A credibility theory for automobile bonus systems

Summary

This paper deals with the problem of designing experience rating systems of the bonus type, commonly used in automobile insurance. On the basis of a simple model the mean squared deviation between a policy's expected claim amount and its premium in the nth insurance period as n→∞, is taken as a measure of the efficiency of a bonus system. It is shown that to any set of bonus rules (which determines the bonus class transitions of the policies), there is an optimal premium scale, which coincides with the one proposed by Pesonen in 1963. Thus the problem of choosing an efficient bonus system reduces to choosing efficient bonus rules. Examples are given of comparison between different bonus rules. In one example the present Norwegian bonus system is compared to alternative systems. Comments are made on earlier papers on bonus systems. The credibility theoretic foundation is laid in a separate section.     

Transparency of medicines data and safety issues–a European/US study of doctors’ opinions: what does the evidence show?

Over the past 10 years, European pharmaceutical regulators (especially the European Medicines Agency [EMA]) have enacted a wave of transparency policies. Since 2010, the overwhelming majority have focused on releasing more scientific medicines information online and providing open access to regulatory data. Amongst other benefits, EMA expects its policies to build public trust and provide outsiders with a better understanding of regulatory decision-making. Yet, few studies have empirically examined the EMA’s transparency policies, especially on the end users of ‘transparent’ information (e.g. medical doctors or patients). This paper presents standout findings from a November 2014 survey conducted in Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom with a sample of 1005 general practitioners and medical specialists treating either multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoporosis, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis or HIV/AIDS. The study found that 76% of respondents think it is a bad idea to release information into the public domain before possible safety issues have been investigated by the regulators and (relevant) pharmaceutical company. The results also suggested that medical doctors in Europe have a poor understanding of pharmaceutical regulatory activities. In particular, the majority were largely unaware of the current activities of the EMA, did not have good knowledge of how the regulators assess the safety of medicines (e.g. only 17% said they had good knowledge of how EMA assess the safety of medicines) and were unfamiliar with regulatory documents frequently used by regulators and industry to discuss the safety of medicines (e.g. in approving a medicine).     

HAZARDS IN IMPLEMENTING A MONETARY CONDITIONS INDEX

Some recent studies have suggested constructing a Monetary Conditions Index (or MCI) to serve as an indicator of monetary policy stance. The central banks of Canada, Sweden and Norway all construct an MCI and (to varying degrees) use it in conducting monetary policy. Empirically, an MCI is calculated as the weighted sum of changes in a short-term interest rate and the exchange rate relative to values in a baseline year. The weights aim to reflect these variables’ effects on longer-term focuses of policy — economic activity and inflation. This paper derives analytical and empirical properties of MCIs in an attempt to ascertain their usefulness in monetary policy. An MCI assumes an underlying model relating economic activity and inflation to the variables in the MCI. Several issues arise for that model, including its empirical constancy, cointegration, exogeneity, dynamics and potential omitted variables. Because of its structure, the model is unlikely to be constant or to have strongly exogenous variables, yet constancy and exogeneity are critical for the usefulness of an MCI. Empirical analyses of Canadian, Swedish and Norwegian MCIs confirm such difficulties. Thus, the value of an MCI for conduct of economic policy is in doubt.