Maximin growth paths with recursive preferences: A complete characterization

This paper examines the growth paths that maximize the utility of the worst off generation for an economy where preferences are stationary and can be represented by a recursive utility function. The analysis focuses on the case where second period utility is an inferior good. It is shown that in such a case the maximin growth paths are time inconsistent. A possible solution to the time inconsistency problem is examined.     

A panel data analysis of productive efficiency in freestanding health clinics

By using a panel data on a number of freestanding health clinics in New York State over 1984–1987, we have estimated the production function for ambulatory care after controlling for unmeasured clinic-specific managerial efficiency. We found significant differences in management efficiency, which peaks around 50500 visits per year. The optimal staffing ratio between doctors, extenders and nurses was found to be around 1∶1/3∶1, in order for a clinic to be on the efficiency frontier.     

Profit-sharing in a unionized cournot duopoly

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze when it is optimal for firms in a unionized duopoly to introduce profit-sharing. It is shown that a firm only prefers a profit-sharing system if its own union does not have “too much” bargaining power, and if the union in the other firm does not have “too much” bargaining power. However, if a firm introduces profit-sharing, the employment increases, and the price in the goods market decreases. Hence, even if it is not in the own interest of a firm to introduce profit-sharing, it may be in the interest of the society.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

Inheritance and inequality when wealth enters the utility function

The distribution of wealth and its dynamic development are analyzed within a non-overlapping generations model. All individuals have identical preferences and abilities. Wealth is represented by land, which is available in fixed aggregate supply. Utility depends on a perishable consumption good and—due to a bequest and/or a prestige motive—in addition on land owned. Two configurations can occur as long run equilbrium: equality and two class dichotomy. All Two Class Equilibria are unstable. The Equality Equilibrium is unstable if and only if land is sufficiently productive. In the case of instability there is a process towards maximal concentration of wealth.For helpful discussions I am indebted to G. Clemenz, S. Krasa, and M. Winkler.     

On the existence of optimal processes in non-stationary environments

We consider an aggregative model of intertemporal allocation under uncertainty, in which the utility and production functions are allowed to be time dependent, the random shocks occurring in each period are entirely arbitrary, and the production functions are permitted to be non-concave. In this framework, we provide a theorem on the existence of infinite-horizon optimal processes. In the course of establishing this result, we obtain the existence of optimal policy functions and we show that they are monotone in the stock levels.This paper has benefitted from the comments of two referees of the journal. Research of the first author was supported by a National Science Foundation Grant.     

Von Thünen's model of the dual economy

We are indebted to Heinz König, John Mellor, and Hans van Beek, and to three anonymous referees of the journal for helpful comments, and to Victoria Dalko for her able research assistance. Financial assistance from the Foerder Institute for Economic Research and the International Food Policy Research Institute is gratefully acknowledged. A version of the paper also appears as Working Paper No. 989 of the Foerder Institute and Discussion Paper No. A 269 of the University of Bonn.     

Overcoming the socialist aftereffects in East Europe

East Europe has inherited from the collapsed socialist systems a web of interlocking practices such as allocation mentality, bribery, dependism, and leveraged bonus, which will take many years to untangle before a free market system can effectively operate. Simplistic solutions will backfire. Reorganization must proceed with contextual knowledge of the interlocking patterns. A causal loop analysis is presented.     

从双边博弈到多边合作——中日俄石油管线争端的案例研究

作者试图运用博弈论分析工具剖析中日俄石油管线争端案例,借此建立一个国家间能源交易合作机制的分析框架。国家间能源博弈要实现合作解,分别可以依托双边机制、多边机制和第三方机制。中俄有关东北亚石油管线的建设项目长期陷入僵局的根源在于两国的双边博弈缺乏稳定解,这不但与日本介入这一外部因素有关,也与中俄之间的经贸关系以及国际市场油价的波动等因素密不可分,从而使重复博弈和质押等双边机制的作用受到限制。在当前国际社会缺乏强制性第三方机制的条件下,为了更好地保障中俄国家间的能源合作,在完善双边机制作用的同时,当务之急是要参与建设和完善各类多边机制。