Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders

Target firms often face bidders that are not equally well informed,which reduces competition, because bidders with less informationfear the winner’s curse more. We analyze how targets shouldbe sold in this situation. We show that a sequential procedurecan extract the highest possible transaction price. The targetfirst offers an exclusive deal to a better-informed bidder,without considering a less well-informed bidder. If rejected,the target offers either an exclusive deal to the less well-informedbidder, or a modified first-price auction. Deal protection devicescan be used to enhance a target’s commitment to the procedure.(JEL G34, K22, D44)     

Subprime mortgage design

This paper offers evidence on the design of subprime mortgages as bridge-financing products. We show that the viability of subprime mortgages was uniquely predicated on the appreciation of house prices over short horizons. High rates of early prepayments on subprime mortgages suggest the use of prepayments as an exit option. This paper argues that high early defaults on post-2004 originations can be explained when one considers high early prepayment rates for pre-2004 originations.     

Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives

This article studies one of the potential causes of the financialmarket bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutualfunds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds'advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendencyto herd. We argue that investing in bubble stocks amounts toherding and contracts with high incentives induce managers todiverge from the herd, thus reducing their holding of bubblestocks. The differential exposure to bubble stocks significantlyimpacted the funds' performance both in the period prior toMarch 2000, as well as afterwards.     

Hybrid strategic groups

The notion of strategic groups has recently emerged as a critical perspective for uncovering firms' strategic postures/recipes and competitive market structures. Firms within strategic groups generally adopt similar strategic recipes and compete more intensely than firms across strategic groups. Building on recent research, the authors develop the concept of hybrid strategic groups, which blend the strategic recipes of more than one group, in contrast to existing conceptualizations of strategic groups, where either firms tightly follow the recipes of a strategic group (i.e., core firms) or firms loosely follow the recipes of a strategic group (i.e., secondary firms). Thus, competition among firms depends not only on the strategic group but also on the overlap of that strategic group with other strategic groups. The authors devise a combinatorial optimization-based classification procedure utilizing a bilinear model that accommodates multiple variable batteries that can estimate hybrid strategic groups. The proposed methodology is illustrated by using archival data on public banks. For this illustration, the hybrid strategic group solution outperforms ordinary cluster analyses and offers critical insights into the nature of competition among firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.