An Experimental Investigation of Approaches to Audit Decision Making: An Evaluation Using Systems‐Mediated Mental Models*

The objective of this research is to articulate a decision‐making foundation for the systems audit approach. Under this audit approach, the auditor first gains an understanding of the auditee's economic environment, strategy, and business processes and then forms expectations about its performance and financial reporting. Proponents of this audit approach argue that decision making is enhanced because the knowledge of the system allows the auditor to focus on the most important risks. However, there has not been an explicit framework to explain how systems knowledge can enhance decision making. To provide such a framework, we combine mental model theory with general systems theory to produce a hypothesis we refer to as a systems‐mediated mental model hypothesis. We test this hypothesis using experimental economics methods. We find that (1) subjects make systematic errors under the setting without an organizing framework provided by the systems information, and (2) the presence of an organizing framework results in lower reporting errors. Importantly, the organizing framework significantly enhances decision making in the settings where the environment changed. Establishing a decision‐making foundation for systems audits can provide an important building block that, in part, can contribute to the development of a more effective and efficient audit technology ‐ an important objective now when audits are facing a credibility crisis.     

Efficiency in the Forward Foreign Exchange Market: Weekly Tests of the Australian/US Dollar Exchange Rate January 1984-March 1987*

This paper examines the relationship which exists between the spot and forward Australian/US Dollar exchange rates for one-, three-and six-month contracts using weekly data over the period January 1984—March 1987. The paper splits the forward premium into a component due to risk and one which is due to a forecasting error, and this analysis is suggestive of a time-varying risk premium.     

Goodwill — An Example of Puzzle-Solving in Accounting

The nature of goodwill continues to be misunderstood by most accountants and confusion surrounding the measurement and reporting of goodwill persists. The rejection of official accounting standards on goodwill is a common occurrence. A dynamic open system perspective is used in this paper to re-examine the nature of goodwill. It is found that a meaningful economic interpretation can be developed for internally generated goodwill but not for 'purchased goodwill'. There is an inability to identify the stream of benefits specifically associated with goodwill arising on acquisition.     

The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting Estimates

This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by‐product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a “disclosure trap,” in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time.