Power,luck and the right index

Summary We have pointed out the theoretical drawbacks of the traditional indices for measuring a priori voting power inasmuch as they are implied in considering the coalition value a private good. This criticism caused us to view the coalition outcome as a public good. From this aspect and additional considerations with respect to power, luck, and decisiveness, we obtained a story describing the characteristics of an adequate measure of a priori voting power. These characteristics were found to be fulfilled by an index presented by Holler (1978). Through the above analysis this index has received its theoretical justification. An independent view of this index was then provided by means of an axiomatic characterization. This characterization makes possible abstract comparison of the index with previously established private good indices.While we have restricted our attention to simple games, the index presented can be generalized to provide a value on games in characteristic function form. We leave this topic for future conideration.     

The Demand for New Motor Vehicles

—– Using Australian Consumer Sentiment Measures to Explain and Predict Consumer Behaviour     

A system of demand equations for Austria

This paper presents results of parameter estimations of a small system of demand equations for Austria. The functional form of the equations follows the log-linear specification well known as the “Rotterdam”-System. Using annual data from 1954 to 1977 we estimate the absolute price version for a rather aggregated system consisting of four sectors of consumption expenditures. Aitken estimation with and without linear restrictions is the adopted estimation method. Tests for the validity of the general linear restrictions axe performed employing the usual criteria. Relations among the test statistics are discussed. Taking into accountBeaton's [1972] argument of the appropriate use of likelihood ratio tests we present results also after iterating on the restricted error-covariance matrix. The question of negative semidefiniteness of the matrix of price coefficients is examined by inspection of its characteristic roots and the calculation of their approximated asymptotic covariance matrix. Finally, our results are confronted with such of other comparable studies.     

Measuring returns to scale and technological change in co-operative banks: A provincial analysis of Canadian credit unions and caisses populaires

In Canada economies of scale in credit unions come not only from large single office arrangements but from external economies realized from belonging to central provincial credit unions. Making use of aggregate provincial time series and cross-sectional data, this study begins by employing a sequential Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) test to select the most appropriate model. This procedure permits the isolation of economies of scale from technological change effects. For all provinces, economies of scale are discovered to be significantly different from 1, and for five of the eight provinces examined, technological change was statistically significant from zero. The larger the provincial organization, as illustrated by the Quebec caisses populaires, the higher we find estimates of returns to scale and technological change. An implication may be that both expansion and more centralization should be encouraged and that other provinces may be able to increase efficiency by imitating some of Quebec's operational and administrative practices.     

Dynamic demand and noncompetitive pricing strategies

This paper studies optimal noncompetitive pricing strategies when the evolution of demand is the result of intertemporal considerations. Two different hypotheses of price expectations (myopia and perfect foresight) are treated. The major implication is that the slight modification from an instantaneous to a very fast consumer reaction may completely modify a monopolist's price strategy. More precisely, the price strategy should be volatile if the equilibrium demand is convex, independent whether the consumers act myopically or employ rational expectations. On the other hand, asynchronous dynamics (e.g., due to competitive fringe supply or different segments of demand) cannot explain even damped price oscillations. The equilibrium price strategy of the noncompetitive supplier exceeds the static rule if consumers employ myopic expectations; rational expectations may lead to prices above or below the static rule depending on the rate of discount.I am grateful for the helpful and elaborate comments from three anonymous referees.     

Multiplier effects in economies with missing risk markets

The paper analyses the impact of pecuniary externalities in a two-sector economy with an incomplete market structure. Agents in each sector choose their proportion of risky investment. Sector specific risks are assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated. It is shown that the economy is more volatile if risk markets do not exist. With a complete set of risk markets, shocks in one sector will be dampened on the aggregate level. In contrast, when risk markets are absent, pecuniary externalities arising from higher risky investment in one sector can create feedback effects in the other sector. When agents are sufficiently risk averse (their coefficient of relative risk aversion being greater than one), an individually optimal response to the increased riskiness of the price distribution will result in an even riskier price distribution: an increase in risky activity in one sector will lead to an increase in risky activity in the other sector, and this gives multiplier effects.Part of this work has been done while I was visiting assistant professor at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.I am grateful to Hans-Werner Sinn for helpful comments. The suggestions of the two referees have contributed to improve the paper considerably.