Rules versus discretion - A disinflation case

This paper compares a strict inflation target regime to a conservative central bank regime to determine the monetary regime appropriate for a disinflation process. The analysis shows that in a two-period model, in which policymakers face given first-period inflationary expectations, a strict inflation target could be preferred to the appointment of a conservative central banker who has discretion. The result differs from that of Rogoff (1985), who assumed rational expectations and concluded that a conservative central banker is always preferable. The disadvantage of the conservative central banker derives from his tendency to accelerate disinflation relative to rate that maximizes social welfare.JEL Classification: E52, E58The authors are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Nissan Liviatan, Allan Drazen, Amit Friedman and Yoav Friedmann for their useful suggestions. We also thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Tel Aviv University macroeconomic workshop, at the Research Department seminar, Bank of Israel, and at the Bank of Israels conference on Macroeconomic Policy, October 2002.     

The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices, and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.     

The value of tax benefits and the cost of liquidating versus selling failed thrift institutions

This paper examines the 205 insolvent thrifts that were resolved in 1988 and assesses the cost savings obtained by selling 179 of the institutions through assisted acquisitions rather than liquidating them. It is hypothesized that the cost savings were determined by factors related both to the future viability of the acquired institution and the particulars of the deal arranged by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The added value by selling a thrift is determined primarily by the level of core deposits obtained by the acquired thrift. However, the branch structure and purchased mortgage-servicing rights should also add franchise value to the firm. In addition to these factors, the analysis accounts for the tax benefits and other regulator forbearances associated with the deals. Other characteristics of the deals are also considered. It is found that core deposits, tax benefits, purchased mortgage-servicing rights, average branch size, and type of acquirer, as well as some other factors, were significant determinants of the cost savings obtained through selling an institution rather than liquidating it.     

Alliances versus Federations: An Extension of Riker's Analysis of Federal Formation

This essay explores the distinction between federations and alliances and asks the question: When will states choose to federate rather than ally? William Riker argues that a necessary condition for a federal state's formation is that those offering the federal bargain must seek to “expand their territorial control, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement.” This argument, though, does not tell us why states sometimes respond to threats by forming federations and at other times by forming alliances. Here we address this issue directly and use a formal model of alliance formation to illustrate our arguments. Briefly, that model assumes states have initial endowments of military and economic resources, where economic resources enter utility functions directly and military capability influences preference only insofar as it determines a state's ability to counter or make threats. State can divert economic resources to military spending, and alliances, in turn, are self-enforcing coalitions designed to augment a state's offensive or defensive capabilities. Federations, which serve the same ends as alliances, are coalitions that need to be enforced by the “higher authority” established when the federation is formed. Our assumption is that states form federations in lieu of alliances if and only if (1) a stable alliance partition does not exist or, if one exists, it is dominated by an unstable partition and (2) if the cost of the loss of sovereignty to each state in the federation is offset by the gains from joining it, relative to what that state secures as its security value.     

Time‐consistent optimal fiscal policy*

This article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. We find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment. First, capital income tax rates are very high (65% on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment). Second, labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around 31% under full commitment). Finally, labor income taxes are quite volatile, whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero.     

Independent central banks as a component of the separation of powers

Citizens are strongly interested not to suffer from the damages wrought by inflation. With the development of inconvertible fiat paper money and the creation of the monopoly of central banks to issue unlimited amounts of banknotes the restrictions formerly existing because of the convertibility of notes into gold or silver at a fixed parity have been removed. As a consequence a constitutional or legal limitation of the supply of money became necessary to check the inflationary bias of politicians became necessary. This could be reached by introducing the independence of central banks from political and governmental influence as a fourth pillar of the separation of powers. The paper also discusses under which conditions monetary stability and independence of central banks can develop and under which it is threatened.     

Brands of Economics and the Trojan Horse of Pluralism

This paper examines the current status and prospects of heterodox approaches to economics in relation to the problem of marketing ideas to groups of potential users who see the world in very different ways. It draws lessons from the changing status of behavioural economics and highlights the marketing problems that arise between heterodox economists whose perspectives overlap only partially. Its principal message is that the best hope for heterodox economics may lie in taking a less openly combative approach than hitherto when trying to win over mainstream economists and instead using strategies of stealth based on the empirical advantages of pluralistic applied research methods.