POLONIA dynamics during the years 2006–2012 and the effectiveness of the monetary Policy of the National Bank of Poland

In the study we investigate the effectiveness of the National Bank of Poland in counteracting the negative results of the financial crisis in the Polish interbank market. The situation was exceptional in a sense, that during the period of the financial crisis the Polish interbank market experienced liquidity surplus, and the main problem of the central bank was to regain confidence among commercial banks and stimulate interbank transactions. We concentrate on the spread between the rate of overnight interbank loans and the reference rate and based upon its dynamics we assess the monetary policy of the Polish central bank. Using econometric techniques we study how the central bank influenced the spread, when its control over it weakened and when was it strengthened. The study is supported by the results of the survey directed to the headquarters of commercial banks. We conclude that the ability of the central bank to control overnight rate was temporarily lost during the first phases of the financial crisis, but gradually regained after implementation of the confidence pact.     

Under What Conditions Is an Insurance Guaranty Fund Beneficial for Policyholders?

In this article, we derive conditions in an imperfect market setting, under which the introduction of a self‐supporting insurance guaranty fund improves the position of the policyholders. When a guaranty fund is advantageous given homogeneous firms in the market, all policyholders benefit from it to the same extent, if they have the same underlying risk preferences and are charged identical premiums. In a more realistic heterogeneous setting, the introduction of an insurance guaranty fund is in general no longer beneficial for all policyholders in the same manner. Hence, systematic wealth transfers take place between the policyholders of different insurance companies. As a possible solution, and in order to counteract this effect, we introduce a framework for utility‐based fund charges.     

Testing for hypothetical bias in willingness to support a reforestation program

This study measures hypothetical bias in CVM-based estimates of willingness to support a forest protection and restoration program in Poland. It does so in two parallel ways: within- and between-subjects. To this end, participants are asked to vote in a referendum on an NGO-led reforestation project for various per-capita cost levels. They do so either directly or, as a surprise continuation, after a hypothetical analogue. Both methods deliver a similar (and substantial) level of hypothetical bias – it is slightly higher, but not significantly so, in the between-subject comparison. This suggests that hypothetical bias in this context is not primarily driven by such factors as consistency seeking or impression management.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

THE NUMÉRAIRE PROPERTY AND LONG‐TERM GROWTH OPTIMALITY FOR DRAWDOWN‐CONSTRAINED INVESTMENTS

We consider the portfolio choice problem for a long‐run investor in a general continuous semimartingale model. We combine the decision criterion of pathwise growth optimality with a flexible specification of attitude toward risk, encoded by a linear drawdown constraint imposed on admissible wealth processes. We define the constrained numéraire property through the notion of expected relative return and prove that drawdown‐constrained numéraire portfolio exists and is unique, but may depend on the investment horizon. However, when sampled at the times of its maximum and asymptotically as the time‐horizon becomes distant, the drawdown‐constrained numéraire portfolio is given explicitly through a model‐independent transformation of the unconstrained numéraire portfolio. The asymptotically growth‐optimal strategy is obtained as limit of numéraire strategies on finite horizons.     

Selfishness, cooperation, the evolutionary point of view and its implications for economics

The assumed selfishness of market actors could be considered in the context of two perspectives: macroeconomic and microeconomic. The first concerns the market mechanism as the most effective from the social well-being or the wealth of a nation points of view. The latter is based on the premises of the nature of human beings. I have distinguished between two possible ways of understanding selfish forms of behaviour in the market: as rational economic behaviour i.e. the most effective from the gains and losses point of view (i.e. public interests in the works of A. Smith) or as selfish from the psychological point of view (this is mostly presented by J. S. Mill's theory). The first approach seems to be concerned with the creation of the most effective market mechanism from the State's point of view. In the context of historical processes over 400 years, cultural evolution “has been promoting” selfish behaviour; for example, it was widely presented in T. Hobbes' works and then for over 200 years, the theory of A. Smith has been supporting and moulding the institutional context of market and social behaviour. Thus, positive economics describes the market created by the ideas of a neo-classical paradigm, which is based on the normative premises of A. Smith and J. S. Mill. Moreover, the virtual market behaviour described by “effects” (f. e. Veblen's effect) and failures seems to be a manifestation of a discrepancy between market reality and the classical assumptions.The social evolution of human beings has been advantageous to the human species. Moreover, from the social point of view, pro-social behaviour is “natural” as well as desirable and it has been preferred by the cultural evolution. Competitiveness assumes that somebody has to lose, because someone gains. Cooperation looks for gains for all the players. The choice is political, and not imposed by selfishness.     

MONETARY POLICY IN A NON‐REPRESENTATIVE AGENT ECONOMY: A SURVEY

It is well known that central bank policies affect not only macroeconomic aggregates, but also their distribution across economic agents. Similarly, a number of papers demonstrated that heterogeneity of agents may matter for the transmission of monetary policy to macro variables. Despite this, the mainstream monetary economics literature has so far been dominated by dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with representative agents. This paper aims to tilt this imbalance towards heterogeneous agents setups by surveying the main positive and normative findings of this line of the literature, and suggesting areas in which these models could be implemented. In particular, we review studies that analyse the heterogeneity of (i) households’ income, (ii) households’ preferences, (iii) consumers’ age, (iv) expectations and (v) firms’ productivity and financial position. We highlight the results on issues that, by construction, cannot be investigated in a representative agent framework and discuss important papers modifying the findings from the representative agent literature.     

ARBITRAGE BOUNDS FOR PRICES OF WEIGHTED VARIANCE SWAPS

We develop a theory of robust pricing and hedging of a weighted variance swap given market prices for a finite number of co‐maturing put options. We assume the put option prices do not admit arbitrage and deduce no‐arbitrage bounds on the weighted variance swap along with super‐ and sub‐replicating strategies that enforce them. We find that market quotes for variance swaps are surprisingly close to the model‐free lower bounds we determine. We solve the problem by transforming it into an analogous question for a European option with a convex payoff. The lower bound becomes a problem in semi‐infinite linear programming which we solve in detail. The upper bound is explicit. We work in a model‐independent and probability‐free setup. In particular, we use and extend Föllmer's pathwise stochastic calculus. Appropriate notions of arbitrage and admissibility are introduced. This allows us to establish the usual hedging relation between the variance swap and the “log contract” and similar connections for weighted variance swaps. Our results take the form of a FTAP: we show that the absence of (weak) arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a classical model which reproduces the observed prices via risk‐neutral expectations of discounted payoffs.