On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation. We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC, IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first author).     

A MARKET WITH FRICTIONS IN THE MATCHING PROCESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

We construct a laboratory market in which there is a friction in the matching between buyers and sellers. Sellers simultaneously post prices and then buyers simultaneously choose a seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the seller's single unit is randomly sold to one of them. Our results show a broad consistency with theoretical predictions, although price dispersion exists and is slow to decay. Prices also exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and buyers' purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.     

Henry George and Europe

A bstract . In the eyes of European scholars, publicists and politicians who studied Henry George's work, he, as a social philosopher , had adopted the position of the natural law philosophers of the 18th century. The latter inspired the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, as well as the poiitical philosophy of Jeffersonian democracy , the ethos of the 18th and 19th century pioneer settlers. George rejected Social Darwinism. He saw natural law as the only true and reliable basis for a just social order. Like Karl Marx he mastered Ricardian economics ; unlike Marx, George made two factors the basis of his system, labor and land. George saw that each person had a natural right —and a natural imperative for survival —to apply his or her productive capacity to the earth –as living space and as storehouse of nutrients and raw materials. The person-land relationship , he discovered, lay at the basis of human culture. And so the land's rent , now monopolized by the few, had to be appropriated to meet the needs of society, most efficiently and justly by a land value tax.     

Henry George and Europe: As Dissident Economist and Path-breaking Philosopher, He was a Catalyst for British Social Reform

Abstract . Henry George's influence was greater in the United Kingdom than in the United States. The 80s and 90s there were particularly favorable for the reception of his revolutionary ideas. Though, thanks to such thinkers as Alfred Russell Wallace and James and John Stuart Mill, a land reform movement already existed, its sudden rise to national significance was due to George. George's writing and speaking skills and his dedication moved many serious citizens into the political Left and heavily influenced men and women who became leaders of British non-Marxian socialism, at the formation and consolidation of their movement. While George's followers broke with both the Wallace and socialist movements, George's rhetorical talents awakened the broad circles of thinking people to a consciousness of the full range of the social question.     

Alternative sources of technology: An analysis of induced innovations

This paper considers why firms differ in the degree to which they rely on their internal R&D organization for generating new technologies (induced innovations) rather than on existing external technology markets (purchased innovations). An empirical model is suggested to explan inter-firm differences in the percentage of new technology induced through R&D efforts. The analysis suggests that such differences are systematically related to the firm's size, its competative environment, and its degree of diversification.     

Environmental regulatory enforcement with “green” consumers

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions     

Expected inflation and the optimal number of nominal wage rate revisions

A neglected aspect of wage contracts, namely the number of times that the nominal wage rate will be revised during the course of a non-indexed contract, is considered. Theory and evidence suggest that the optimal number of revisions depends on the cost of each revision, expected inflation and contract length.     

Random coefficient regression and the long-run phillips curve for the U.S.

This research suggests that a random coefficient regression model is well-suited for analyzing long-run versus short-run movements in wages and unemployment and is an improvement over some empirical techniques typically used.