Asymmetric ACD models: Introducing price information in ACD models

This paper proposes an asymmetric autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model, which extends the ACD model of Engle and Russell (1998). The asymmetry consists of letting the duration process depend on the state of the price process. If the price has increased, the parameters of the ACD model can differ from what they are if the price has decreased. The model is applied to the bid-ask quotes of two stocks traded on the NYSE and the evidence in favour of asymmetry is strong. Information effects (Easley and O'Hara 1992) are also empirically relevant. As the model is a transition model for the price process, it delivers `market forecasts' of where prices are heading. A trading strategy based on the model is implemented using tick-by-tick data.While remaining responsible for any error in this paper, the authors would like to thank R. Anderson, G. Le Fol, C. Gouriéroux, J. Jasiak, W. Pohlmeier, A. Roell, O. Scaillet, S. Wei and three anonymous referees for useful remarks and suggestions on previous versions. The authors would also like to thank A. Ruttiens from KBC-CBC for useful discussions on practical issues related to trading. Support of the European Commission Human Capital and Mobility Program through the network `Econometric inference using simulation methods' is gratefully acknowledged. This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors.     

Applied Welfare Economics with Bounded Rationality: Public Policies Toward Remote Sensing

Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments.     

The effect of fertility on labour force participation: The Spanish evidence

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of fertility on the decision of labour force participation of married females in Spain, allowing for the existence of unobserved characteristics that affect both fertility and participation. We use a pooling of five waves of the European Household Panel for Spain (1994–1998). Results indicate that not taking into account the unobserved characteristics that affect both variables imposes on average a strong downward bias on the true effect of fertility on participation. This bias is especially strong for highly educated females. We are grateful to Raquel Carrasco and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Financial support from Gobierno Vasco (PI-1999-160)), Ministry of Education and Science (BE2000-1394), Instituto de la Mujer and Universidad del País Vasco (UPV 00035.321-13511/2001) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001     

The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002     

The proper panel econometric specification of the gravity equation: A three-way model with bilateral interaction effects

We argue that the proper specification of a panel gravity model should include main (exporter, importer, and time) as well as time invariant exporter-by-importer (bilateral) interaction effects. In a panel of 11 APEC countries, the latter are highly significant and account for the largest part of variation. First version received: February 2001/Final version received: June 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  We are grateful to two anonymous referees and Robert Kunst for their helpful comments.     

Class length and student performance: An extended study

Many accounting educators believe that the student learning of accounting is better facilitated over a longer period of time, rather than a shorter period of time. This study examined the results of student performance in two introductory accounting courses, comparing student performance results of four-week summer classes with the results of traditional 16-week courses. In this research, the same professor taught the spring and summer ACC 201 courses, and two other professors taught both the spring and summer ACC 211 courses. Also held constant were the lecture material, course assignment, and test content. The results of the study indicate that in general, students taking introductory accounting over four weeks fare about as well as students who take introductory accounting over a traditional 16-week period. These results have potential importance beyond accounting education and provide support to universities offering more block courses to better serve individual student needs.     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

The impact of product diversification strategy on the corporate performance of large Spanish firms

We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable, as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance, which performance is not significantly different between them.     

Selecting Social Goals: J. M. Keynes and the Emergence of Ontological Rationality in Economics

In this paper we discuss the fundamental inconsistency that results from employing the two traditional concepts of rationality as the basis of selecting social goals. We then consider the possibility that the selection of social goals must be based on explicitly ethical criteria. To do so a third concept of rationality namely, ontological rationality, should be adopted. Moreover, we argue that J. M. Keynes in A Tract Monetary Reform based his public policy recommendations on a modified version of ontological rationality, thereby introducing ontological rationality into economics as the basis for selecting social goals.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 2004. The authors are grateful to session participants for their helpful suggestions, though the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper.