The Evolution of Industrial Earnings Inequality in Mexico and Brazil

Industrial data are used to derive estimates of the pattern of change in wage inequality in Mexico and Brazil. Using the group decomposition of Theil's T -statistic, the paper presents monthly changes in the dispersion of industrial wages for Brazil (1976 through 1995) and for Mexico (1968 through 1998). Both countries show increases in wage dispersion over time, and a strong negative correlation is found with the rate of real economic growth. Other things equal, the later Brazilian heterodox stabilization plans seem to have reduced inequality in the short run.     

National telecommunications planning in Brazil

During the past 15 years Brazil has undergone a process of rapid modernization in its telecommunications. Starting from a chaotic situation, institutional foundations were established and an ambitious development programme carried out. A fundamental piece of this programme was a planning process that proved to be flexible and adequate to handle the social and economic disparities of the country. The policies that have emerged from the planning process were implemented and provided good economic results and satisfaction to customers.     

Strategic groups and performance in the Spanish hotel sector

This study uses the strategic group theory to identify business strategies and competitive advantages implemented by Spanish hotels, which are grouped together according to three variables (size, chain affiliation, and category) and the degree of development of the different business strategies. An analysis carried out with the aim of checking the potential existence of significant differences in performance among the strategic groups revealed that the highest performance levels are achieved by larger-sized, chain-affiliated, and higher-category hotels as well as by establishments which base their competitive advantage on category and capacity or size and internal management.     

Category management and consumer choice

This paper shows the results of an exploratory analysis of the structure of a complex product category: Wine. In complex categories, a usual strategy of consumers is the partitioning of alternatives into homogeneous subsets and the sequential eliminations of subsets until a product/brand is chosen from among few homogeneous alternatives in the last subset. To identify if there is such a kind of strategy and the product attributes involved is of great interest for the retailer. After a discussion of the different modelling alternatives of the choice process, the authors provide an application of the additive trees (ADDTREE) model to explore the hierarchical structure. The ADDTREE results provide a first overview of the competitive market structure of the wine category: competition becomes more intense as the wine category is partitioned by, first, the type of wine criteria and, second, the designation of origin (DO) criteria.     

Barriers to women entrepreneurship. Different methods,different results?

Building on research by Akehurst et al. (Serv Ind J 32:2489–2505, 2012), this study analysed internal and external factors in women entrepreneurship and linked these factors to the barriers that women face when starting businesses. To do so, two contrasting statistical techniques were used: PLS and QCA. After analysing results from each of these techniques, we observed that family duties and difficulties in obtaining financing (both internal and external) were the main factors related to barriers faced by women entrepreneurs.     

Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4).