this goodwill. We extend the risk management model by theorizing that some types of CSR activities will be more likely to create goodwill and offer insurance‐like protection than other types. We delineate several firm and event specific characteristics that we expect to influence the link between CSR activities and an insurance effect. We then test our model using an event study of 178 negative legal/regulatory actions against firms throughout the 11 years from 1993–2003. We find that participation in institutional CSR activities—those aimed at a firm's secondary stakeholders or society at large—provides an ‘insurance‐like’ benefit, while participation in technical CSRs—those activities targeting a firm's trading partners—yields no such benefits. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for future theorizing and research into the economic value of CSR engagement. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sequential bargaining with common values

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this game which is unique if offers are required to be strictly increasing. Equilibrium agreement is reached gradually and non-deterministically. The better informed player obtains a rent.     

Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations

We consider a notion of voluntary participation for mechanism design in public goods economies in which mechanisms select public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations that are robust to non-participation is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and may shrink to the endowment as the economy is replicated. When agents become small as the economy becomes large, any non-trivial mechanism suffers from non-participation when agents cannot be coerced to contribute.     

The Impact of Financial Incentives and Perceptions of Seriousness on Whistleblowing Intention

The purpose of this article is to qualitatively describe and critically explain the discursive construction of employee co-operation negotiations in Finland as an arena for management-by-fear. The article consists of a theoretical review, covering the legislative basis of co-operation negotiations and recent research on management-by-fear. The empirical study consists of media texts and company media releases in Finland in 2012–2013. The main conclusions are that there are distinctive features in the co-operation negotiations that enable and enforce the possibility of management-by-fear, and thus destructive leadership. The process, supported by law and very much against the original aim, enhances authoritative leadership, objectification of employees, distortion of information and misleading, and the negative consequences thereof. The process is an employer-invited discursive dance where the employee has to follow through the set steps and in the set rhythm, with the media orchestrating the tune and managing the fear. The study adds a valuable element to the research areas of downsizing, bad management, and the discursive construction of these phenomena.     

Positive uncertainty: the benefit of the doubt in advertising

Positive uncertainty refers to uncertainty surrounding an anticipated positive outcome. It provides consumers with the opportunity to imagine and speculate on a product's or experience's potentially positive characteristics. Research has shown that when uncertainty is associated with something positive, consumers may prefer uncertainty to certainty. In a between-subjects experimental design with a large US (n = 446) and Japanese sample (n = 453), the present study demonstrates that positive uncertainty increases consumers’ positive feelings when they evaluate a product, particularly for high-involvement products that allow consumers to imagine and speculate about potentially positive product benefits. Unexpectedly, the study findings are consistent across the two different markets, which vary substantially in terms of consumers’ level of uncertainty avoidance. Specifically, results show that future-framed advertisements are effective in generating positive uncertainty and that positive uncertainty generates positive attitudes, both in countries scoring high (Japan) and low (USA) on uncertainty avoidance.     

Social support timing and persistence in nascent entrepreneurship: exploring when instrumental and emotional support is most effective

This paper investigates how the timing of social support, both emotional and instrumental support, affects entrepreneurial persistence of nascent entrepreneurs. Drawing on social support theory, we hypothesize that the effectiveness of support depends on when, during the venture development process (number of gestation activities completed), it is provided. We also propose that the impact of social support depends on when during the entrepreneur’s life stage (age) that support is made available. Testing our hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset of nascent entrepreneurs, we find that emotional support is most relevant earlier on during venture development, while instrumental support is most relevant for entrepreneurs who begin their businesses in earlier life stages.     

A comparison of regret-based and utility-based discrete choice modelling – an empirical illustration with hospital bed choice

There is some concern that the unobserved preference heterogeneity in random utility maximization theory-based discrete choice experiment modelling is an important source of error variability. The randomness in utility is often interpreted as interpersonal preference heterogeneity but it can also be intrapersonal random variation in preferences. We compare utility maximization and regret minimization-based choice models’ sensitivity to individual heterogeneity, examine differences between two consecrated models and validate with empirical illustrations. We use frequency of category (public, semi-private, and private) of bed chosen from Swiss cross-sectional datasets (2007–2012) to compare two approaches – utility maximization and regret minimization by applying multinomial logit (MNL) models in regard to the variances in utility (regret) function, goodness-of-fit and predicted marginal effects (pseudo-elasticity) of additional payment. We find parameters with the same sign and estimates with almost same order of magnitude in both the approaches. The statistical significance of attribute effects is consistent in all variants of utility -based MNL models while effects of different attributes are significant only in heteroskedastic extreme value (HEV) variant of regret-based MNL models. This empirical illustration suggests that HEV variant of regret-based models perform better in capturing attribute effects in choice behaviour.     

Conflicted financial advice: disclosure revisited

We examine the impact of disclosing an advisor’s conflict of interest in providing financial advice to a client in an experiment. We find that an advisor’s conflict of interest harms the client and that disclosing the conflict harms the advisor. Unlike earlier literature, we do not find that disclosure of the advisor’s conflict of interest results in moral licensing or strategic exaggeration behaviour by the advisor nor, relatedly, that disclosure disadvantages the client.