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31.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,36(2):237-254
In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers
(green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and
environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that
more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental
attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it.
Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the
positive market effect.
相似文献
32.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
33.
José M. Luengo Sagrario Arias Mario Arcos Elías R. Olivera 《Spanish Economic Review》2005,7(4):307-307
Spanish Economic Review referees (2003-2004)
Spanish Economic Review referees (2003-2004) 相似文献34.
Isabel Pardo García 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(4):459-467
The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic and social cohesion in the European Union. There are different factors to
explain the convergence process and besides, empirical findings are not conclusive. To the European Union, GDP per head interregional
differences have decreased for certain periods but it has remained unchanged or even increased for others periods. The second
report on the economic and social cohesion indicates that some decades are necessary to eliminate regional differences. These
differences in regional GDP are mainly explained by differences in their productive structures, degree of innovate activity,
communications structures, which depend on the relative level of transport infrastructures, and manpower qualifications. This
analysis allows us to obtain some conclusions to the economic policies and the social cohesion.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in the 57th International Atlantic Conference, held in Lisbon, Portugal,
March 10–14, 2004. 相似文献
35.
ABSTRACT The paper makes three contributions to the understanding of the post-crisis European banking governance. First, it offers a more comprehensive approach to banking governance, beyond the Banking Union, through its concept of ‘New European Banking Governance’ (NEBG) that incorporates EU state aid rules and fiscal regulations. Second, it considers the impact of NEBG on democratic institutions and processes in EU member states, an under-researched topic in the literature on European banking governance. Finally, through its in-depth case study of Slovenia it considers the NEBG in relation to peripheral Eurozone states. It argues that the post-crisis banking governance framework of the EU not only severely constrained the Slovenian state in its policy choices but rearranged its policy-making institutions in a way that restricted and continues to restrict democratic banking policy formation. 相似文献
36.
Let X (r, n, m, k), 1 r n, denote generalized order statistics based on an absolutely continuous distribution function F. We characterize all distribution functions F for which the following linearity of regression holds
E(X(r+l,n,m,k) | X(r,n,m,k))=aX(r,n,m,k)+b.We show that only exponential, Pareto and power distributions satisfy this equation. Using this result one can obtain characterizations of exponential, Pareto and power distributions in terms of sequential order statistics, Pfeifers records and progressive type II censored order statistics.
Received July 2001/Revised August 2002 相似文献
37.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
38.
A new framework is presented for the study of the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Koopmans’ equation in the unbounded
case, that is based on the contraction mapping approach. In the bounded below case with bounded consumption streams, uniqueness
of the solution in the whole class of weak-star continuous utility functions is obtained. When the aggregator is unbounded
below and/or consumption streams are unbounded, existence of a weak-star continuous solution is shown, and a simple criterium
to check the sufficient conditions for existence is provided.
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero and Carlos Rodríguez-Palmero gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER funds under Research Projects MTM2005-06534 and SEJ2005-08709/ECON, respectively, and by Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Castilla y León under Research Projects VA99/04 and VA017B05, respectively. This paper has substantially benefited from the comments of an
anonymous referee. Particular and special thanks are due to Robert Becker for his very helpful comments and valuable suggestions. 相似文献
39.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
40.