Simultaneous estimation after selection and ranking and other procedures: The negative exponential case

We considerk (≥2) independent negative exponential populations with unknown location parameters and unknown but equal scale parameter. We incorporate the existing purely sequential and three-stage sampling procedures for selecting the “best” population and study the asymptotic second-order characteristics of the proposed fixed-size simultaneous confidence regions for the location parameters constructed after selection and ranking. Some direct estimation procedures have also been discussed.     

The transactions trust demand for money

An exchange economy using gold as a means of payment is considered where it is possible to borrow gold in a money market. A positive money rate of interest is encountered as the shadow price of the capacity constraint in an economy without enough gold. The meaning of enough gold and the role of the default penalty are noted in the determination of the interest rate.Revised from Enough Gold in a Society Without and With Moneylenders, CFDP No. 753. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Aequus Institute.     

Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections

Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework for estimating price‐cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a ‘joint market imperfections parameter’. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978–2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC‐EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right‐to‐manage bargaining in the labor market (IC‐PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC‐MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within‐regime firm differences in the estimated average price‐cost mark‐up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC‐EB), we also relate our industry and firm‐level estimates of price‐cost mark‐up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm‐specific variables respectively. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do High-technology Exports Cause More Technology Spillover in China？

The volume of China’s high-technology exports has grown sharply since the implementation of its export promotion strategy "Revitalizing Trade through Science and Technology" in 1999.This paper investigates whether technology spillover effects are greater for hightechnology exports than for primary manufactured goods exports.We present a generalized multi-sector spillover model to identify both between spillover effects from exports towards non-exporters and within-spillover effects among export sectors.Using panel data for 31 provinces in China over the period from 1998 to 2005,we find that although high-technology export sectors have higher productivity compared with other sectors,this productivity advantage does not lead to technology spillover to both domestic sectors and other export sectors,and export technology spillover mainly derives from traditional export sectors rather than high-technology export sectors.As such findings can be largely attributed to the fact that China’s high-technology exports depend significantly on processing trade by foreign- invested firms,policy implications are discussed in relation to how to best promote the role of China’s high-technology exports during economic expansion.     

适中论

当代的主调是和平与发展；在这个当代，本文尝试从人文、社科、科技三个方面共十个命题，论述一个观点，“为了适，必须中”：（１）人文思考——哲理，历史；（２）社科评价——政治运动，宣传导向，经济体制，收获递减律；（３）科技分析——数学的极值，系统工程的优化技术，材料物理的能量学与动力学分析，功能（性能、才能）过剩     

Foreign aid and fiscal behavior in a bounded rationality model: Different policy regimes

We examine how the source of foreign aid affects the composition of the recipient government's spending. Does the source of aid – bilateral or multilateral – influence recipient policy-makers' choice between development and nondevelopment expenditure? We depart from previous literature by introducing strong asymmetries in policy-makers' preferences. With the financial constraints set by foreign aid and domestic revenues, this formalization allows us to model and estimate the fiscal behavior of government policy-makers in the presence of foreign aid.     

Reliability Differentiation of Electricity Transmission

In many jurisdictions, electric utility restructuring has included the creation of an independent system operator (ISO) to dispatch generation, establish the market-clearing price, and allocate limited transmission capacity among users. This paper differentiates reliability through rate unbundling. We propose a capacity reservation tariff (CRT) to induce the users to self-select their preferred levels of reliability. Based on these self-selected reliability levels, the ISO can efficiently allocate limited transmission capacity. Our proposed CRT can be a practical solution to the transmission congestion problem faced by the California ISO in the implementation of retail access.     

对中国经济的现状,特点及前景的几点思考

中国经济的现状和发展前景，是国人普遍关心的大问题。本文从辩证法和实证的观点出发，对几项宏观经济指标及其反映的问题，对经济发展的特点、机遇及挑战，对发展前景，进行了分析和研究，提出了几点政策性建议。诸如，大力发展中小企业、三资企业，使之成为国民经济新的增长点，强化宏观经济政策的落实力度，等等     

Good governance and good aid allocation

We model the aid allocation process as a rent-seeking contest between two countries and investigate the effects of differing allocation rules on recipients' behavior in a simple framework. We investigate the aid allocation mechanism design that attempts to increase the governance quality of potential recipient countries: the potential recipients spend costly resources improving governance, while the donor country allocates the fund based on their governance quality. The paper compares two mechanisms: one uses a simple winner-takes-all tournament to award the entire available purse to the country with the best governance; while under the other aid is distributed among countries in proportion to their governance qualities. The paper shows the second mechanism outperforms the first only if competing countries are sufficiently asymmetric. Moreover, the recipient who is most effective in governance – and stands to benefit the most from development assistance – has interests opposite to those of the donor. In addition, the paper shows that if the donor country allocates the fund based on both governance and the levels of poverty, it may result in a poverty trap: the leaders of potential recipient countries deliberately allocate funds away from the poorest so as not to better their position in order to receive more aid.