Production risk in multi-output industries: estimates from Norwegian dairy farms

Farmers who produce multiple outputs are portfolio managers in the sense that they use inputs to balance expected economic return and variance of return. This article estimates the structure of the stochastic multioutput production technology in Norwegian dairy farming, allowing for a more flexible specification of the technology than previous studies. We find that an increase in input levels leads primarily to higher output variability, and that inputs also influence the covariance of shocks between outputs. Risk reducing effects of inputs on outputs are primarily present in the covariance functions. Technical change leads to shifts in the profit distribution over the data period, but no welfare improvement for risk averse farmers.     

Die CES-Funktion

Ohne ZusammenfassungMit 7 TextabbildungenWertvolle Anregungen verdankt der Verfasser der Vorlesung, die Professor W. Leontief am Institut für Höhere Studien und wissenschaftliche Forschung in Wien über das Thema Die Theorie der Produktion gehalten hat, sowie seinem verehrten Lehrer Professor S. Sagoroff, dem Direktor dieses Institutes. Dr. G. Derflinger vom Rechenzentrum des Statistischen Institutes der Unversität Wien, der die Elastizitäten der Tab. 5 berechnete, schuldet der Verfasser gleichfalls großen Dank.     

Medicines transparency at the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in the new information age: the perspectives of patients

The concept of transparency has gained widespread appeal in the European pharmaceutical domain, not least at the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Agency policies have two main objectives: (1) to enable the reuse of data (e.g. clinical study reports) and (2) to empower patients to directly and indirectly make more informed decisions on medicines. Past research has almost exclusively focused on the perspectives of external researchers intending to reanalyse data made publically available. Few studies, however, have explored what can be learnt from the perspectives of other actors (e.g. health care professionals, patients, the regulators themselves, industry and others). This empirical study explores the EMA’s transparency policies from the perspectives of patients. After presenting the results of a survey (N = 1010) with a sample of individuals diagnosed with five specific medical conditions (HIV/AIDS, multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoporosis and idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis) from four EU countries (Germany, Spain, France and the UK), the authors argue that EMA’s transparency policies do not adequately address the real-world complexities of communicating with patients. In turn, the paper concludes that the perspective of patients provides an essential contribution to understanding the full net effects (positive, negative and/or limited) of EMA’s transparency policies.     

Equilibrium Unemployment Dynamics in a Panel of OECD Countries

We focus on the equilibrium unemployment rate as a parameter implied by a dynamic aggregate model of wage and price setting. The equilibrium unemployment rate depends on institutional labour market institutions through mark‐up coefficients. Compared with existing studies, the resulting final equation for unemployment has a richer dynamic structure. The empirical investigation is conducted in a panel data framework and uses OECD data up to 2012. We propose to extend the standard estimation method with time dummies to control and capture the effects of common and national shocks by using impulse indicator saturation (WG‐IIS), which has not been previously used on panel data. WG‐IIS robustifies the estimators of the regression coefficients in the dynamic model, and it affects the estimated equilibrium unemployment rates. We find that wage co‐ordination stands out as the most important institutional variable in our data set, but there is also evidence pointing to the tax wedge and the degree of compensation in the unemployment insurance system as drivers of equilibrium unemployment.     

Transparency of medicines data and safety issues–a European/US study of doctors’ opinions: what does the evidence show?

Over the past 10 years, European pharmaceutical regulators (especially the European Medicines Agency [EMA]) have enacted a wave of transparency policies. Since 2010, the overwhelming majority have focused on releasing more scientific medicines information online and providing open access to regulatory data. Amongst other benefits, EMA expects its policies to build public trust and provide outsiders with a better understanding of regulatory decision-making. Yet, few studies have empirically examined the EMA’s transparency policies, especially on the end users of ‘transparent’ information (e.g. medical doctors or patients). This paper presents standout findings from a November 2014 survey conducted in Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom with a sample of 1005 general practitioners and medical specialists treating either multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoporosis, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis or HIV/AIDS. The study found that 76% of respondents think it is a bad idea to release information into the public domain before possible safety issues have been investigated by the regulators and (relevant) pharmaceutical company. The results also suggested that medical doctors in Europe have a poor understanding of pharmaceutical regulatory activities. In particular, the majority were largely unaware of the current activities of the EMA, did not have good knowledge of how the regulators assess the safety of medicines (e.g. only 17% said they had good knowledge of how EMA assess the safety of medicines) and were unfamiliar with regulatory documents frequently used by regulators and industry to discuss the safety of medicines (e.g. in approving a medicine).     

On Bonus and Bonus Prognoses in Life Insurance

The surplus on a life insurance policy is defined, at any time during the term of the contract, as the difference between the second order retrospective reserve and the first order prospective reserve. General principles for redistribution of the systematic part of the surplus as bonus are formulated, and various special bonus schemes are discussed. Techniques for forecasting future bonuses are worked out in an extended model with stochastic experience basis. Numerical illustrations are provided.