A game-theoretic analysis of the Waterloo campaign and some comments on the analytic narrative project

The paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it provides what appears to be the first game-theoretic modeling of Napoléon’s last campaign, which ended dramatically on June 18, 1815, at Waterloo. It is specifically concerned with the decision Napoléon made on June 17, 1815, to detach part of his army and send it against the Prussians, whom he had defeated, though not destroyed, on June 16 at Ligny. Military strategists and historians agree that this decision was crucial but disagree about whether it was rational. Hypothesizing a zero-sum game between Napoléon and Blücher, and computing its solution, we show that dividing his army could have been a cautious strategy on Napoléon’s part, a conclusion which runs counter to the charges of misjudgment commonly heard since Clausewitz. On the other hand, the paper addresses some methodological issues relative to “analytic narratives”. Some political scientists and economists who are both formally and historically minded have proposed to explain historical events in terms of properly mathematical game-theoretic models. We liken the present study to this “analytic narrative” methodology, which we defend against some of objections that it has aroused. Generalizing beyond the Waterloo case, we argue that military campaigns provide an especially good opportunity for testing this new methodology.     

Construction of a state space for interrelated securities with an application to temporary equilibrium theory

Summary We construct an endogenous state space in an exchange economy with possibly infinite horizon. Every period agents trade securities whose payoffs depend on future dividends and asset prices. We reject the perfect foresight assumption on the ground that agents have not only limited knowledge of other individuals' endowments and preferences, but also limited capacity to compute equilibria. We choose instead absence of arbitrage as the principle which allows agents to determine if a system of future prices is possible. We give an alogrithm to compute the set of nonarbitrage prices every period, with both finite and infinite horizon. We then apply this endogenous structure of uncertainty to an infinite horizon temporary equilibrium model.I would like to thank Professor Donald Brown for his constant help and guidance. I have also greatly benefited from helpful discussions with Professors Jacques Drèze, Bernard Dumas, Mordecai Kurz, Carsten Nielsen, Jan Werner, and Ho-Mou Wu.     

A robust house price index using sparse and frugal data

In this article, we describe a house price index algorithm which requires only sparse and frugal data, namely house location, date of sale and sale price, as input data. We aim to show that our algorithm is as effective for predicting price changes as more complex models which require detailed or extensive data. Although various methods are employed for determining house price indexes, such as hedonic regression, mix-adjusted median or repeat sales, there is no consensus on how to determine the robustness of an index, and hence no agreement on which method is the best to use. We formalise an objective criterion for what a house price index should achieve, namely consistency between time periods. Using this criterion, we investigate whether it is possible to achieve strong robustness using frugal data covering only 66 months of transactions on the Irish property market. We develop a simple multi-stage algorithm and show that it is more robust than the complex hedonic regression model currently employed by the Irish Central Statistics Office.     

Exploring the Curvature of the Relationship Between HRM–CSR and Corporate Financial Performance

Journal of Business Ethics - This article contributes to the general literature on the relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance, as well as to the...     

The Capital Structure of Swiss Companies: an Empirical Analysis Using Dynamic Panel Data

In this paper, we analyse the determinants of the capital structure for a panel of 104 Swiss companies listed in the Swiss stock exchange. Dynamic tests are performed for the period 1991–2000. It is found that the size of companies and the importance of tangible assets are positively related to leverage, while growth and profitability are negatively associated with leverage. The sign of these relations suggest that both the pecking order and trade‐off theories are at work in explaining the capital structure of Swiss companies, although more evidence exists to validate the latter theory. Our analysis also shows that Swiss firms adjust toward a target debt ratio, but the adjustment process is much slower than in most other countries. It is argued that reasons for this can be found in the institutional context.     

Speculation,interest arbitrage,and the forward foreign exchange rate of the Canadian dollar: Updated evidence

This note presents updated estimates of the reduced forms of the “Modern Theory of the Forward Foreign Exchange Rate” and of the “Interest Parity Theory” for Canada for the period 1962–1977. The evidence does not support the Modern Theory's hypothesis of a significant effect of speculation on the forward rate, and supports the hypothesis of effective interest arbitrage only for the most recent period 1976–1977.     

Fiscal Consolidation and the Public Sector Balance Sheet in South Africa

Between 1994 and 2008 the South African government reduced its debt/GDP ratio from almost 50% to 27%. Unfortunately this reduction was accompanied by a significant decrease in government's fixed capital/GDP ratio from 90% to 55% – fiscal sustainability might have been restored, but government's balance sheet did not improve. A similar story can be told for State Owned Enterprises. Since the Great Recession the fiscal situation worsened markedly – the public debt ratio again approaches 50%. To restore fiscal sustainability this article suggests that the government faces two options: (1) to create room for future countercyclical policy, the government must cut current expenditure and reduce the public debt/GDP ratio to its pre‐crisis level, or (2) substitute much‐needed infrastructure capital expenditure for current expenditure while stabilising the debt/GDP ratio at its post‐crisis level. Given that the much lower fixed capital/GDP ratio inhibits economic growth, the latter option might be more sensible.     

The Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro: A Matter of Size?

This paper analyzes how country size affects exchange rate policy and volatility. A hump shaped relation between exchange rate variability and the size of countries is generated in the theoretical model: exchange rate variability increases with country size for small countries but then decreases for large countries. The paper finds that this theoretical prediction holds well for bilateral exchange rates of the OECD countries in the period between 1980 and 1995 as well as for a subsample of European exchange rates with respect to the dollar. The results suggest that the dollar/euro volability may be lower than the present dollar/DM volatility.J. Japan. Int. Econ., Dec. 1998,12(4), pp. 455–482. CERAS-ENPC, Graduate Institute of International Studies, and CEPR, 28 rue des Saints Pères, Paris 75007, France.Copyright 1998 Academic Press.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers F33, F41, F42.     

A sequential approach to regional integration: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe

This paper develops a theory of optimal sequencing of regional integration and applies it to the specific question of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the EU. We show that the timing of transition and integration has implications for the long-term trade structure of Europe. In this model the interest to integrate the CEECs comes from harmonization of policies to attract industries. Without integration, European countries will try to inefficiently protect their industries. Because of the transfers implied by the CAP and the Structural Policies, the EU delays enlargement until the CEECs have sufficiently converged. CEECs might at this point prefer to stay outside the EU and attract industries by offering them more generous protection than the EU. Such timing may be inefficient ex ante for all countries because it may prevent full European integration in the long run, inducing firms to relocate outside of the EU and governments in the EU and the CEECs to inefficiently protect industry. During the transition, all countries benefit from regional integration among the CEECs.