Taxation and the stock market valuation of capital gains and dividends: Theory and emphirical results

Dividends seem to be more heavily taxed than capital gains. Why then do corporations pay dividends rather than repurchasing shares or retaining earnings? Either corporations are not acting in the interests of shareholders, or else shareholders desire dividends sufficiently for nontax reasons to offset the tax effect.In this paper, we measure the relative valuation of dividends and capital gains in the stock market, using a variant of the capital asset pricing model. We find that dividends are not valued differently systematically from capital gains. This finding is consistent with share price maximization by firms but inconsistent with the fact that most shareholderspay a heavier tax on dividends.We also show that the relative value of dividends provides an indirect measure of a marginal Tobin's q. The measured value of dividends relative to capital gains tends to be higher during prosperous periods, as is consistent with this interpretation. We hope that this time series on a marginal Tobin's q will prove to be useful in forecasting the rate of investment.     

Analyzing a panel of seasonal time series: Does seasonality in industrial production converge across Europe?

In this paper we consider deterministic seasonal variation in quarterly industrial production for several European countries, and we address the question whether this variation has become more similar across countries over time. Due to economic and institutional factors, one may expect convergence across business cycles. When these have similar characteristics as seasonal cycles, one may perhaps also find convergence in seasonality. To this aim, we propose a method that is based on treating the set of production series as a panel. By testing for the relevant parameter restrictions for moving window samples, we examine the hypothesis of convergence in deterministic seasonality while allowing for seasonal unit roots. Our main empirical finding is that there is no evidence for convergence in seasonality.     

Modeling Distribution Services and Assessing Their Welfare Effects in a General Equilibrium Framework

Most international trade models fail to account for the fact that almost all goods must pass through the distribution sector. The authors compare different approaches to modeling distribution within an Applied General Equilibrium framework and find that such modeling may significantly affect trade opening simulations. They also predict large potential gains from streamlining distribution. For instance, a 10% reduction in Japan's final goods distribution margins would benefit it as much as worldwide free trade would. They also find that, compared to trade opening, reducing margins leads to smaller inter‐sectoral production shifts and thus may engender less political opposition.     

Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

This article examines the effect of the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) on stockholder lawsuits. We explorethe role of restatements, earnings forecasts, and insider tradingin the filing and resolution of lawsuits for a sample of hightechnology firms. Consistent with our predictions, there isa post-PSLRA shift away from litigation based on forward-lookingearnings disclosures. Conversely, there is a significantly greatercorrelation between litigation and both earnings restatementsand abnormal insider selling after the PSLRA. Finally, we finda post-PSLRA increase in the likelihood of settlement for casesinvolving earnings restatements.     

Financial crisis in Southeast Asia: dispelling illusion the Minskyan way

This paper extends Minsky's financial instability hypothesisto the case of the open, ‘liberalised’, economy,making it possible to put forward a specifically Minskyan accountof the road to the financial crisis in Southeast Asia (1997/1998).The analysis suggests that the threats to growth and employmentemanating from the financial sector which Minsky identifiedin the closed economy setting are much intensified in open,liberalised, developing economies. Financial liberalisationis an important key factor in this process. Rival explanationsof the crisis are examined and rejected in favour of the extendedMinskyan explanation. The policy implications are derived anddiscussed.     

Ombudsman schemes in the United Kingdom's financial sector: The insurance ombudsman,the banking ombudsman,and the building societies ombudsman

The problems facing consumers in pursuing complaints against suppliers through the courts are well known and have given rise to the development of alternative strategies. This paper considers the development and use of one such strategy — the ombudsman — in dealing with the complaints of consumers against insurers, banks and building societies. The decisions to create these schemes can be seen against a background of the radical changes in the financial markets during the 1980s. However, the practice of the different ombudsmen is also influenced by the history, rules, practices and commercial contexts of their respective industries. It is argued, for instance, that the ombudsmen have developed standards of fairness which enable them to step outside established law and practice. However, the extent to which each is willing to do this may depend on the history and legal context of the relationships which a particular sector has had with its customers.

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Ombudsmann-Regelungen im Finanzsektor Grobritanniens: Die Ombudspersonen für Versicherungen, für Banken und für Wohnbaugenossenschaften

Zusammenfassung Die Schwierigkeiten, die Konsumenten haben, wenn sie Beschwerden gegen Anbieter auf gerichtlichem Wege klären lassen wollen, sind gut bekannt und waren Anla\ für die Entwicklung alternativer Strategien. Der Beitrag behandelt eine dieser Alternativen — den Ombudsmann — bei der Behandlung von Verbraucherbeschwerden gegenüber Versicherern, Banken und Wohnbaugenossen-schaften. Die Entscheidungen, die zur Schaffung dieser Regelung geführt haben, sind vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der starken Veränderungen auf den Finanzmärkten in den 80er Jahren zu sehen. Dabei wird das praktische Vorgehen der Ombudspersonen von der Entstehungsgeschichte, von Gewohnheiten und Praktiken und vom wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang ihrer jeweiligen Branche beeinflu\t. So haben die Ombudspersonen zum Beispiel Richtlinien für Fairne\ entwickelt, die ihnen auch Möglichkeiten au\erhalb der etablierten Bereiche des Rechts und der Praxis eröffnen. Allerdings hängt die Bereitschaft des einzelnen Ombudsmannes, solche Möglichkeiten zu ergreifen, von der Geschichte und dem rechtlichen Kontext der Beziehungen ab, die seine Branche mit ihren Kunden gehabt hat.

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The authors would like to thank VW-Stiftung which funded the project, of which an earlier version of this study formed a part: Southern Extension of the EC, Financial Services and Consumer Protection; as well as Magda D'Ingeo and Katrina Wilson, both of Brunel University.     

Building the dream team: don't make it a nightmare

This article covers the often overlooked area of team management concepts through a discussion of what many companies have done to implement these new concepts successfully. It describes the basics of how to and also explains why people resist the process of implementation. The main topics are (1) team formation, (2) pitfalls to avoid, and (3) team measurement.     

Persuasion and economic efficiency. The cost-benefit analysis of banning abortion

A simple cost-benefit approach to the abortion debate is unlikely to be persuasive if efficiency arguments conflict with widely held concepts of justice or rely on improbable notions of consent. Illustrative of the limitations of economic analyses are the models proposed by Meeks and Posner to make a case against abortion on demand. Meeks posits a tradeoff between the consumer surplus women gain from access to abortion and the expected loss of earnings that would have accrued to the aborted conceptuses. From here, Meeks derives the critical price elasticity that equates welfare gains and losses and argues that a ban on abortion represents a Kaldor-Hicks improvement in welfare if the price elasticity of demand falls above the critical level. Basic to his model are several questionable assumptions: an independence of ability to pay for an abortion and income, all women who select abortion have the same linear demand for the procedure, an abortion ban would eliminate the practice of abortion, economic efficiency generally requires slavery, and the morally relevant population includes the unborn. Posner, on the other hand, argues that an abortion ban would be efficient if the average surplus lost by a woman who chooses not to break the law is less than half the average value of the fetus saved. He assumes that it takes 1.83 abortions avoided to increase the population by 1 individual and favors reducing the current abortion rate by 30% rather than banning the procedure. Although Posner's model does not require specification of any particular value for the fetus, it neglects the increased health risk for pregnant women of illegal abortion. Moreover, Posner assumes that all women obey the law if it is in their economic interest to do so. Detrimental to both models is an assumption that sound normative judgments can be made on the basis of average values for observable data and the goal of maximizing wealth is logically prior to the specification of individual rights. It is concluded that economic arguments can be persuasive on the abortion issue only if there is agreement that cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate basis for decision making.