Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

During the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social interactions for explaining sickness-absence behavior. In this context, public discussions about the intentions of the insurance, and of the rights and duties of the receivers, may be important for reducing the sickness absence. In this article, we study whether information meetings about the Swedish sickness insurance affect the length of sickness-absence spells. The study is based on experimental data on individuals with weak labor market attachments. The displacement of when the call to the meeting was sent out was randomized. Comparing the survival functions of those called immediately with those whose calls were delayed (by about 30 days) makes it possible to study whether the length of sickness absence is affected by receiving the call earlier. The result suggests that the length is reduced by, on average, 20%. In the long term (12 months later), there is no effect of the information meeting. This suggests that attendance to the information meeting does not change individuals’ long-term behavior.     

The Manure Hits the Land: Economic and Environmental Implications When Land Application of Nutrients Is Constrained

The discharge of manure nutrients into area waters from confined animal feeding operations is considered a leading contributor to U.S. water quality impairments. An option to mitigate these impairments is to constrain land application of manure. When these constraints are particularly binding, due to minimal acceptance of manure as a substitute for commercial fertilizer, potentially large and unanticipated changes in returns to agricultural production and water quality may occur. Moreover, some of the cost of meeting the constraints is passed on to consumers through higher prices and to a portion of rural economies through lower production rates and labor expenditures.     

Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice

Key features of U.S. agri-environmental programs are reviewed and analyzed using literature review and program data. We focus, in particular, on several key questions: Has benefit-cost targeting increased the environmental benefit obtained from program budgets? Has competitive bidding reduced program costs? To what extent have these program designs resulted in additional gain (that would not have otherwise been obtained)? Previous research illustrates how benefit-cost targeting using environmental indices (such as the Environmental Benefits Index in the Conservation Reserve Program) can increase environmental cost-effectiveness. Previous research and data from two U.S. programs suggests that bidding has reduced costs, but that the full potential of bidding may not have been realized. Finally, most U.S. programs are intended to yield environmental gains that would not have otherwise been obtained, but sometimes fall short of this goal.     

An analysis of dynamic risk in the Greater China equity markets

This study looks at the time-varying nature of systematic risk in the Greater China equity markets. The Shanghai and Shenzhen markets both have a low average systematic risk when measured against the world market. The short outbursts in systematic risk for these two markets seem to be directly related to policy shifts. The Hong Kong and Taiwan markets are more integrated with world markets and they show signs of large variations in systematic risk over time. Furthermore, conditional betas in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are stationary, while the Hong Kong and Taiwan betas are integrated of order one. In addition, long memory tests show that all four markets exhibit a long-run dependence in their conditional betas. While the two mainland China market betas are covariance stationary, the Hong Kong and Taiwan betas are not.     

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.     

Institutional Effects on the Evolution of the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper it is argued that the size distribution of firms may largely be determined by institutional factors. This hypothesis is tested in an exploratory fashion by studying the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time in Sweden for a period spanning from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. The data used are divided into finer size classes compared to most previous studies. This gives more scope for investigating the impact of institutions. Moreover, we use a unique data set, starting in 1984, to take account of corporate groups and government ownership. The analysis shows a poor development for intermediate-sized (10–199 employees) firms. This is likely to reflect the existence of a threshold that many firms are either unwilling or unable to cross. The analysis of the institutions and rules of the game determining the entrepreneurial and business conditions in Sweden indicate that the conditions have been unfavorable for small firms, and hence that too few small firms have managed to grow out of the smallest size classes. The conclusion is supported by an international comparison of the number of firms in different size classes. Data indicate that Sweden has fewer small (10–99 employees), and more large (500+) firms per capita than other European countries.     

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.     

The effects of input tariffs on productivity: panel data evidence for OECD countries

Based on a panel of 16 OECD countries and 10 manufacturing industries over 1996–2007, this paper investigates the impact of tariffs on foreign intermediate goods on productivity growth in downstream manufacturing industries. The results show that imposing tariffs on imported intermediate goods is particularly harmful for industries that operate close to the global technological frontier. We also consider the possibility that input-tariff liberalisation may have different effects depending on the technological content of imported intermediate goods. Our findings suggest that protecting imports of high-technological goods is more harmful for productivity improvements in industries that operate close to global best practice.     

Organizing and Disorganizing Strategic Communication: Discursive Institutional Change Dynamics in Two Communication Departments

This article explores the institutionalization of strategic communication as a dynamic interplay between macro- and mesolevel discourses. The change processes in the two cases of this study involved both a reorientation of the purpose of the communication function and a physical relocation of the professionals to a centralized department. In both organizations, the transformation toward a strategic management function failed and the communication professionals are now working in ways similar to those before the change was initiated. The analysis illustrates that the institutionalization of strategic communication is effected by organizational-level processes and mechanisms that are not always controlled by communication professionals. The institutionalization of strategic communication is bound by organizational discourses as well as by the actions of communication practitioners and general managers. The study also shows that macro- and mesolevel discourses influence the ways in which change initiatives are translated and strategic communication effected on an organizational level. Hence, institutionalization processes of strategic communication will comply with management trends but can change direction when these trends are challenged. Our results expose that new ideas or practices of strategic communication are translated discursively within organizations in processes of recontextualization, reinterpretation, and reframing. Consequently, new ideas and practices of strategic communication are adjusted to organizational discourses and organizational settings. The translation of a new idea or practice will therefore change the initial meaning of that same idea or practice. For that reason, institutionalization of strategic communication should not be reduced to a unidirectional process but conceptualized as a dynamic interplay between discourses on different levels that moves institutionalization in multiple directions.