Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

The Global Competition for Wild Fish Resources between Livestock and Aquaculture

Aquaculture satisfies a growing global demand for fish but also consumes an increasing share of the world’s wild fish resources. This has led to a concern that increased aquaculture production poses a threat to the sustainability of capture fisheries. We use a shrinkage estimator to estimate fishmeal demand from countries with different make‐up of meat and farmed salmon production. Although we are not able to identify structural differences between these sectors, the empirical results show that fishmeal demand is price inelastic. Technological change, however, is reducing fishmeal usage in feeds, suggesting that strong demand pressure on pelagic fish resources targeted for fishmeal is a temporary phenomenon.     

The first five years of the EU Impact Assessment system: a risk economics perspective on gaps between rationale and practice

In 2003, the European Commission (EC) started using Impact Assessment (IA) as the main empirical basis for its major policy proposals. The aim was to systematically assess ex ante the economic, social and environmental impacts of European Union (EU) policy proposals. In parallel, research proliferated in search for theoretical grounds for IAs and in an attempt to evaluate empirically the performance of the first sets of IAs produced by the EC. This paper combines conceptual and evaluative studies carried out in the first five years of EU IAs. It concludes that the great discrepancy between rationale and practice calls for a different theoretical focus and a higher emphasis on evaluating empirically crucial risk economics aspects of IAs, such as the value of statistical life, price of carbon, the integration of macroeconomic modelling and scenario analysis.     

A possible way forward for evidence-based and risk-informed policy-making in Europe: a personal view

European regulatory policy, especially in the chemicals and environmental sectors, is not as predictable, evidence-based, risk-informed, or clear as it could be. There are a number of reasons for this, all somewhat related to the new more adversarial model of regulation. This includes the involvement of influential environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and member states (such as Denmark and Sweden) that are highly active in environmental and chemical control. In addition, we see the rise of the campaigning journalist or newspaper that often bases their articles on emotions rather than scientific facts – the UK Daily Mail newspaper is a typical example. Finally, a number of academics, think tanks, and stakeholders tend to amplify their research findings if there is a nice ‘news hook’ (such as this chemical may cause cancer, or this pharmaceutical is unsafe) without presenting their research findings within a wider context. In this article, I first briefly outline the history of environmental policy-making in Europe then discuss the rise of the new model of adversarial regulation. Secondly, I provide evidence of some of the unintended consequences of the new model, and give a couple of case study examples. In the concluding part of the essay, I offer possible solutions that could aid in helping to make chemical and environmental control policy in Europe more evidence-based and risk-informed.     

Sur le calcul numérique des moments ordinaires et des moments composés d'une distribution statistique

Abstract

Considérons une distribution statistique (empirique ou théorique) x _v (v = 1, 2 ... n) désignant les valeurs que peut assumer une variable fortuite une-dimensionelle x, et P_v (v= 1,2 ... n) désignant les fréquences observées (absolues ou relatives) ou bien les probabilités des valeurs x_v .     

Interactions between Agriculture and Industry: Theoretical Analysis of the Consequences of Discriminating Agriculture in Sub–Saharan Africa

Many countries in sub–Saharan Africa discriminated against agriculture to promote industry after independence. The domestic terms of trade were turned against agriculture by the price fixing of monopoly marketing boards. This policy was assumed to reduce labor costs of industry and was combined with overvaluation of the currency, protectionism, and priority rationing of imported inputs to industry. The region got the worst of both worlds—stagnation in both agriculture and industry. What went wrong? In a dual model designed to represent characteristics of the region, discrimination of agriculture is shown to contract industry through trade linkages. Export–oriented agriculture has been held back, and import–dependent industries have suffered because of the foreign exchange constraint. In a dynamic extension assuming learning–by–doing in industry and catching–up in agriculture, it is shown that discrimination against agriculture may reduce the growth rate of the economy and the technological advantage of industry.