Inheritance and inequality when wealth enters the utility function

The distribution of wealth and its dynamic development are analyzed within a non-overlapping generations model. All individuals have identical preferences and abilities. Wealth is represented by land, which is available in fixed aggregate supply. Utility depends on a perishable consumption good and—due to a bequest and/or a prestige motive—in addition on land owned. Two configurations can occur as long run equilbrium: equality and two class dichotomy. All Two Class Equilibria are unstable. The Equality Equilibrium is unstable if and only if land is sufficiently productive. In the case of instability there is a process towards maximal concentration of wealth.For helpful discussions I am indebted to G. Clemenz, S. Krasa, and M. Winkler.     

Overcoming the socialist aftereffects in East Europe

East Europe has inherited from the collapsed socialist systems a web of interlocking practices such as allocation mentality, bribery, dependism, and leveraged bonus, which will take many years to untangle before a free market system can effectively operate. Simplistic solutions will backfire. Reorganization must proceed with contextual knowledge of the interlocking patterns. A causal loop analysis is presented.     

The serial correlation structure for a random process with steps

Summary We derive the detailed correlation structure for the simple “staircase model”: a process where white noise is superimposed on a deterministic step function that has equal rises and equal treads. It turns out that this structure is an immediate generalisation of that for a linear trend (which, for discrete data, can be alternatively considered as a step function with equal rises and unit treads). We compare the structure obtained with that for a random walk, and those for a subset of other ARIMA(p, 1,q) models, and those of general ARIMA(p, d, q) processes withd>1.     

Utility and economics

Summary Although utility has been the central concept in economics, economists have paid relatively little attention to its measurement. Generally, utility is measured indirectly via the revealed preference approach. We discuss problems with this approach and next introduce alternative direct measurement methods. The direct measurement methods are seen to spawn a so-called theory of preference formation, which explains differences in utility functions of different individuals. The similarities of this theory with related theories in sociology and psychology, and various sorts of empirical evidence, are reviewed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for economic theories.This is a slightly adapted version of my inaugural address at Tilburg University. I thank Tom Wansbeek for his helpful comments.     

Agency in a market setting

This paper examines a market in which a continuum of principals and agents interact in a game. Principals offer contracts while agents decide on sets of acceptable contracts. A mechanism from a class satisfying efficiency, unbiasedness, and continuity properties then matches principals and agents. With risk neutral agents, when the contribution of principals and agents to the total gains from trade in a pairing are additively separable, the equilibria of the game coincide with the competitive equilibria for the market. In particular, all contracts used in Nash equilibrium induce first-best effort levels. Both principals and agents have exogenous opportunities outside this market. In equilibrium, agents have endogenously determined outside opportunities available from employment by another principal, and this may be the binding participation constraint in a principal-agent pairing. The results are extended to special non-separable cases and to the case of identical risk averse agents.We are grateful to seminar participants at Indiana University, the University of Kentucky, and Vanderbilt University for comments on earlier versions of this work. Referees' comments led us to generalize the model and to more clearly specify the point of the paper.