Positioning of the stakeholders in the interaction project management–project marketing: A case of a coconstructed industrial project

Based on a business‐to‐business (B‐to‐B) case within the automotive industry, this study proposes logics (constructivist and determinist, respectively) of protagonists and highlights the complexity of their dynamics during the successive project's phases. The concept of milieu will emphasize the complex business in which project marketing takes place; notably, it allows better identification of relevant relationships. Our article focuses on this concept of milieu with regard to the interactions between project marketing and project management actors during project phases. In particular, this article underlines the difference and the accommodation between the dynamics of interaction and the dynamics of congruence of marketing and management logics.     

Measuring and Accounting for the Deprivation Gap of Portuguese Immigrants in Luxembourg

This paper examines the relative well‐being of Portuguese immigrants in Luxembourg by looking at indicators of material deprivation. We document material deprivation differences between immigrants and nationals—the “deprivation gap”—and measure the extent to which income differentials (and other sociodemographic differences) explain this gap using a combination of non‐parametric methods and a versatile graphical device. We find a large and significant deprivation gap against Portuguese immigrants, whatever the indicator considered. The extent to which the gap is merely a reflection of differences in income, however, depends on what deprivation items are taken into consideration. Income differences almost fully account for material deprivation differences when the latter is measured using the items included in the official EU social indicator of material deprivation. Inclusion of housing condition indicators mitigates this relationship and we then find compelling evidence that the deprivation gap is not entirely accounted for by income differentials.     

Reciprocal influences in future thinking between Europe and the USA

La prospective is generally considered to have grown after WWII in developed countries with two main centers, France and the United States of America. In France, the development of prospective does constitute an important point in contemporary history. Stemming from an idea from philosopher Gaston Berger near the end of the 1950s, a spirit arose accompanied by a practice spread in the central administration (government) and in major French corporations. The objective of this article is not to claim any French originality in thinking about the future. Instead, the following pages show how an original approach blending reflection on the future and present action took shape and the relationship that developed involving current practices on the other side of the Atlantic, mainly the USA, with the help of a few intermediaries.     

Scenario building: Uses and abuses

Scenarios hold little interest if they are not pertinent, coherent, and plausible. Although foresight requires a rigorous approach to address complex problems, the tools must also be simple enough to be easily used. Since the mid-1980s, the approach in strategic prospective workshops (a term that reminds us of the participatory nature of the French approach) has proven its effectiveness in meeting these criteria (simple, rigorous and appropriable; i.e., may be appropriated by participants). The authors try to reply to simple and important questions: What is a scenario? How to judge the quality of a scenario? Which strategies for which scenarios? These questions remind us that applications of strategic foresight tools are contingent and modular. They could also involve the stakeholders from upstream to downstream, as seen in the agro-food sector. Finally, they argue that the future still has to be built and that futurists produced too many scenarios and not enough projects.     

International portfolios, capital accumulation and foreign assets dynamics

Despite the liberalization of capital flows among OECD countries, equity home bias remains sizable. We depart from the two familiar explanations of equity home bias: transaction costs that impede international diversification, and terms of trade responses to supply shocks that provide risk sharing, so that there is little incentive to hold diversified portfolios. We show that the interaction of the following ingredients generates a realistic equity home bias: capital accumulation and international trade in stocks and bonds. In our model, domestic stocks are used to hedge fluctuations in local wage income. Terms of trade risk is hedged using bonds denominated in local goods and in foreign goods. In contrast to related models, the low level of international diversification does not depend on strongly countercyclical terms of trade. The model also reproduces the cyclical dynamics of foreign asset positions and of international capital flows.     

Demystifying Fair Trade in France: The History of an Ambiguous Project

In France, Fair Trade arrived on the scene in the late twentieth century, and since then has passed through several experimental phases before becoming an enduring “realistic” economic alternative. To understand the transformation, this article defines Fair Trade as a social construct issues and tensions of which change depending on the point of entry. By conducting a secondary analysis of several data sets from varied sources, including documentary material, interviews, and observations, the authors trace the history of Fair Trade in France, define its introduction as a system, describe its institutionalization, and contribute to a greater understanding of how its ideals have changed and become more professional over time. The analyses reveal that the term “Fair Trade” has become ambiguous, spanning divergent and conflicting ideas and projects, including opening and closing conventional market systems and alter-globalization and anti-globalization.     

Time-Varying Leverage and Basel III: A Look at Canadian Evidence

Why did the conventional leverage indicators not pick up any meaningful signal of the mounting systemic risk before the subprime crisis? They remained almost unchanged in recent decades, whereas the banking landscape underwent a tremendous metamorphosis. Market-oriented banking is characterized by a new type of systemic risk, a risk which essentially evolves off the radar screen, i.e., off-balance sheet (OBS) (Calmès and Théoret Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (7): 1719–1728, 2010, 2011). In this article, we argue that the standard leverage indicators are not fitted to capture this kind of new banking risk. We introduce a new empirical framework which enables us to exploit the cyclical properties of elasticity leverage measures, while at the same time controlling for the noisy information they usually deliver. In a nutshell, thanks to the Kalman filter, we are able to compute optimal levels of bank leverage. This methodology delivers cyclical, forward-looking measures signalling systemic risk bubbles years before their burst. By properly accounting for all activities, including market-oriented banking, these time-varying leverage measures tend to systemically capture regulatory capital arbitrage and the OBS risk it entails.     

Application of Coherent Risk Measures to Capital Requirements in Insurance

Risk measurements go hand in hand with setting of capital minima by companies as well as by regulators. We review the properties of coherent risk measures and examine their implications for capital requirement in insurance. We also comment on the specific risk-based capital computations.     

A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection

This paper examines the role of coalition formation in the empirically observed negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit. We study an economy composed of four groups of agents (capitalists, unemployed people, low- and high-skilled workers), each one represented by a politician. Politicians first form political parties and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by simultaneously proposing policy bundles composed of an employment protection level and an unemployment benefit. We first show that, in the absence of parties (i.e., in a citizen-candidate model), low-skilled workers are decisive and support a maximum employment protection level together with some unemployment benefit. We then obtain that, under some conditions, allowing for party formation results in all policy equilibria belonging to the Pareto set of the coalition formed by high-skilled workers together with unemployed people. Policies in this Pareto set exhibit a negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit.