Sidgwick and Edgeworth on indeterminacy in the labour market

Commentators have underlined Sidgwick's influence on Edgeworth's thinking and more particularly on New and Old Methods of Ethics (1877). But have failed to notice that Sidgwick remained a major reference in Mathematical Psychics (1881). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show that, in this book, Edgeworth wanted to refine upon the problem of wages addressed by Sidgwick in 1879. The thesis of the paper is that Sidgwick and Edgeworth's disagreement as to the role of open competition in the resolution of indeterminacy in the labour market stems from two different notions of competition. This latter can be seen as a differentiation process, as in Sidgwick's, or as a replication mechanism, as in Edgeworth's.     

Economic sociology: a historical perspective

In this paper we briefly recall what is meant by economic sociology, basing our definition principally on the works of R. Swedberg and M. Cranovetter. We then focus on the questions and problematics which are more particularly relevant to the history of economic and sociological thought in such a way as to make explicit the kind of past in relation to which economic sociology is most pertinent. We shall thus be induced to correct certain explanations and to propose a slightly different perspective on the origin of economic sociology. This historical work enables us to formulate a definition of economic sociology based on two key concepts - economic institution and economic action - and allows us to articulate what economic sociology actually is, rather than merely describing what it is not. Finally, we show that these propositions are not without interest in relation to the present-day economic sociology that tends to go by the name - made fasionable by Granovetter and Swedberg - of ‘New Economic Sociology.’     

Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation

Summary This paper analyzes how learning behaviors can substantially modify the outcome of competition in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. We consider the case of a symmetric duopoly game where firms have imperfect information about market demand and learn through observing the volume of their sales. The main body of the paper consists in showing how market experimentation can explain the existence ofprice-dispersion in an oligopolistic industry. We study this phenomenon and its dynamic evolution in the context of an Hotelling duopoly model; we then extend the analysis to general demand functions and toN-firm oligopolies. We discuss some implications of the public good aspect of information about market demand. We then conclude with a few comments on what happens when the value of information in the oligopolistic industry is negative.We are very grateful to Patrick Bolton for his helpful advice. We also wish to thank Richard Caves, Anthony Creane, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Andreu Mas-Colell, Eric Maskin, Jean-Charles Rochet, Margaret Slade, John Sutton, Jean Tirole, Mike Whinston and an anonymous referee.     

Mixed bundling auctions

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.     

Gender and Promotions: Evidence from Academic Economists in France*

The promotion system for French academic economists provides an interesting environment to examine the promotion gap between men and women. Promotions occur through national competitions for which we have information both on candidates and on those eligible to be candidates. Thus, we can examine the two stages of the process: application and success. Women are less likely to seek promotion, and this accounts for up to 76 percent of the promotion gap. Being a woman also reduces the probability of promotion conditional on applying, although the gender difference is not statistically significant. Our results highlight the importance of the decision to apply.     

Playing the synthesizer with Canadian data: Adding polls to a structural forecasting model

Election forecasting has become a fixture of election campaigns in a number of democracies. Structural modeling, the major approach to forecasting election results, relies on ‘fundamental’ economic and political variables to predict the incumbent’s vote share usually a few months in advance. Some political scientists contend that adding vote intention polls to these models—i.e., synthesizing ‘fundamental’ variables and polling information—can lead to important accuracy gains. In this paper, we look at the efficiency of different model specifications in predicting the Canadian federal elections from 1953 to 2015. We find that vote intention polls only allow modest accuracy gains late in the campaign. With this backdrop in mind, we then use different model specifications to make ex ante forecasts of the 2019 federal election. Our findings have a number of important implications for the forecasting discipline in Canada as they address the benefits of combining polls and ‘fundamental’ variables to predict election results; the efficiency of varying lag structures; and the issue of translating votes into seats.     

A New Strategy Against Hostile Takeovers: A Model of Defense in Participations

This article examines the efficacy of a ‘defense in participations’ policy consisting of competitors acquiring cross‐equity participations within the same industry to prevent hostile takeovers. This defense in participations strategy provides disincentive for raiders as partial ownerships increase market power of competitors and then reinforce the ‘outsider effect’. Also, we find conditions for a general result, which state that takeovers are less profitable in an industry with participations rather than in an industry without any capital links. We provide information to regulators about the positive social impact of cross participations in the context of mergers and expose an economic dilemma between a ‘laissez‐faire’ and an interventionist approach. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business services,the new engine of French regional growth

This article analyses the evolution of employment in the French regions, putting the accent on business service firms. A ‘shift and share’ type of analysis shows that a primary decentralisation in tertiary activities seems to emerge in the 1990s, essentially pertaining to ancillary producer services. An explanatory analysis backs up the general validity of the regional economic base theory: the basic activities, to which business services can quite legitimately be attached, certainly play a leading long-term role on global employment dynamics. Finally it shows that over the past 20 years, the regional offer of services to businesses has been the major discriminating variable between regions, greatly influencing the evolution of basic employment and thus confirming the vital driving force of this sector in regional dynamics.     

Time-consistent linear taxation and redistribution in an overlapping-generations framework

We study time-consistent labour and capital income linear taxationusing an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of asmall open economy. Individuals have different productivitiesand the government intervenes for purely redistributive purposes.The study of time-consistent taxation requires the introductionof borrowing restrictions in the economy. We characterize thetime-consistent solution and consider alternative solutionsbased on a simple tax rule. We demonstrate the existence andthe uniqueness of the time-consistent solution using a log-linearutility function. We provide numerical comparisons between time-consistentand time-inconsistent linear taxation: the importance of beingable to make commitment decreases when the differences betweenindividuals increase.