SAVINGS BEHAVIOR IN 17 OECD COUNTRIES

This article compares savings behavior in a sample of 17 OECD countries over 24 years. On the basis of an analysis of variance and of a life-cycle-hypothesis-based equation, we test the homogeneity of households' savings behavior. It appears that one cannot really speak of a homogeneous saving behavior across countries. This is a relevant finding in times of increasing economic and financial integration.     

Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition

Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal withholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.     

Employment Subsidy with Capital Mobility

Most models of tax competition assume full employment. Yet, actually one often observes that fiscal competition, particularly when it is aimed at attracting investment, is motivated by the concern of fighting unemployment and enhancing job creation. The present paper considers a multicountry model with capital mobility and unemployment. Fiscal policy has two opposing objectives: financing unemployment insurance and increasing employment. In each country there is a majority vote on this policy.
The purpose of the paper is to analyse how opening borders to capital flows modifies the median voter's choice of the employment subsidy. Assuming that capital and labour are complements, economic integration is shown to raise the employment subsidy with fixed wages. This agrees with intuition as a larger employment subsidy attracts more capital. However, when wages are set by labour unions economic integration can change the median voter's choice in either direction.     

Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisited

This article studies the optimal direct/indirect tax mix problem when individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments). It presents general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1976) result, differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods. When cross substitution effects are zero, the expressions resemble traditional many households Ramsey rules. In a Cobb–Douglas illustration, where endowments differ only in good 1 (interpreted as “wealth”), the tax on good 2 provides an indirect way to tax the unobservable wealth.     

The Inherited Inequality: How Demographic Aging and Pension Reforms can Change the Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth

The role of inherited wealth in modern economies has increasingly come under scrutiny. This study presents one of the first attempts to shed light on how demographic aging could shape this role. It shows that, in the absence of retirement annuities, or for a given level of annuitization, both increasing longevity and decreasing fertility should reduce the inherited share of total wealth in a given economy. Thus, aging is not likely to explain a recent surge in this share in some advanced economies. Shrinking retirement annuities, however, could offset and potentially reverse these effects. The paper also shows that individual bequests will be more unequally distributed if aging is driven by a drop in fertility. In comparison, the effect of increasing longevity on their distribution is non‐monotonic.     

Missing poor and income mobility

Higher mortality among the poor prevents standard poverty measures from quantifying the actual extent of old-age poverty. Whereas existing attempts to deal with the ”missing poor” problem assume the absence of income mobility and assign to the prematurely dead a fictitious income equal to the last income enjoyed, this paper relaxes that assumption in order to study the impact of income mobility on the size of the missing poor bias. We use data on poverty above age 60 in 12 countries from the EU-SILC database, and we compare standard poverty rates with the hypothetical poverty rates that would have prevailed if (i) all individuals, whatever their income, had enjoyed the same survival conditions, and if (ii) all individuals within the same income class had been subject to the same income mobility process. Taking income mobility into account has unequal effects on corrected poverty measures across countries, and, hence, affects international comparisons in terms of old-age poverty.     

The political economy of derived pension rights

Derived pension rights (including survivor benefits and spousal compensations for one-earner couples) exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They are mainly viewed as a means to alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how they can emerge from a political economy process when Social Security is a combination of Bismarckian and Beveridgean pillars. We find that the pension system should be contributive but with a positive level of derived rights. We also show that such a system encourages stay-at-home wives, thus revealing an unpleasant trade-off between female labor participation and poverty alleviation.     

Public production and shadow pricing in a model of disequilibrium in labour and capital markets

This paper develops second-best rules for public investment and employment in various regimes of disequilibrium on the capital and the labour markets. The model used is very simple so as to imply rules which can easily be interpreted and contrasted with the current literature on the subject. Another issue considered is that of possible changes of regimes within a process of welfare improvement involving adjustments in the public production plan; it is dealt with through a numerical example which points out that such changes can indeed occur.     

A model of the optimal allocation of government expenditures

Government expenditures can be used for various socioeconomic objectives, including public education, consumption of public goods and services, and social protection. This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of public expenditures among these competing functions. We establish an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals in which the government optimally chooses income tax, transfer payment, educational spending, and public consumption. Our model characterizes the transitional dynamics and the steady state of each function with and without a pay‐as‐you‐go intergenerational contract. We also conduct a simulation illustrating that the presence of an intergenerational contract may raise public consumption and social welfare in the steady state.     

Redistributive taxation and social insurance

This paper studies the role of social insurance as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal (linear or general) income tax. It considers a second-best setting with two unobservable individual characteristics: ability, measured by the wage rate and risk, measured by the probability of incurring a loss. It shows that both tax progressivity and the optimal level of social insurance crucially depend on the correlation between ability and risk.This paper has been prepared for the IIPF 51 st Congress held in Lisbon, August 21–24, 1995. The authors are grateful to F. Gahvari, M. Lundholm, M. Marchand, J.-C. Rochet, P. Sørenson and the referees for their comments.