Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: TOWARD A FOCUSED APPROACH

Regulation of financial markets arose in a simpler time when transactions were carried out face to face on an exchange floor or in a banker's office—when trading was localized and the variety of financial instruments was small. Today the task of regulators is much more difficult. Markets are global, trading takes place in cyberspace, and the variety of financial instruments is limitless.
The initial focus, and still the central concern, of our regulatory system is to ensure full corporate disclosure and transparency of trading markets. But regulation today goes far beyond disclosure requirements. The existing tendency to expand regulation to match the expanding financial markets is likely to be inefficient, unwieldy, and too costly, given the increased complexity and global nature of financial markets. A new approach and a new regulatory mindset are needed—one in which regulators aim to identify and provide only necessary regulation rather than simply continuing to expand regulatory oversight. Such a focused approach to regulation would separate what is regulated from what is not. Those aspects of banking that are essential to the integrity of the payments system would be regulated while other aspects would not. Some securities and derivatives markets would be regulated, while others would not. And market participants would be able to choose which markets to participate in. Given an ever-expanding financial system, such a focused approach to regulation is not only the most cost effective one—it is also likely to prove the only workable alternative to a system that is now under great pressure.     

The Importance of Social Capital to the Management of Multinational Enterprises: Relational Networks Among Asian and Western Firms

Social capital is an important concept for multinational firms. Firms operating in global markets rarely have adequate resources to compete effectively in global markets; they access the needed resources through formal and informal relationships with other firms. The cultures in Asian countries have emphasized relationships much more strongly than Western firms. Thus, relational capital, based on guanxi (China), kankei (Japan) and inmak (Korea), provides the framework for business dealings in many Asian countries. As a result, the social capital of many Asian firms gives them a potential competitive advantage in global markets. Western firms must develop social capital and learn to manage relational networks to gain and sustain a competitive advantage in global markets. Western firms can learn how to develop and manage social capital from Asian firms. Alternatively, social capital has some disadvantages. Firms are limited by their networks and thus experience opportunity costs and path dependence. Additionally, while Asian firms often have strong network ties in their domestic markets, they have to develop many more ties globally to operate effectively in global markets. As a result, the development and management of social capital has become of critical importance for competitive advantage in global markets.     

The pricing of U.S. IPOs by seasoned foreign firms

We examine the pricing of U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) by foreign firms that are already seasoned in their domestic countries. Presumably, these equity offers have less downside risk for investors than typical IPOs since domestic share prices can be used to help establish a preoffer value for the firm's equity. In spite of the presumed diminished downside risk, we find that offers by firms from countries that impose foreign ownership restrictions and capital controls are on average underpriced, experiencing an average first-day return in the United States of 12.7%. This result stems in part from the underwriter's failure to price the issue to fully reflect the postoffer premium that often arises for the U.S. shares. In contrast, offers by firms from countries without ownership restrictions have an average first-day return of 0.0%.     

Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.     

Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.     

High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts

Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high‐water mark provisions that condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the previously achieved maximum share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely, represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high‐water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed‐form solution to the cost of the high‐water mark contract under certain conditions. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.     

Valuation of SGARAs IN THE Wine Industry: Time for Sober Reflection

The application of AASB 1037 Self Generating and Regenerating Assets provides little guidance to the commercial performance of winemakers. The valuation of grapevines essentially requires the valuation of a segment of a business (vineyards), from which is deducted the value of associated infrastructure. Grapevines are reported at a fictional "net market value" even though they cannot be bought or sold. The combination of recognising revaluation increments as distributable profits through the valuation of grapevines at "net market value", and the subsequent "amortisation" of those revaluation increments over the useful lives of the grapevines, creates a reporting maze which is more likely to confuse than inform.     

Valuing and Pricing Retail Leases with Renewal and Overage Options

We consider retail leases with landlord overages options, with tenant renewal options, with both and with neither. We illustrate how the ratio of initial expected sales to the sales threshold can be manipulated to equate the value of the landlord overage options to that of the tenant renewal option at the same initial rent. Not only are the values equal, but the cumulative distributions of potential IRRs on the two leases are nearly identical, suggesting that these leases are equally attractive to risk-averse investors and thus that the same risky discount rate can be used in valuing the leases. In contrast, the appropriate risky discount rate for the overage lease is calculated to be 75–160 basis points greater than that for the renewal lease.