Charities and the political support for estate taxation

We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good.     

Taxing Sin Goods and Subsidizing Health Care*

We study the taxation of sin goods in a two‐period, three‐good model. Individuals can buy health care to compensate for the damages caused by their earlier sin‐good consumption. Individuals are myopic and underestimate the effect of the sinful consumption on health; in their second period, they may acknowledge their mistake or persist in their error. We characterize and compare the first‐best and the (linear) second‐best taxes in these different settings. In particular, we examine how the results are affected by the way sin‐good consumption and health care interact in health production technology.     

Redistributive taxation and social insurance

This paper studies the role of social insurance as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal (linear or general) income tax. It considers a second-best setting with two unobservable individual characteristics: ability, measured by the wage rate and risk, measured by the probability of incurring a loss. It shows that both tax progressivity and the optimal level of social insurance crucially depend on the correlation between ability and risk.This paper has been prepared for the IIPF 51 st Congress held in Lisbon, August 21–24, 1995. The authors are grateful to F. Gahvari, M. Lundholm, M. Marchand, J.-C. Rochet, P. Sørenson and the referees for their comments.     

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re‐examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

Optimal redistribution when different workers are indistinguishable

Abstract.  Using the standard non linear income and commodity taxation framework, we examine the optimal policy to be adopted when the same labour disutility can receive two opposite interpretations: taste for leisure and activity limitation. In the absence of complete information about individual characteristics, an income tax does not allow distinguishing lazy from handicapped individuals. One may rely, however, on a combination of commodity and income taxes to redistribute from the former to the latter when they differ in their preferences for commodities. JEL Classification: H21, H41
Redistribution optimale quand les divers travailleurs sont indistincts.  A l'aide du cadre d'analyse conventionnel de fiscalité non linéaire sur les revenus et les biens, ce mémoire examine la politique optimale à adopter quand le même niveau de désutilité du travail peut être interprété de deux manières opposées : goût pour le loisir et souffrance attribuable à une infirmité. En l'absence de renseignements complets à propos des caractéristiques des individus, un impôt sur le revenu ne permet pas de distinguer les individus paresseux de ceux qui sont handicapés. On peut cependant compter sur une combinaison de taxes sur les revenus et les biens pour redistribuer du premier groupe vers le second quand leurs préférences pour les biens diffèrent.     

Discount rates and shadow prices for public investment

This paper extends the Harberger–Sandmo–Drèze model for public discount rates to a many-good economy. It derives a formula for discount rates which are specific to each public enterprise or agency and used by them to discount future outputs and inputs evaluated at market prices. Such an approach is shown to be more efficient than that of simply using a single rate for all public projects. It is also more practical than asking each public firm to use second-best shadow prices in their analyses of investment projects.The general results are first provided; then, simple cases are considered and numerical examples presented to help interpret our formula and analyse its main determinants.     

The Double Dividend of Postponing Retirement

Early retirement seems to plague social security systems in a number of European countries. In this paper we argue that delaying retirement may have two positive effects: it is likely to partially restore the financial balance of the system, and it may foster redistribution among retirees. To obtain such a double dividend, the benefit rule of the initial social security scheme must have the following two characteristics. First, it operates redistribution within generations. Second, it is biased and induces early retirement.