Partnership dissolution with interdependent values

We study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed. In contrast with the case of private values (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987), in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal, there exists a wide class of situations in which full efficiency cannot be reached. In these cases, (i) the subsidy required to restore the first best is minimal when the entire ownership is allocated initially to one of the parties, and (ii) ruling out external subsidies, the second‐best welfare is maximized when one of the parties initially has full ownership.     

Why NAMA Liberalisation is Good for Developing Countries

This paper reviews the criticisms that have been made of the view that trade liberalisation benefits developing countries. In particular, it focuses on mainstream NGOs’ criticisms of the NAMA negotiations. The paper firmly concludes that the belief that trade liberalisation hampers development opportunities is mistaken. Developing countries have a strong interest in a successful outcome to the NAMA negotiations and the Doha Round as a whole.     

U-shaped relationship between vertical integration and competition: Theory and evidence

This paper considers how competition can affect aggregate innovative activity through its effects on firms' decision whether or not to vertically integrate. A moderate increase in competition enhances innovation incentives and too much competition discourages innovative effort. These effects generate an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation and between competition and the incentive to vertically integrate. Preliminary evidence finds that there is a nonlinear relationship between competition and the propensity of firms to vertically integrate. These results seem to be more consistent with the Property Right Theory of vertical integration than with the Transaction Cost Economics approach.     

Advertising and R&D: theory and evidence from France

Advertising and innovation are two engines for firms to escape competition and improve profits. We propose a model that encompasses both the static and dynamic interactions between R&D, advertising and competitive environment. It provides three main predictions. First, for a given competitive environment, quality leaders spend more in advertising in order to extract maximal rents; thus, lower costs of ads may favor R&D. Second, the inverted-U relation between competition and R&D still holds with the introduction of advertising. Third, more competition is associated with on average more advertising expenditures. Empirical evidence from a large panel of 59,000 French firms over 1990–2004 supports these three properties.     

Income growth in the 21st century: Forecasts with an overlapping generations model

We forecast income growth over the period 2000–2050 in the US, Canada, and France. To ground the forecasts on relationships that are as robust as possible to changes in the environment, we use a quantitative theoretical approach which involves calibrating and simulating a general equilibrium model. Compared to existing studies, we allow for life uncertainty and migrations, use generational accounting studies to link taxes and public expenditures to demographic changes, and take into account the interaction between education and work experience. Forecasts show that growth will be weaker over the period 2010–2040. The gap between the US and the two other countries is increasing over time. France will catch-up and overtake Canada in 2020. Investigating alternative policy scenarios, we show that increasing the effective retirement age to 63 would be most profitable for France, reducing the gap between it and the US by one third. A decrease in social security benefits would slightly stimulate growth but would have no real impact on the gap between the countries.     

Luenberger and Malmquist Productivity Indices: Theoretical Comparisons and Empirical Illustration

This contribution establishes, from a theoretical viewpoint, the relations between the Malmquist productivity indices, that measure in either input or output orientations, and the Luenberger productivity indices, that can simultaneously contract inputs and expand outputs, but that can also measure in either input or output orientations. The main result is that a Malmquist productivity index overestimates productivity changes, since it provides productivity measures that are nearly twice those given by the Luenberger productivity index looking for simultaneous contractions of inputs and expansions of outputs. This relationship is empirically illustrated using data from 20 OECD countries over the 1974–97 period.     

Optimal Regulation of Private Production Contracts with Environmental Externalities

We address the problem of optimal regulation of an industry where the production of a polluting output is contracted with independent agents. The provision of inputs is divided between the principal and the agent such that the production externality results from their joint actions. The main result shows that in the three-tier hierarchy (regulator-firm-agent) involving a double-sided moral hazard, the equivalence across regulatory schemes generally obtains. The only task for the regulator is to determine the optimal total fiscal revenue in each state of nature because any sharing of the regulatory burden between the firm and the agent generates the same solution. The equivalence principle is upset only when the effects of regulation on the endogenous organizational choices are explicitly taken into account.JEL Classification: D82, H23, Q50We thank Bob Chambers, Emma Hutchinson, David Martimort and Katleen Segerson as well as the participants of the 2nd World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Monterey, 2002; the 2nd Annual Workshop on the Economics of Contracts in Agriculture, Annapolis, 2002; and the 1st CIRANO-IDEI-LEERNA conference on Regulation, Liability and the Management of Major Industrial Environmental Risks in Toulouse, 2003 for their comments on previous versions of the paper. Support from the French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development is gratefully acknowledged.     

A Study of Consumer Behavior Using Laboratory Data

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which subjects had to buy real products in 5 different budget/price situations. Subjects were randomly drawn from the population of a medium-sized French city, and some of their socio-economic characteristics were recorded. We check the consistency of product choices with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP), and find that 29% of the subjects are GARP-inconsistent. This inconsistency rate is slightly lower than the ones found in comparable studies. A possible explanation for our lower rate of GARP violations might be that the subjects in our study were confronted with less budget/price situations. In looking for determinants of the GARP violations, we find that gender, the size of the household, the degree of switching between different products, and the times spent on performing experimental tasks have significant impacts on the probability of GARP-inconsistency.     

Restructuring outcomes and the evolution of ownership patterns in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper begins from the proposition that ‘deep restructuring’ requires both finance and managerial expertise. It addresses the question of how this second stage of enterprise restructuring will come about in the majority of state-owned or former state-owned firms that are not owned by foreigners. In particular, it seeks to identify how the initial post-privatization ownership and control structure impinges on the likelihood that deep restructuring takes place. Conclusions for the design of privatization policy are drawn. The initial post-privatization ownership structures in the Visegrad countries and Russia are surveyed along with evidence of the transfer of ownership from insiders to outsiders.     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.