Spatial concentration and plant-level productivity in France

This paper analyzes empirically the effect of spatial agglomeration of activities on plant-level productivity, using French firm and plant-level data from 1996 to 2004. We exploit short-run variations of variables by making use of GMM estimation. This allows us to control for endogeneity biases that the estimation of agglomeration economies typically encounters. This means that our paper focuses on a subset of agglomeration economies, the short-run ones. Our results show that French plants benefit from localization economies, but we find very little - if any - evidence of urbanization economies. We also show that those localization benefits are relatively well internalized by firms in their location choice: we find very little difference between the geography that would maximize productivity gains in the short-run and the geography actually observed.     

Equilibrium asset pricing and the cross section of expected returns

Annals of Finance - In a mean-variance framework with a representative agent, any linear model for the cross section of expected returns can be supported as an equilibrium as long as the market...     

WTO Disciplines on Domestic Support and Market Access in Agri‐Food Supply Chains

Multilateral negotiations on agriculture in the WTO are making very little progress as developed economies are reluctant to bind trade‐distorting domestic support and import tariffs at levels acceptable to developing countries. This paper presents the basic Bagwell–Staiger framework as it relates to agricultural trade negotiations. In its basic version, market access commitments are sufficient to achieve efficient trade agreements. We show that vertical linkages between agricultural goods and processed food commodities may prevent countries to reach an efficient trade agreement. We argue that the features of agricultural supply chains hinder the argument that total discretion over domestic policies is appropriate. Les négociations multilatérales de l'OMC sur l'agriculture progressent très lentement étant donné que les pays développés hésitent à maintenir un soutien interne qui fausse les échanges et des barrières tarifaires à des niveaux acceptables pour les pays en développement. Le présent article traite du modèle Bagwell–Staiger dans le contexte des négociations sur le commerce des produits agricoles. Dans sa version de base, les engagements quant à l'accès au marché sont suffisants pour permettre des échanges commerciaux efficaces. Nous montrons que les liens verticaux entre les produits agricoles et les produits alimentaires transformés peuvent empêcher les pays d'atteindre un accord commercial efficace. Nous soutenons que les caractéristiques des chaînes d'approvisionnement agricole entravent l'argument voulant que l'entière discrétion quant aux politiques intérieures soit appropriée.     

LE RENOUVELLEMENT PÉRIODIQUE DES CONTRATS DE CONCESSION: LE CAS DES SERVICES DE L'EAU

RESUME ** :  Le renouvellement régulier des contrats de concession apparaît nécessaire pour bénéficier de concurrence dans certains secteurs, comme l'eau. Nous décrivons les contrats et la règle de renouvellement optimaux dans ce contexte. Ils arbitrent entre les diminutions de coûts, en cas de changement de concessionnaire, et les incitations à investir à long terme du concessionnaire en place. La meilleure information du concessionnaire en place sur des éléments constituant une valeur commune de la concession est importante. Nous montrons que ses conséquences diffèrent fortement du cas des enchères de biens.     

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A HIGH‐RISK PRINCIPLE1

The precautionary principle ‐ recently added to the French constitution and part of the draft Constitution of the European Union ‐ aims to protect the public from the risks associated with scientific and technological advance by allowing governments to ban any activity deemed to involve risks, even if those risks are unproven. In reality, the precautionary principle itself poses enormous risks of losing the advantages of projects that are banned, of preventing the development of the means by which risk may be ameliorated and of threatening the private property rights that provide the most effective environmental safeguard.     

DEFAULT RISK INSURANCE AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS1

This paper uses the existence of secondary markets for debt instruments with default risk (e.g. corporate bonds) to define default insurance along the lines of financial economics. It examines whether, in the case of several risk-neutral measures, characteristics of default can be uniquely determined by the prices of contracts involving default-prone securities.     

SOCIAL EXPENDITURE: SOCIALIZATION OF EXPENDITURE? THE FRENCH EXPERIMENT WITH SATELLITE ACCOUNTS

This paper discusses the history of the French development of satellite accounts during the late 1960s and 1970s, noting the circumstances that led to the initiation of work in this area and describing the types of problem encountered. It then goes on to draw, on the basis of the French experiment, more general conclusions and to present a proposed accounting framework. The final section considers the concept of social expenditure, but concludes that, at least for the present, it is not possible to construct a useful global concept.     

Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies

In deregulated industries former monopolies often adopt asymmetric behaviors: these firms impede the entry of foreign competitors in their home market, especially using defensive political strategies, and, at the same time, aggressively develop international strategies in foreign markets. To account for this behavior, I develop a game theoretic model involving three players: the former monopoly, its home government, and the host government of the country into which the firm wants to enter. I show first that there are in fact different asymmetric strategies that former monopolies can use in such a setting, and that a global strategy cannot always be implemented by those firms because of cooperation issues between the two governments. I also study the conditions under which these issues can be solved and show that this can happen only when the firm develops a political strategy that integrates both defensive and offensive activities. Overall, this paper therefore argues that asymmetric strategies are not always adopted to maintain monopoly rents but are also dictated by the nature of the international relationships between the governments involved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.