Why is research on management accounting change not explicitly evolutionary? Taking the next step in the conceptualisation of management accounting change

In this article we discuss the evolutionary foundation of the OIE-guided management accounting change research building on the framework of [Scapens R.W. 1994. Never mind the gap: towards an institutional perspective on management accounting practice. Management Accounting Research, 5, 301–321.] and [Burns, J. and Scapens, R.W., 2000. Conceptualizing management accounting change: an institutional framework. Management Accounting Research, 11, 3–25.]. We argue that research on management accounting change should be based on evolutionary theory, but that the full potential of evolutionary theory has not yet been described or used in management accounting research. The conceptualisation and understanding of management accounting change can be improved and expanded if the evolutionary approach is developed beyond the general belief that it describes only small and gradual, often slow, changes. In this article we show that an evolutionary perspective on management accounting change implies that management accounting’s development is explained as the interaction between the evolutionary sub processes of retention (inheritance), variation and selection. Thus, both continuity and change are seen as evolutionary outcomes. These processes follow the cumulative causality that Charles Darwin proposed and Thorstein Veblen applied to the social sciences. Such a comprehensive theory, here labelled Universal Darwinism, must, however, be given substance with supporting details.     

A Critical Appraisal of the Current Use of Transaction Cost Explanations for Government Make-Or-Buy Choices: Towards a Contingent Theory and Forms of Tests

Abstract

This article aims at contributing to the extant literature on government make-or-buy choices building on transaction cost economics (TCE) by explicitly theorizing about transaction alignment and its relation to performance. It is argued that current theoretical and empirical models of government make-or-buy choices are not able to make predictions that corroborate theory. They are dependent upon the assumption of perfect competition that is ill-suited for the public sector setting. Instead, contingent models that take performance differences into account constitute a more valid model of TCE in this setting. In this article, theoretical models and empirical approaches for such a research agenda are developed.     

Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility

In a bargaining model, we show that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long‐term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short‐term contracts. Therefore, a decrease in the benefit level reduces the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long‐term than with short‐term contracts, thereby creating an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers are shown to change in the same direction.     

International alliances: Why now?

Conclusion Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995) suggest several items for further research, including “Why are strategic alliances more pervasive in some industries relative to others?” (p. 294) and “Which objectives are best pursued using an alliance strategy?” (p. 295). The speculations offered here suggest that such research can be more deeply grounded in the industry structure. For example, one can suggest that the competitive intensity and the degree to which markets are global will help explain why ISAs in distribution and manufacturing are formed. It is also possible to advance the hypothesis that where the objectives of the alliances revolve around R&D, the speed of new product introductions will predict an increasing reliance on ISAs. The main proposition emerging out of the theoretical speculation is that international SAs in R&D have arisen because unique and protected technological know-how is a thing of the past. No firm in a competitive industry can any longer expect to be alone with a unique technological capability. Thus there is no reason to avoid collaborating with “the enemy,” the competitors. The second proposition is that some firms need to be in multiple markets and products to compete effectively and that alliances are an efficient way to leverage scarce resources. Distribution and manufacturing ISAs are organizational consequences of lean manufacturing and re-engineering. He is an expert in the areas of international marketing strategy and consumer decision making, especially as applied to Japanese and European companies and markets, and has published extensively. Johansson has held faculty positions at the University of Washington and the University of Illinois and has held several visiting appointments in Japan, Europe, Canada, and the United States. He is on the editorial boards of several prestigious journals. Johansson earned his Ph.D. and M.B.A. degrees from the University of California, Berkeley, and his undergraduate degree (Civilekonom) at the Stockholm School of Economics.     

Commodity prices as payment vehicles in valuation experiments

Many contingent valuation experiments use commodity prices as the payment vehicle. In this note it is shown, in general, that this approach does not allow the investigator to extract the respondent's willingness to pay. However, it is also shown how the valuation question can be formulated so as to yield a commodity price payment vehicle which is equivalent to a lump sum payment.The idea for this paper came while teaching the Royal Economic Society Easter School in Birmingham (March/April 1995). I am grateful to my students for stimulating discussions and comments on the subject. Kerry Smith provided me with (as always) insightful comments on an     

Self-employment and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Finland

Using a large Finnish micro data set, I study how wealth influences the decision to become self-employed. The main result is that personal wealth increases the probability of a person becoming self-employed. This suggests the presence of liquidity constraints.
JEL classification: J 23; M 13     

The theory of the experimentally organized economy and competence blocs: an introduction

This article presents the theory of the experimentally organized economy and competence blocs. The theory assumes that information is immense and that economic actors are boundedly rational. This makes practically all economic activities to some extent uncertain and unpredictable; they become experimental in nature. Economic growth is, hence, viewed as an evolutionary process of the discovery, use and selection of knowledge. So-called competence blocs—the minimum set of agents with different, but complementary competencies required to generate and commercialize new combinations—are identified as necessary for efficient resource allocation. The incentives given by the institutions to the actors in the competence bloc are crucial for economic performance.