Biological Adaptation in Human Societies: a ‘Basic Needs’ Approach

The groundzero premise (so to speak) of the biological sciences is that survival and reproduction is the basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; life is at bottom a survival enterprise. It follows that survival is the paradigmatic problem for human societies as well; it is a prerequisite for any other, more exalted objectives. Although the term adaptation is also familiar to social scientists, until recently it has been used only selectively, and often very imprecisely. Here a more rigorous and systematic approach to the concept of adaptation is proposed in terms of basic needs. The concept of basic human needs has a venerable history – tracing back at least to Plato and Aristotle. Yet the development of a formal theory of basic needs has lagged far behind. The reason is that the concept of objective, measurable needs is inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions that have dominated economic and social theory for most of this century, namely, valuerelativism and cultural determinism. Nevertheless, there have been a number of efforts over the past 30 years to develop more universalistic criteria for basic needs, both for use in monitoring social wellbeing (social indicators) and for public policy formulation. Here I will advance a strictly biological approach to perationalizing the concept of basic needs. It is argued that much of our economic and social life (and the motivations behind our revealed preferences and subjective utility assessments), not to mention the actions of modern governments, are either directly or indirectly related to the meeting of our basic survival needs. Furthermore, these needs can be specified to a first approximation and supported empirically to varying degrees, with the obvious caveat that there are major individual and contextual variations in their application. Equally important, complex human societies generate an array of instrumental needs which, as the term implies, serve as intermediaries between our primary needs and the specific economic, cultural and political contexts within which these needs must be satisfied. An explicit framework of Survival Indicators, including a profile of Personal Fitness and an aggregate index of Population Fitness, is briefly elucidated. Finally, it is suggested that a basic needs paradigm could provide an analytical tool (a biologic) for examining more closely the relationship between our social, economic and political behaviors and institutions and their survival consequences, as well as providing a predictive tool of some value.     

On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person non-transferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Unemployment Risk, Labour Force Participation and Savings

This paper analyses labour force participation and precautionary savings in the presence of risks of being fired or failing to secure a job offer when out of the labour market. We use a finite horizon framework with two employment states and a stage utility function which is CARA in consumption but non-separable in leisure. The results are that there is precautionary labour force participation: employment risk lowers the reservation wage; generally it also reduces consumption. However due to the non-separability assumption, precautionary savings, as usually defined, may not be positive. We characterize the reservation wage and contrast the results with those in which the stage utility is additive in leisure and consumption. We extend the analysis to study the effects of cyclical variation in employment risk, of stochastic future wage rates, and of adding a third employment state of search.     

The impact of corporate strategy on the capital structure of Australian companies

Research into the capital structure of firms has been the subject of extensive empirical investigation but further progress may be constrained by the conventional paradigm underlying most of this work. This paper seeks to extend the debate by examining the endogenous influence of corporate strategy on financing decisions made by firms. While the theoretical specification of the possible relationship has to be developed further, various models were constructed and company data from Australia, an economy with some notoriety for fairly loose corporate debt management, was used to examine various hypothesized relationships. Our analysis suggests that corporate strategy influences capital structure, particularly for the most diversified firms, and that the emerging relationship is complex. Profit, cash flow, the rate of growth and the level of earnings risk are important additional internal influences on capital structure. The results are reasonably robust and indicate that this focus of enquiry has considerable potential for further resolution of the capital structure puzzle, as well as contributing to the debate on the impact of institutional shareholders on the corporate strategy of the firms in which they invest.     

Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment

This paper assesses the relationship between corruption and inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Previous research has presumed that corruption directly enters the cost function of multinationals, suggesting a negative relationship between corruption and FDI. For a sample of 73 developed and less developed countries and the time period 1995–1999, we find a clear positive relationship between corruption and FDI. Corruption is thus a stimulus for FDI.     

Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality

The author argues that increased foreign competition can affect technical choice and skill differentials even when actual imports do not rise significantly. A model is presented of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) in which a reduction in import barriers (whether technological or policy–imposed) encourages more strategic investment by incumbent firms. The predictions accord with many of the stylized facts: higher skill premia; higher ratios of skilled to unskilled workers employed in all sectors and throughout the economy; little change in import volumes or prices; and rapid technological progress with rather little change in total factor productivity.     

Revealed preference and differentiable demand

Summary. We prove that, for finitely many demand observations, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference tests not only the existence of a strictly concave, strictly monotone and continuous utility generator, but also one that generates an infinitely differentiable demand function. Our results extend those of previous related results (Matzkin and Richter, 1991; Chiappori and Rochet, 1987), yielding differentiable demand functions but without requiring differentiable utility functions.Received: 1 November 2001, Revised: 5 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D12. Correspondence to: Kam-Chau WongThis is a much revised version of Lee and Wong (2001). We are grateful to the Referee for valuable suggestions. We also thank Professor Marcel K. Richter for his comments.